State v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 30 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 75375,75375
• Citation: 263 Kan. 843,953 P.2d 1016
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Sheryl M. LEWIS, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1016

953 P.2d 1016

263 Kan. 843

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Sheryl M. LEWIS, Appellant.

No. 75375.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. 30, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law. An appellate court's review of a question of law is unlimited.

2. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court must give effect to the intention of the legislature rather than determine what the law should or should not be.

3. The general rule is that a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the criminal statute. However, this rule is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent.

4. Except as otherwise provided, a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime defined by the Kansas Criminal Code. The criminal intent requirement found in the Kansas Criminal Code applies to crimes created by a statute not contained within the Kansas Criminal Code unless the statute creating the crime expressly states otherwise, or the context of the statute otherwise requires.

5. A person may be guilty of an offense without having criminal intent if the crime is a misdemeanor or traffic infraction and the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.

6. The public welfare doctrine provides that the legislature may, for the protection of public interest, forbid the doing of an act and make its commission criminal without regard to the intent or knowledge of the doer. The use of the public welfare doctrine as an exception to intent in Kansas is limited by the Kansas Criminal Code to those statutory offenses which are (1) misdemeanors or traffic infractions and (2) clearly indicate a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.

7. An accused's knowledge of his or her status as a habitual violator is a required element of the crime of driving while a habitual violator under K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287. Proof of such knowledge may be by evidence of actual knowledge or by circumstantial evidence indicating a deliberate ignorance on the part of the accused. Also, such knowledge may be, but is not required to be, inferred from the fact that notification of the accused's status as a habitual violator was mailed to the accused at the accused's last known official address.

8. Deliberate ignorance exists where a person believes that it is probable that something is a fact but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth. It requires a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment; a showing of mere negligence or mistake is not sufficient. Deliberate ignorance is a form of knowledge, not a substitute for knowledge.

9. Under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.

10. The notice provisions of K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-255(d) contained within the habitual violator statutes comport with notice requirements of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

Barry Albin, Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the briefs, for appellant.

Delia M. York, Assistant District Attorney, argued the cause, and Nick A. Tomasic, District Attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, was with her on the briefs, for appellee.

DAVIS, Justice:

Sheryl M. Lewis was convicted of driving while a habitual violator under K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287, a severity level 9, nonperson felony. She denied receiving the mailed notice of her license revocation as a habitual violator. The Court of Appeals concluded that the offense does not require that a "licensee have actual knowledge of the notice declaring him or her a habitual violator." State v. Lewis, 23 Kan.App.2d 758, 768, 935 P.2d 1072 (1997). Lewis petitions this court for review of the Court of Appeals' decision. We reverse and hold that knowledge of status is an essential element of the offense of driving while a habitual violator. K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287.

On September 28, 1994, the defendant's car broke down on I-635 in Wyandotte County. A Kansas Highway Patrol trooper stopped to render assistance. During the course of rendering assistance, the trooper ran a license check and discovered that the defendant's license had been revoked as a habitual violator.

The State filed charges against the defendant for driving while a habitual violator under K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287. At the preliminary hearing, the State offered into evidence the trooper's testimony as well as a certified copy of the defendant's driving record and the order revoking her license as a habitual violator. Under K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-286, whenever the records of the Division of Vehicles disclose that a licensee meets the requirements of a habitual violator, the licensee's license is immediately revoked for a period of 3 years. Notification to the licensee that he or she has been declared a habitual violator and his or her license has been revoked is sent by regular mail to the address listed on the license. See K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-255(d).

There is no dispute that the order of revocation was sent to the defendant's address listed on her driver's license. The defendant testified that she resided at the address listed on her driver's license. She admitted that she had received multiple tickets in the past for driving without insurance and that she paid the fines. However, she denied receiving any notices from the Division of Vehicles regarding those tickets or her license until 2 months after her arrest in this case. She testified that she had no knowledge that she had been declared a habitual violator.

The district court bound the defendant over for trial, noting that the driving record reflected that the Department of Revenue had sent the defendant three suspension notices prior to her arrest. The court stated that in light of the notices, the defendant's testimony that she never got them was "a little bit difficult for the Court to ... believe frankly."

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss before trial on the grounds that the habitual violator statutes were unconstitutional. She argued that the notice requirements of the habitual violator statutes were inadequate to satisfy due process. She also argued that if K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287 does not require proof of notification, it was unconstitutional because it established an irrebuttable presumption that notice had been received. The trial court took the matter under advisement and later denied her motion.

The case was submitted to the district court on stipulated facts. The defendant stipulated that she had been driving her vehicle on September 28, 1994, and was being assisted by a state trooper when a check of driving records revealed that she had been declared a habitual violator on August 16, 1994. The defendant further stipulated that she lived at the address where the notice declaring her a habitual violator was sent. However, the defendant denied that she received the notice. Based on these facts, the court found the defendant guilty, sentenced her to 6 months in prison, and placed her on probation for 2 years.

The defendant argued in her appeal to the Court of Appeals that K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-286 and K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287, the habitual violator statutes, were unconstitutional because they failed to give adequate notice prior to a person being declared a habitual violator and because they set up an irrebuttable presumption that the notice declaring a person a habitual violator had been received. As part of the latter argument, she contended that such a presumption invades the province of the factfinder in determining whether the element of criminal intent was satisfied.

The Court of Appeals determined that sending suspension notices by first class mail was not a violation of due process because it is reasonably calculated to give notice. 23 Kan.App.2d at 765, 935 P.2d 1072. The Court of Appeals then determined that K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287 does not require that the licensee have actual notice that he or she has been declared a habitual violator in order to sustain a conviction. 23 Kan.App.2d at 768, 935 P.2d 1072. We granted the defendant's petition for review.

Discussion

The dispositive issue in this case is whether an accused's knowledge of his or her status as a habitual violator is an essential element of the offense of driving while a habitual violator under K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and held the offense to be one of strict liability: "K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287 does not require that the licensee have actual knowledge of the notice declaring him or her a habitual violator to sustain a conviction." 23 Kan.App.2d at 768, 935 P.2d 1072. We disagree and, for the reasons set forth below, hold that an accused's knowledge of his or her status as a habitual violator is an essential element of the offense of driving while a habitual violator under K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287.

Standard of Review

The resolution of the above issue involves interpretation of the Kansas habitual violator statutes, K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-286 and K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-287. The issue also involves interpretation of the provisions of the Kansas Criminal Code dealing with intent and strict liability crimes, K.S.A. 21-3201 and K.S.A. 21-3204, as well as K.S.A. 21-3102, concerning the application of the Kansas Criminal Code. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and our review is unlimited. State v....