State v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 24 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. DA 11–0388.,DA 11–0388.
• Citation: 2012 MT 157,365 Mont. 431,282 P.3d 679
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Christopher Robin LEWIS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

365 Mont. 431

282 P.3d 679

2012 MT 157

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Christopher Robin LEWIS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 11–0388.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs June 6, 2012.

Decided July 24, 2012.

For Appellant: Robin A. Meguire, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana.

For Appellee: Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Tammy A. Hinderman, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, William Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana.

Justice MICHAEL E. WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[365 Mont. 432]¶ 1 Christopher Robin Lewis (Lewis) appeals from a judgment and commitment entered by the Twenty–First Judicial District, Ravalli County, finding him ineligible for parole during his ten year prison term for aggravated assault. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In March 2010, Lewis was charged with one count of aggravated assault for the abuse of his son L.L. and one count of assault on a minor for the abuse of his other son A.L. Lewis initially pled not guilty to the charges against him. On January 18, 2011, the parties entered an “appropriate plea” agreement, pursuant to § 46–12–211(1)(b), MCA, wherein Lewis agreed to plead either guilty or no contest to the aggravated assault charge in exchange for the State's dismissal of the charge of assault on a minor. The parties further agreed that their separate recommendations for an appropriate sentence would fall within the following range:

The State: The State will recommend a twenty (20) year commitment to Montana State Prison, with ten (10) years suspended.

Defendant: The Defendant may recommend a sentence no less restrictive than a ten (10) year commitment to the Department of Corrections, with five (5) years suspended.

Nothing in the plea agreement addressed the District Court's authority to restrict Lewis' eligibility for parole, and it contained no commitment from the State regarding such a restriction. Section 3 of the plea agreement also provided that the parties were “otherwise free to recommend and argue for any other lawful term of sentence and/or conditions thereto, subject to a final decision by the court.”

¶ 3 The District Court held a change of plea hearing on January 19, 2011. During the hearing, the parties confirmed the terms of and their individual obligations under the plea agreement. The State also stated it would not be seeking a parole restriction. The court then explained to Lewis that, due to the nature of the plea agreement, Lewis could withdraw his plea if the court did not follow the plea agreement. Lewis stated he understood the consequences of the agreement and pled no contest to the charge of aggravated assault.

¶ 4 The District Court deferred sentencing until after a presentence investigation report (PSI) could be completed. The probation officer who completed the PSI recommended that the court impose a twenty-year commitment to the Department of Corrections (DOC) with fifteen years suspended. The PSI also recommended that Lewis “not be considered eligible for release into the community until he has completed in-patient chemical dependency treatment, anger management, all phases of Cognitive Principles and Restructuring and be assessed for any mental health concerns.”

¶ 5 Lewis took issue with this recommendation, and filed a written sentencing memorandum. In his memorandum, Lewis argued that the court, pursuant to State v. Burch, 2008 MT 118, 342 Mont. 499, 182 P.3d 66, had no authority to impose restrictions on his early release, and that the determination of whether to grant the privilege of early release belonged solely to the DOC. This was Lewis' only argument against imposing a parole restriction; he did not argue that the plea agreement prohibited a parole restriction, that the State agreed such a restriction would not be imposed, or that the court would be required to reject the agreement in order to impose such a restriction.

¶ 6 On March 23, 2011, the District Court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the State, in accordance with the plea agreement, recommended a sentence of twenty years at the Montana State Prison (MSP) with ten years suspended. The prosecutor also responded to Lewis' sentencing memorandum and stated that § 46–18–202(2), MCA, authorizes a district court to reasonably restrict a defendant's parole eligibility, but made no recommendation to the court regarding Lewis' parole eligibility. Instead, the prosecutor explicitly stated that he would leave the decision of whether to impose a parole restriction to the discretion of the court. Defense counsel once again argued that the court should impose a DOC sentence, and that the court was not authorized to impose any restrictions on the DOC's ability to release Lewis early under such a commitment.

¶ 7 The District Court accepted the plea agreement, and imposed a twenty-year commitment to MSP with ten years suspended, but ordered that Lewis serve the MSP commitment “without benefit of parole.” The court's conclusion was “based on the severity of what occurred and the utter helpless nature of the victim,” and it believed that Lewis “should be given the most severe sanction” within the limits of the plea agreement. Beyond this, the court did not discuss its specific reasons for imposing the parole ineligibility restriction.¹ Although a District Court is required to set forth its reasons for imposing a parole restriction pursuant to § 46–18–202(2), MCA, Lewis never objected to his sentence for this reason.

