State v. Lichtenberg

• Decision Date: 21 June 1892
• Citation: 4 Wash. 407,30 P. 716
• Parties: STATE EX REL. MILLER ET UX. v. LICHTENBERG, JUDGE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

30 P. 716

4 Wash. 407

STATE EX REL. MILLER ET UX. v. LICHTENBERG, JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 21, 1892

Application for mandamus by state of Washington, on the relation of P. B. M. Miller and wife, against I. J. Lichtenberg, judge of the superior court of King county. Writ denied.

HOYT J.

The relators presented their complaint to the defendant herein and, on the ground that an emergency was made to appear showing that relief should be granted without notice to the other part, obtained an order requiring such adverse party to show cause on a day certain why a temporary injunction should not be granted, and that in the mean time he be restrained from doing certain acts mentioned in the order of the court. Before hearing was had upon the application for the temporary injunction, such proceedings were had in the cause that the court dismissed the same for want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter. From such judgment of dismissal relators sought to prosecute an appeal to this court. They gave notice of appeal, and asked of the court an order fixing the amount of the bond necessary to be filed on appeal to keep in force the restraining order theretofore issued. The court declined to make any order fixing the amount of such bond, and this proceeding is prosecuted by the relators in the name of the state, to compel him to fix the amount of such bond, and to make an order continuing in force the restraining order above mentioned until the determination of the appeal. Some technical objections are made on behalf of the defendant as to the sufficiency of the petition to authorize this court to grant the relief prayed for. We shall, however, consider the case only upon the merits as they appear to us from the petition. The sole question discussed by counsel in this regard is as to whether or not a temporary restraining order of the nature granted in this case is such a restraining order or injunction as by the terms of section 1409, Code Proc., ^[1] the party interested is entitled to have kept in force by the giving of a bond as provided for in said section. That the terms "injunction or restraining order," as contained in said section, are broad enough to cover restraining orders of the kind in question, is conceded. It is claimed, however, on the part of the defendant, that when the whole statute law upon the subject of granting injunctions and restraining orders is taken into consideration, together with certain language used in said section 1409, a more restricted construction of said words as contained in said section is required. It is contended on the part of the relators that, to give each of these words any force at all, they must be held, not only to cover injunctions temporary and perpetual, but also restraining orders of the kind involved herein. They say that this kind of a restraining order is the only one mentioned in the chapter upon the subject of injunctions and restraining orders, and that, if the construction contended for by the defendant is to prevail, there was no reason whatever for using both the words "injunction" and "restraining order," as the use of the word "injunction" alone would have completely covered the subject, and been all that was necessary or proper to have been used. If we are to hold that this kind of an order is the only one that can properly be designated a "restraining order," there would be much force in this position of relators. It seems to us, however, that under the language of the chapter relating to that subject there will be no great violence done to the language used to interpret the words "injunction" and "restraining order" as substantially synonymous and that the legislature, in speaking of injunctions and restraining orders, meant to use terms which would make it proper for the court to put its order in the shape of a formal injunction as known to the common law, if it saw fit to do so, and that if it did not see fit to go into all the formalities required by the use of such a writ it could accomplish the same purpose by issuing a simple order restraining the acts complained of. This construction of the chapter gets force from the fact that the legislature itself in the same chapter speaks, not only of restraining orders but also of temporary restraining orders. Section 274. If it had been the intention of the legislature to confine the designation "restraining order" to a single class, it would not have been technically correct for it to have spoken in one section of "restraining orders," and in other sections of "temporary restraining orders." This circumstance in itself would not be entitled to great weight, but it is entitled to consideration, as tending very strongly to destroy the force of the contention on the part of the relators that we must construe the language of the legislature so as to give entire and exact force to each word used in the different provisions on the subject. As we have already said, section 1409, Code Proc., is in terms broad enough to cover the order in question, and we have also seen by the language used by the legislature that it does not necessarily follow that because the language will admit of a certain interpretation, or even because a certain interpretation is the reasonable and logical one, that the legislature must necessarily have intended it.

We must look to the entire legislation upon the subject to gather what the intent of the legislature was in the enactment of any particular provision. Therefore, to...