State v. Lewis

Decision Date18 February 1960
Docket NumberNo. 35213,35213
Citation349 P.2d 438,55 Wn.2d 665
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Plaintiff, v. William LEWIS, Defendant and Relator, Superior Court of State of Washington for King County, Henry Clay Agnew, Judge, Respondent.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Alan L. Froelich, Seattle, for relator.

Charles O. Carroll, Pros. Atty., Anthony Savage, Jr., Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Judge.

By this application for a writ of certiorari in forma pauperis, the relator seeks review of the trial court's refusal to furnish a statement of facts at public expense, in accordance with the procedure set forth in Woods v. Rhay, Wash., 338 P.2d 332.

The relator, after a jury trial, was found guilty of illegal possession of narcotics. At the trial he was represented by counsel of his choice. Thereafter, the same attorney was appointed by the trial court to represent the relator for the purpose of seeking an appellate review of his conviction and to obtain the statement of facts at public expense.

The relator in his motion for a statement of facts 1 set forth the following:

'* * * An instruction given by the Court, which was not objected to by the prosecution, stated as follows: 'It is not sufficient that the proved circumstances merely be consistent with the theory of guilt; they must be irreconcilable with innocence in order to justify conviction.'

'It is the position of affiant and defendant on an appeal that the proven circumstances in this case are not irreconcilable with innocence. On appeal the Court will be asked to reconcile the law of the case as is set forth in this instruction with the peculiar circumstances related by the arresting officers of the Seattle Police Force.

'These peculiar circumstances included (although are not limited to) the fact that the apprehension of Defendant was December 18, 1958. Defendant was not arrested and the narcotics were not discovered in his possession. After detention by the police officers for an hour or two, Defendant was released and the police officers knew, having searched Defendant and discovered a plane ticket in his pocket, that he was leaving Seattle for Jacksonville, Florida. Defendant, a day or two later, did actually leave for Jacksonville, Florida, where he was arrested by telegraphic warrant from Seattle in January. One of the Seattle Police Department officers who apprehended Defendant in December, flew to Florida, took Defendant into custody and flew back to Seattle. Defendant was charged, by information filed March 11, 1959, with the unlawful possession of narcotics on December 18, 1958.

'It is the belie[f]ve of affiant and Defendant that these facts should be subjected to an appellant review in light of the law of the case that the circumstance must be irreconcilable with any theory of innocence.'

The trial court denied the relator's motion for a statement of facts at public expense by a formal order based upon a memorandum opinion. All parties desire and are willing that this court consider the memorandum opinion as a finding of fact for the purpose of this review. The pertinent part of the trial court's memorandum opinion or 'finding' is as follows:

'There is no doubt of the defendant being indigent and entitled to a statement of facts at the expense of the county if such is necessary and if the defendant has any honestly debatable assignment of error. I find the present application to be frivolous. It undertakes to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict without in any way showing any insufficiency or specifying the same with any particularity.

'The instruction mentioned was in its wording very favorable to the defendant and reads as follows: * * *

"Where circumstantial evidence alone is depended on to prove guilt, the proved circumstances must be consistent with each other and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

'It is not sufficient that the proved circumstances merely be consistent with the theory of guilt; they must be irreconcilable with innocence in order to justify a conviction.'

'Two police officers testified. One of them testified that at the time of defendant's arrest he threw away a small package which fell under a stairway, and that he, having to hold the defendant, asked his partner to look for the package and get it. This his partner did and it turned out to be narcotics. The officer who picked up the package testified to the same set of circumstances. They both testified that the defendant for a short time denied that the narcotics were his or that he threw any package. He later freely admitted that he had done so and offered to cooperate in obtaining a buy from the man who had sold him the narcotics.

Defendant was released for this purpose agreeing to meet the officers at a certain time and place. Instead of doing so, the defendant took a change of venue to Florida. The defendant put in no testimony and the jury seemed to take the undisputed testimony of the officers as true, very promptly finding the defendant guilty.'