¶ 8 Lewis did, however, make one objection to his sentence. He objected on the grounds that the District Court had exceeded the bounds of the plea agreement by declaring Lewis ineligible for parole. In response, the sentencing judge stated that the plea agreement “didn't address parole eligibility,” which permitted the court “to impose parole restrictions up to and including the entire sentence.” Defense Counsel then admitted that the plea agreement was silent regarding the issue of parole ineligibility, but maintained his objection.

¶ 9 On April 19, 2011, Lewis filed a motion for specific performance of the plea agreement, or in the alternative, a motion for reconsideration of the sentencing order. In the State's response brief, it argued that the District Court was free to impose a parole restriction. Notably, in Lewis' reply brief he asserted that “[i]f the State is advocating that the Court should rule in a manner that results in retention of the parole restriction, that position could arguably constitute a breach of the plea agreement.” The District Court denied the motion on May 10, 2011. Lewis timely appealed, and raised the following issues:

¶ 10 Issue One: Whether the District Court's imposition of the parole restriction violated the plea agreement?

¶ 11 Issue Two: Whether the prosecutor breached the plea agreement?

¶ 12 Issue Three: Whether the District Court erred when it failed to specifically state its reasons for imposing a parole restriction?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 13 A plea agreement is essentially a contract and is subject to contract law standards. State v. McDowell, 2011 MT 75, ¶ 14, 360 Mont. 83, 253 P.3d 812. We review the district court's interpretation of a contract for correctness. Brothers v. Home Value Stores, Inc., 2012 MT 121, ¶ 6, 365 Mont. 196, 279 P.3d 157. Whether the State has breached a plea agreement is a question of law, which we review de novo. McDowell, ¶ 12 (citing State v. Bullplume, 2011 MT 40, ¶ 10, 359 Mont. 289, 251 P.3d 114). When a defendant is sentenced to more than one year of actual incarceration, we review the sentence for legality only. McDowell, ¶ 11 (citing Bullplume, ¶ 10).

DISCUSSION

¶ 14 Issue One: Whether the District Court's imposition of parole restriction violated the plea agreement?

¶ 15 Lewis argues that the State, through the prosecutor's representations that he would not seek a parole restriction and that he would leave that decision to the court, agreed that the plea agreement encompassed a condition that Lewis' parole eligibility would not be restricted. Therefore, Lewis argues, the District Court erred when it simultaneously accepted the parties' agreed disposition, but still imposed a no-parole eligibility restriction on Lewis' sentence without affording Lewis the opportunity to withdraw his no contest plea. The State argues that the prosecutor's verbal representations did not alter the plea agreement.

¶ 16 A plea agreement is a contract subject to contract law standards. McDowell, ¶ 14. Contract law principles mandate that “ ‘[w]here the contractual language is clear and unambiguous on its face, it is this Court's duty to enforce the contract as drafted and executed by the parties.’ ” State v. Shepard, 2010 MT 20, ¶ 14, 355 Mont. 114, 225 P.3d 1217 (citing Felska v. Goulding, 238 Mont. 224, 230, 776 P.2d 530, 534 (1989)).

¶ 17 The written plea agreement between Lewis and the State clearly demonstrates that the parties did not come to an agreement as to whether Lewis' sentence would include a restriction on his eligibility for parole. The plea agreement is silent, as defense counsel agrees, regarding parole ineligibility. Additionally, Section 3 of the plea agreement unambiguously permitted either party “to recommend and argue for any other lawful term of sentence and/or conditions thereto.” Thus, the plain language of the plea agreement demonstrates that the District Court could impose any lawful conditions on the sentence, as long as the sentence fell within the agreed upon disposition.

¶ 18 Nevertheless, Lewis argues that the prosecutor's representations either clarified the plea agreement or amended it to include a provision that Lewis would be eligible for parole. Lewis cites to Shepard, ¶¶ 11–12, for the proposition that a party's statements prior to sentencing can amend a written plea agreement. This Court in Shepard, however, did not reach that conclusion. Instead, we concluded that the State could not assert that a parole...