State v. Lichtenberg

• Decision Date: 09 July 1892
• Citation: 30 P. 659,4 Wash. 553
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE EX REL. HILL v. LICHTENBERG, JUDGE.

30 P. 659

4 Wash. 553

STATE EX REL. HILL v. LICHTENBERG, JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 9, 1892

Application by the state, on relation of George L. Hill, for a writ of mandamus to compel I. J. Lichtenberg, as judge of the superior court of King county, to proceed with the trial of a cause. Writ granted.

Solon T. Williams, for relator.

Preston, Albertson & Donworth and Julius Rochester, for respondent.

SCOTT J.

The relator brought an action before the respondent, as one of the judges of the superior court of King county, against A B. Young and Hulda A. Young, for the partition of certain real estate. The cause proceeded to a hearing before the respondent, who made certain findings of fact, and as a conclusion of law he found that the issues of fact as to the rights of the plaintiff in said lands, before a partition could be had, should be determined by a jury trial which the defendants had previously demanded. There are three superior judges in King county, and, by force of certain rules adopted by them, the business of said court is partitioned to them, respectively, according to a certain classification; the criminal business being assigned to one of them, the civil jury business to another, and the equity department of said court was presided over by the respondent to whom was assigned such business. Upon the findings and conclusions of law as aforesaid respondent made an order transferring said cause to the civil jury department of said court for the purpose of having a jury trial of the facts, and the cause was transferred accordingly, and certain issues were framed, and tried before a jury, who rendered a verdict thereon; whereupon the judge who presided over said department certified said proceedings to the equity department for final disposition. The respondent refused to proceed with said cause, claiming that, it having been transferred to the civil jury department to have the facts determined by a jury, it was pending before the judge who presided over said department, and that it was his duty to dispose of the same. It is contended by the relator that said cause was not fully transferred from the equity to the civil jury department of said court, but that there was only a partial transfer thereof, for the purpose of having certain issues of fact tried by jury. From the view we take of the cause, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the original transfer was a partial or a complete one. The action was triable in equity, and was properly before the judge presiding over the equity department of said court, and the relator had a right to have the cause fully tried and determined in that department of the court. If the judge presiding over the equity department deemed it advisable to submit certain questions of fact to a jury, he should have called one for that purpose, and not have transferred the cause to another judge, in order that such questions might be so submitted. The right of a judge to refer questions of fact in an equity cause to a jury is well established, and exists in this state. In the case of Garsed v. Beall, 92 U.S. 695, it is said: "Equity courts may decide both fact and law, but they may, if they see fit, refer doubtful questions of fact to a jury. Findings of the kind, however, are not conclusive; and, if not satisfactory, they may be set aside or overruled; but, if the findings is satisfactory to the chancellor, the practice is to regard it as the proper foundation for a decree." Citing Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 103. "Such findings are regarded as influential in an appellate court, but they are not conclusive." And see Watt v. Starke, 101 U.S. 247. The defendant disputed the plaintiff's title in said...