State v. Liles

Decision Date08 June 1989
Docket NumberNo. 619A87,619A87
Citation379 S.E.2d 821,324 N.C. 529
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. S.C. LILES.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Doris J. Holton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, and M. Patricia Devine, Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant.

FRYE, Justice.

Defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of murder in the first degree in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-17; felonious breaking or entering in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-54(a); felonious larceny in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-72(b)(2); and felonious possession of stolen goods in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-72(c). After a sentencing hearing held pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury recommended a life sentence on defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree after failing to find any aggravating circumstances. The trial judge then entered a life sentence on the murder conviction and a sentence of a term of years on the remaining offenses. On appeal to this Court, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying both defendant's motion to preclude the State's witness, Floyd Ingram, from testifying, and defendant's motion for an independent psychiatric examination of the same witness. We find no error in the judge's rulings.

Evidence for the State tended to show the following: On 8 January 1987, two hunters discovered the body of a man, later identified as Isiah Sweeney, hanging across a tree in the Pee Dee River near Cheraw, South Carolina. The victim's hands were tied behind his back and the body was in the water from the knees down to the feet.

Floyd Ingram, a co-defendant, testified at trial for the State. Ingram stated that in the afternoon of 17 December 1986, defendant and the victim were together at the victim's mother's house. Ingram followed them to the victim's house where they drank liquor. After several drinks, the three men left together in defendant's car to drive to the Pee Dee River. They stopped at a boarded-up, one-room house, twenty or thirty feet from the river. Defendant told Ingram to get a lug wrench and a screwdriver out of the car. Ingram complied with defendant's request and subsequently removed two boards from the back of the house while defendant and the victim took the lock off the door and entered the house. Ingram also entered the house and heard defendant tell the victim that the victim owed him money. Ingram further testified that at defendant's direction, he removed from the house the linen from a bed, a heater and some beer and placed the items in defendant's automobile. Ingram and defendant then tied the victim's hands with string and with the victim's belt. Defendant then led the victim, who was intoxicated, out of the house and down to the river. Ingram further testified that he saw defendant hit the victim "right up across the head" with a stick while they were in the house and again when they reached the river. At the river, defendant took the victim down a little slope, laid him in the water, and "put his foot on him."

Cheryl Thorne, an expert in the field of forensic pathology, testified that the cause of the victim's death was drowning. The testimony of other witnesses for the State tended to corroborate the testimony of Ingram.

Defendant testified in his own behalf and stated that he knew nothing about the death of Isiah Sweeney. Ola Mae Liles, Bun Liles, Willie Mae Liles, Tara Liles, Richard Allen and Charles McNeil each testified that defendant and Ingram were together on the day in question and that both men were drinking alcohol. Sally Hennighan, Ingram's former girlfriend, testified that Ingram had beat her on one occasion. Juanita Collins and Shirley Little testified regarding separate incidents in which Ingram had attempted to have sexual relations with them and threatened them with a butcher knife.

Defendant made two motions at trial, a motion to preclude Floyd Ingram from testifying and a motion for an independent psychiatric examination of Ingram. The trial judge orally denied both motions and subsequently entered the following order:

Now comes the Defendant being present in open court with his attorneys ... with a motion upon a paperwriting entitled, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF STATE'S WITNESS FLOYD INGRAM and MOTION TO PROCLUDE [sic] FLOYD INGRAM FROM TESTIFYING AGAINST S.C. LILES IN THE ABOVE ENCAPTIONED ACTIONS, the Court makes the following findings of fact:

....

2. The Court considered a REPORT OF PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF FLOYD INGRAM BY DOROTHEA DIX HOSPITAL which is contained in file number 87 CrS 212, State vs. Floyd Ingram.

3. The defendant has had access to and reviewed such report.

....

5. Other than the psychiatric report on Floyd Ingram and oral arguments by counsel, the defendant has presented no other evidence.

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following conclusions of law:

1. That the Defendant has failed to establish grounds for disqualification of Floyd Ingram as a witness in this matter.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: That the relief sought be and is hereby denied.

In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to preclude Floyd Ingram from testifying. After the trial judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the motions, the defendant objected to the judge's conclusion that Ingram was competent to testify because he was competent to assist counsel in his own defense. The trial judge responded to the objection in the following manner:

COURT: I understand that, but what I was simply saying in that was that if he is competent to assist counsel in his defense on a first degree murder charge, he ought to be competent to testify, given those problems that you have raised, some of which are mentioned in this report.

Defendant asserts that the order of the trial court denying both motions was erroneous as an arbitrary finding of competency to testify based on an incorrect standard of competency to stand trial, i.e., that the witness could assist counsel in his own defense at trial. We find no error in the ruling of the trial court.

The competency of a witness to testify is governed by N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 601, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) General rule.--Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules.

(b) Disqualification of witness in general.--A person is disqualified to testify as a witness when the court determines that he is (1) incapable of expressing himself concerning the matter as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him, or (2) incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 601 (1988). To test the competency of a witness, the trial judge must assess the capacity of the proposed witness to understand and to relate...

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4 cases
  • State v. Abraham
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 9, 1994
    ...a witness to submit to a psychiatric examination. State v. Horn, 337 N.C. 449, 451-52, 446 S.E.2d 52, 53 (1994); State v. Liles, 324 N.C. 529, 534, 379 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1989); State v. Clontz, 305 N.C. 116, 286 S.E.2d 793 (1982); State v. Looney, 294 N.C. 1, 240 S.E.2d 612 (1978). In Looney......
  • State v. Fleming
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 7, 2016
    ...under oath the facts which will assist the jury in determining the truth with respect to the ultimate facts." State v. Liles, 324 N.C. 529, 533, 379 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1989). "The trial court must make only sufficient inquiry to satisfy itself that the witness is or is not competent to testif......
  • Whittaker General Medical Corp. v. Daniel
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1989
    ... ... Such covenants are enforceable in this state if they are (1) in writing, (2) made part of a contract of employment, (3) based on valuable consideration, (4) reasonable both as to time and ... [324 N.C. 528] 543, 304 S.E.2d 236 (1983); Mastrom, Inc. v. Warren, 18 N.C.App. 199, 196 S.E.2d 528 (1973); and Wilmar, Inc. v. Liles, 13 N.C.App. 71, 185 S.E.2d 278 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 305, 186 S.E.2d 178 (1972), to argue that there was no consideration for the covenant ... ...
  • State v. Horn, 552PA93
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • July 29, 1994
    ...evaluations available to defendants at trial), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1208, 111 S.Ct. 2804, 115 L.Ed.2d 977 (1991); State v. Liles, 324 N.C. 529, 379 S.E.2d 821 (1989) (trial judge has no discretionary power to require psychiatric examination to determine witness' (a codefendant) competence......

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