State v. Lewis
Decision Date | 22 February 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 25943.,25943. |
Citation | 363 S.C. 37,609 S.E.2d 515 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | The STATE, Petitioner/Respondent, v. Gerrod LEWIS, Respondent/Petitioner. |
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson, and Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, all of Columbia; and Robert D. Robbins, of Summerville, for petitioner/respondent.
Assistant Appellate Defender Eleanor Duffy Cleary, of Columbia, for respondent/petitioner.
Respondent/petitioner (Lewis) and his co-defendant, Timothy Washington, were convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), two counts of kidnapping, grand larceny of a vehicle, and armed robbery. Lewis was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty years for CSC, thirty years for each kidnapping charge, five years for grand larceny, and thirty years for armed robbery.1 The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. State v. Lewis, 354 S.C. 222, 580 S.E.2d 149 (Ct.App.2003). Judge Anderson dissented. We now affirm in part and reverse in part.
Lewis argues the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court's decision not to suppress an in-court identification or to require an in camera hearing prior to the in-court identification.
Gill Armstrong and Jane Doe3 were driving from Virginia to their home in Florida with their seven-month-old daughter when they stopped at a motel off I-95 in St. George about 11:00 p.m. Armstrong then left to get food. Upon his return, he noticed three black males in the breezeway of the motel and assumed they were guests of the motel. He had a direct view of the men because of the fluorescent lighting in the breezeway. After taking the food into the hotel room, Armstrong then went to the vending machines to get drinks. As he began to place money in the machine, the three men walked up to him and placed a gun to the back of his head. The men then forced him into the motel room. Before entering the room, the men turned him around and Armstrong saw Washington holding the gun to his head. When they entered the room, the lights were on. Doe was just getting out of the shower and was clad only in a towel. Lewis asked where the money and jewelry was. While Lewis was digging in a duffel bag, Washington instructed Lewis to turn off the lights. Before the lights were turned off, Armstrong was able to view his assailants for a few minutes.
After the men did not find anything, Washington pointed the gun at Armstrong's daughter who was still asleep and said, "If you try anything, she's gone." The men became extremely angry when they discovered the couple had only $14. At this point, Armstrong was taken into the bathroom and was placed on his knees, bending over into the bathtub, with the gun pointed at him. At first, Lewis held Armstrong in the bathroom at gunpoint, but then the third man, Shermaine Elmore,4 switched with Lewis.
Doe testified that two of the men, allegedly Lewis and Washington, then took turns forcing her to perform oral sex on them. Washington then took Doe into the bathroom, bent her over the toilet, and raped her while forcing Armstrong to watch. Then, the men asked for Armstrong's car keys. As they left, Washington told Armstrong "Happy Father's Day."5 The men then took the couple's car and burned it.
Doe was not able to give a description of the attackers.6 However, Armstrong told the police that the men were black males and gave general descriptions of their height, facial hair, and clothing.7 A few days later, Shermaine Elmore informed the police he was the lookout during the crimes. Elmore told the police that Washington and Lewis were the two men who sexually assaulted Doe. Armstrong confirmed at trial that Elmore had no involvement in the sexual assault.
At trial, Armstrong identified Washington and Lewis as the perpetrators. In fact, Armstrong stated he was "100 percent positive" in his identification of Lewis. Further, Armstrong testified the individuals that committed the crimes were "stuck in [his] mind." Counsel objected to the in-court identification and requested an in camera hearing to determine the reliability of his identification. The trial judge denied the request, and ruled that Armstrong could identify the defendants in court, even though Armstrong had never previously identified them.8
The Court of Appeals held that, since Armstrong had never previously identified the defendants, no hearing was necessary.9 The court further held that the reliability of Armstrong's identification was a question for the jury and that Lewis' counsel extensively cross-examined Armstrong regarding the identification. In his dissent, Judge Anderson concurred in the result but found that the trial judge should have held an in camera hearing to determine the reliability of Armstrong's identification.
The Court of Appeals' decision represents the majority view that the Neil v. Biggers10 analysis should not be extended to protect criminal defendants against identifications that occur for the first time in court without a pre-trial identification. In Neil v. Biggers, the United States Supreme Court found that a court must review the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an identification is reliable. See also State v. Scipio, 283 S.C. 124, 322 S.E.2d 15 (1984). The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the accused; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375; State v. Drayton, 293 S.C. 417, 361 S.E.2d 329 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S.Ct. 1060, 98 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1988).
We conclude, as the majority of courts have, that Neil v. Biggers does not apply to in-court identifications and that the remedy for any alleged suggestiveness of an in-court identification is cross-examination and argument. The United States Supreme Court has not extended its exclusionary rule to in-court identification procedures that are suggestive because of the trial setting. See State v. Smith, 200 Conn. 465, 512 A.2d 189, 193 (1986).
The Georgia supreme court has stated, "[b]ecause pretrial identification procedures occur beyond the immediate supervision of the court, the likelihood of misidentification in such cases increases, and courts have required that pretrial identification procedures comport with certain minimum constitutional requirements in order to ensure fairness." Ralston v. State, 251 Ga. 682, 309 S.E.2d 135, 136 (1983). See also United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.1986),cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 893, 93 L.Ed.2d 845 (1987) ( ). However, as the Ralston court explained, these extra safeguards are not applicable to an in-court identification because the witness' testimony is subject to the same rules of evidence, witness credibility, and cross-examination as all testimony in a criminal trial. Ralston v. State, 309 S.E.2d at 136-137. See also United States v. Bush, 749 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir.1984),cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1771, 84 L.Ed.2d 831 (1985) ( ); People v. Brazeau, 304 A.D.2d 254, 759 N.Y.S.2d 268 (2003) ( ); State v. Smith, 200 Conn. 465, 512 A.2d 189 (1986) ( ); People v. Rodriguez, 134 Ill.App.3d 582, 89 Ill.Dec. 404, 480 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (1985)cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1089, 106 S.Ct. 1476, 89 L.Ed.2d 731 (1986) ( ).
Accordingly, we conclude Neil v. Biggers does not apply to a first-time in-court identification because the judge is present and can adequately address relevant problems; the jury is physically present to witness the identification, rather than merely hearing testimony about it; and cross-examination offers defendants an adequate safeguard or remedy against suggestive examinations. Therefore, the Court of Appeals properly concluded the trial court did not err by denying Lewis' request for an in camera hearing prior to the in-court identification by Armstrong.11 In any event, Armstrong's in-court identification was strong, detailed, and clear, and would have survived an in camera hearing.
The State argues the Court of Appeals erred by holding the trial judge improperly disallowed Lewis' attempt to strike a juror who had previously been struck for discriminatory reasons in...
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