The relator's counsel in his argument before this court (reproduced by tape recorder on which all oral arguments are taped), when asked whether or not Judge Agnew's memorandum opinion was correct, answered as follows:

'I do not deny that police officers testified to that chain of circumstances. As I represented the defendant at the trial court, I know that he testified to that. Judge Agnew's recollection is correct.'

And when asked whether the appeal was frivolous, answered:

'Perhaps I can answer that in this fashion. I will agree for this purpose--I will assume that the appeal is frivolous. Assuming that there is no merit to the assignment of error; assume that the trial court was correct when he stated that this was a frivolous appeal--that he had a right to deny a statement of facts which a nonindigent could get and bring this matter up here for this court to pass upon; assuming without agreeing, I do not believe that I can handle this matter by coming to this court and agreeing that the appeal is frivolous. I would be derelict in my duty to do so. I think perhaps the court can resolve the issue, howerver, by answering the question in that manner. Assuming that this appeal is frivolous, I cannot stand here and admit [it].'

The issue presented is whether the cases of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, and Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269, require that a statement of facts must be furnished at public expense to an indigent defendant where reasonable minds cannot differ that the appeal, for which the statement of facts is requested, is frivolous.

The error alleged to have occurred and upon which the relator relies for his appeal, is conceded to be frivolous and is in fact devoid of any merit.

The question whether circumstantial evidence tending to connect the accused with the crime charged excludes, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt, is a question for the jury, and not for the court, when the evidence, although circumstantial, is legally sufficient to take the case to the jury. State v. Gillingham, 33 Wash.2d 847, 207 P.2d...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • State v. White
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 29 Agosto 1968
    ... ... State v. Gillingham,supra; State v. Long, 44 Wash.2d 255, 266 P.2d 797 (1954); State v. Lewis, 55 Wash.2d 665, 349 P.2d 438 (1960). Where there is substantial evidence to prove each element of the embezzlement, even though the evidence may be conflicting and reasonable minds might draw different conclusions ... from it, the case must go to the jury. State v. Reynolds, 51 Wash.2d 830, ... ...
  • State v. Randecker
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 19 Agosto 1971
    ... ... State v. Basford, 76 Wash.2d 522, 457 P.2d 1010 (1969); State v. Zorich, 72 Wash.2d 31, 431 P.2d 584 (1967). It other words, the trial court must concern itself only with the presence or absence of the required quantum. State v. Basford, Supra; State v. Lewis, 55 Wash.2d 665, 349 P.2d 438 (1960); State v. Donckers, 200 Wash. 45, 93 P.2d 355 (1939) ...         In determining wheher the necessary quantum exists, the trial court must assume the truth of the state's evidence and view it most strongly against the defendant and in a light most ... ...
  • State v. Douglas
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 25 Mayo 1967
    ... ... Taylor, 47 Wash.2d 213, 287 P.2d 298 (1955); State v. Charley, 48 Wash.2d 126, 291 P.2d 673 (1955); State v. Berg, 49 Wash.2d 86, 298 P.2d 519 (1956); State v. Sewell, 49 Wash.2d 244, 299 P.2d 570 (1956); State v. Siemion, 54 Wash.2d 17, 337 P.2d 715 (1959); State v. Lewis, 55 Wash.2d 665, 349 P.2d 438 (1960) (jury so instructed); State v. Walters, 56 Wash.2d 79, 351 P.2d 147 (1960); State v. James, 58 Wash.2d 383, 363 P.2d 116 (1961) (tried to court; same test applied); State v. Courville, 63 Wash.2d 498, 387 P.2d 938 (1963); ... ...
  • State v. Rutherford, 37038
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 5 Marzo 1964
    ... ... 477, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899; Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 83 S.Ct. 1366, 10 L.Ed.2d 456; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331; In re Woods v. Rhay, 54 Wash.2d 36, 338 P.2d 332; State v. Lewis, 55 Wash.2d 665, 349 P.2d 438 ...         (2) Indigence is a relative term, and must be considered and measured in each case by reference to the need or service to be met or furnished. When related to the constitutional rights surrounding the furnishing of a prepaid statement of facts ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT