State v. Limary

• Citation: 235 A.3d 860
• Decision Date: 04 June 2020
• Docket Number: Docket: Aro-19-329
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Jonathan LIMARY
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

235 A.3d 860

STATE of Maine

v.Jonathan LIMARY

Docket: Aro-19-329

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted On Briefs: April 14, 2020

Decided: June 4, 2020

Revised: June 23, 2020

Hunter J. Tzovarras, Esq., Bangor, for appellant Jonathan Limary

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Katie Sibley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

HORTON, J.

[¶1] Jonathan Limary appeals from a judgment of conviction of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2020), and aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208(1)(A) (2020), entered by the court (Aroostook County, Stewart, J. ) after a jury trial. Limary argues that the court deprived him of a fair trial by denying his request during jury voir dire to pose certain questions in the jury questionnaire, and that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Limary's actions—rather than subsequent medical treatment—caused the victim's death. We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could rationally have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Asaad , 2020 ME 11, ¶ 8, 224 A.3d 596. Late on the night of October 29, 2017, Limary and some friends had a dispute, via text-based and voice-based social media, with the victim—a man whom none of them had met. As a result, Limary and a friend of his—with three others in the vehicle—drove from Presque Isle to Caribou to meet up with the victim and his friend in a parking lot to fight. While Limary and the victim's friend fought, Limary's friend fought with the victim. Limary's friend and the victim ended up on the ground, and Limary's friend eventually got up and backed away from the victim. By then, another friend of the victim had arrived with his teenage son and had gone over to help the victim up off the ground. Before the victim could rise from his knees, Limary approached and forcefully kicked the victim in the face, resulting in numerous fractures to the victim's nose, eye orbits, upper jaw, and cheek bones.

[¶3] The victim received medical care in the early morning hours of October 30 and was released, but he returned to the hospital later that day and was admitted. He was released on November 2. He then had two surgeries on November 9 and was released on November 17. For purposes of the surgeries, a tracheostomy tube

was inserted; that tube was removed two days before the victim's release from the hospital, leaving the victim with a healing hole in his throat at the incision site where the tracheostomy tube had been.

[¶4] On the day that the victim was released, his friend and the friend's son brought him to their house. That evening, the victim began bleeding from the opening in his neck, and his friend called 9-1-1. Under the guidance of the dispatcher, the victim's friend performed CPR until the ambulance arrived. The victim bled profusely, and, despite the paramedics' resuscitation efforts, he died. An autopsy revealed that, although at least some blood exited the victim through the tracheostomy

site,¹ more extensive hemorrhaging occurred in the victim's sinuses.²

[¶5] In January 2018, Limary was charged by indictment with manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A), and aggravated assault (Class B), id. § 208(1)(A). He pleaded not guilty, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.

[¶6] Jury selection was held on May 13, 2019. The court refused to include on the jury questionnaire three of the questions that Limary proposed relating to self-defense and defense of another:

• "[I]f during the trial Mr. Limary generates evidence that he acted in self-defense or in the defense of another in using physical force against [the victim], the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Limary did not act in self-defense or defense of another. Would you have any difficulty applying this burden on the State to disprove self-defense or defense of another beyond a reasonable doubt?"

• "[W]ould you be willing to find Mr. Limary not guilty if he acted in self-defense or in defense of another in using physical force against [the victim]?"

• "[D]o you have any personal, religious, philosophical or other beliefs that a person is never justified in using physical force against another human being even if it is done in self-defense or defense of another?"

The court reasoned that it was not evident that a self-defense or defense-of-another instruction would be generated by the evidence. The court indicated that it would ask "whether or not jurors would have ... any difficulty in being a fair and impartial juror when fighting has occurred." The questionnaire presented to the potential jurors included such a question and also asked the jurors if they would be able to "base their verdict upon the evidence and according to the law" without allowing "any feelings of bias, prejudice, pity, anger, sympathy or other emotion [to] influence their verdict in any way" and if they would be able to follow the law as instructed by the court "even if [they] d[id] not agree with the law."

[¶7] After the potential jurors completed the questionnaire, the court conducted individual voir dire. Both the State and Limary agreed that the jury that was ultimately selected was satisfactory.

[¶8] The jury trial was held over the course of the next four days. The State offered testimony from eyewitnesses, a paramedic who treated the victim on the day of his death, a police officer, and the State's Chief Medical Examiner. The State offered no evidence that would suggest that Limary had acted in self-defense or defense of another. The medical examiner testified that, before performing an autopsy of the victim, he reviewed hospital records summarizing the multiple, serious fractures to the victim's face. He also considered a post-surgery x-ray showing the surgeons' use of braces and other materials to reconstruct the victim's face. The autopsy revealed no hemorrhaging in the area of the tracheostomy

but extensive hemorrhaging in the sinuses, where the victim had sustained the injuries and undergone surgery. The medical examiner concluded that the victim died of blood loss—specifically, "hemorrhagic complications following multiple fractures of facial bones due to the blunt force trauma of his head."

[¶9] Limary moved for a judgment of acquittal on the manslaughter charge, arguing that the victim's surgery, which he claims was elective, broke the chain of causation between his actions and the victim's death such that the jury could not find him guilty of manslaughter. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 29. The court denied the motion.

[¶10] Limary then offered an expert witness—the Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Maryland—whose testimony differed from the State's Chief Medical Examiner's mainly in identifying the source of the victim's bleeding as one or more veins at the site of the tracheostomy

, not the site of Limary's injuries and surgery.³ Limary also offered his own testimony that he had kicked the victim in the mouth to protect his friend because he thought the victim was getting up to continue fighting and he wanted to get away from the victim and his friends.

[¶11] In its instructions to the jury, the court provided instructions on self-defense and defense of another. The jury found Limary guilty of both the manslaughter and aggravated assault charges. After a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Limary to sixteen years in prison for manslaughter, with all but forty-five months suspended and four years of probation. For the conviction of aggravated assault, the court sentenced Limary to forty-five months in prison, to be served concurrently with the manslaughter sentence. The court also ordered Limary to pay $70 plus restitution of $2,519 to the Victims' Compensation Fund. Execution of the sentence was stayed pending appeal. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 38(a). Limary timely appealed. 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2020) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶12] Limary challenges (A) the court's denial of his request to pose questions regarding self-defense and defense of another in the juror questionnaire and (B) the sufficiency of the evidence that he caused the victim's death. We address each issue in turn.

A. Juror Questionnaire

[¶13] Limary argues that he was deprived of a fair and impartial jury because the questionnaire did not specifically inquire of the jurors whether they were able to be fair and impartial regarding issues of self-defense and defense of another. He contends that, unlike in State v. Burton , 2018 ME 162, ¶ 17 & n.2, 198 A.3d 195, the court did not include other questions regarding self-defense or defense of another that would satisfy the concerns he raised.

[¶14] We review challenges to the conduct of voir dire for abuse of discretion. State v. Roby , 2017 ME 207, ¶ 11, 171 A.3d 1157. "[T]he purpose of the voir dire process is to detect bias and prejudice in prospective jurors, thus ensuring that a defendant will be tried by as fair and impartial a jury as possible." Burton , 2018 ME 162, ¶ 15, 198 A.3d 195 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, a trial court has considerable discretion over the scope of voir dire provided that it is adequate to disclose facts that would reveal juror bias. Id.

[¶15] A court need not voir dire potential jurors in the exact manner requested by a party as long as the process is sufficient to reveal bias. Roby , 2017 ME 207, ¶ 13, 171 A.3d 1157. Nor does a court abuse its discretion in excluding questions "that have no relationship to a prospective juror's knowledge, bias, or predisposition, or that are intended to advocate a party's position regarding the facts or issues in dispute." Roby , 2017 ME 207, ¶ 11, 171 A.3d 1157 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶16] For purposes of the United States Constitution, "[t]o be constitutionally compelled, ... it is not enough that [voir dire] questions might be helpful. Rather, the trial...