State v. Lincourt
| Decision Date | 25 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CR 18-0290,1 CA-CR 18-0290 |
| Parties | STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. CAROL ANN LINCOURT, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
The Honorable Dale P. Nielson, Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Michael Valenzuela
By David M. Cantor, Christine Whalin, Sabra M. Barnett, Jason Karpel
Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.
¶1 Carol Ann Lincourt appeals her convictions and sentences for transportation of a dangerous drug for sale (methamphetamine), possession of a dangerous drug for sale, and misconduct involving weapons. Lincourt argues the trial court (1) erred in denying her motions to suppress; (2) allowed prosecutorial and juror misconduct, resulting in an unfair trial; (3) erred in admitting evidence; and (4) improperly considered an aggravating factor at sentencing. Lincourt also argues that pervasive law enforcement "impropriety" requires reversal. For the following reasons, we vacate her conviction for possession of a dangerous drug for sale, but otherwise affirm.
¶2 In the early morning of October 16, 2015, Navajo County Sheriff's Office Deputy Watson stopped the vehicle Lincourt was driving near Heber. After asking Lincourt for her license and registration, Deputy Watson ordered Lincourt to exit her vehicle and stated he was issuing her a warning for speeding. Once out of the vehicle, Lincourt appeared nervous, was sweating profusely, and repeatedly looked back at her vehicle. When asked whether she had weapons or illicit drugs in her vehicle, Lincourt stated she did not, and the deputy proceeded to run Russell, his drug-detection dog, around the perimeter of Lincourt's vehicle "[t]o conduct a free air sniff." Trained to identify marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, the dog alerted twice near the vehicle's driver's side. Deputy Watson searched the interior of the vehicle, and behind a panel near the left rear wheel, he found approximately 120 grams of methamphetamine wrapped in a plastic bag. He also found a handgun and more than $1,000 in a briefcase in the passenger area.
¶3 The State charged Lincourt with one count each of transportation of a dangerous drug for sale, a class two felony; possession of a dangerous drug for sale, also a class two felony; and misconduct involving weapons, a class four felony. Challenging the lawfulness of the traffic stop and Deputy Watson's search of her vehicle, Lincourt moved before trial to suppress the evidence the deputy had obtained. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court denied Lincourt's motions.
¶4 The jury found Lincourt guilty as charged. The jury also determined the State proved Lincourt committed the drug offenses with the expectation of pecuniary gain. The court imposed concurrent, presumptive terms of imprisonment, the longest of which was ten years. Lincourt timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
¶5 Lincourt makes several arguments challenging the trial court's denial of her motions to suppress. She argues Deputy Watson lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her for speeding, the deputy unlawfully extended the stop after she refused his request to search her vehicle, and the dog sniff and alert were not sufficiently reliable to create probable cause to support the warrantless search.
¶6 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review only the evidence submitted at the suppression hearing, State v. Blackmore, 186 Ariz. 630, 631 (1996), and view the facts in the light most favorable to affirming, State v. Driscoll, 238 Ariz. 432, 433, ¶ 2 (App. 2015) (citation omitted). We defer to the trial court's determinations of the witnesses' credibility and the reasonableness of the inferences the court drew, but we review the court's legal decisions de novo. State v. Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. 116, 118 (1996). We will not reverse a ruling on a motion to suppress absent clear and manifest error, a standard that has been equated with abuse of discretion. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 396 n.6, ¶ 22 (2006).
¶7 Although "[a]n investigatory stop of a motor vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment," Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. at 118 (citation omitted), an officer needs only reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed an offense to stop a vehicle. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). Reasonable suspicion exists when the "totality of the circumstances" provides "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person" has violated the law. See Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. at 118 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)); accord State v. O'Meara, 198 Ariz. 294, 295, ¶ 7 (2000) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18). An officer is not required to determine a violation has occurred before stopping a vehicle for further investigation. See State v. Vera, 196 Ariz. 342, 343-44, ¶ 6 (App. 1999); A.R.S. § 28-1594 .
¶8 First, Lincourt argues Deputy Watson lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her for speeding. Deputy Watson testified at the suppression hearing that, before stopping Lincourt, his radar indicated she was driving fifty miles per hour in a forty-five mile-per-hour posted speed zone. Deputy Watson also explained that he calibrated the radar before his shift that day, as he typically does before every shift. The trial court noted that Lincourt presented expert testimony that her speed at the time was approximately forty-five miles per hour. Nonetheless, the court found Deputy Watson had reasonable suspicion to stop Lincourt, and even assuming arguendo the deputy's radar device may not have been entirely accurate, on this record the deputy could rely on a good faith belief in the device's accuracy. Because Deputy Watson had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting Lincourt was speeding, the trial court did not err in finding he had reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. See generally State v. Ossana, 199 Ariz. 459, 460-61, ¶¶ 3, 8 (App. 2001), declined to follow in part by Raney v. Lindberg, 206 Ariz. 193, 195, 199-200, ¶¶ 1, 18-22 (App. 2003).
¶9 Second, Lincourt argues Deputy Watson impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop by ordering her to exit her vehicle as he issued her a warning, asked her questions including a request to search her vehicle, and conducted the dog sniff. In general, an officer's questions during a traffic stop do not violate the Fourth Amendment if the questioning does not unreasonably prolong the stop. See State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 23, ¶ 24 (App. 2007); but see Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-16 (2015) (). Thus, as happened in this case, an officer may ask questions directly related to the stop, such as requesting the driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance, and determining whether there are any outstanding warrants against the driver. See State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 611 (App. 1991); Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Further, any time an officer has lawfully detained a motorist, the officer may ask questions related to officer safety and order the driver (and any passengers) to get out of the car for officer safety reasons. See Newell v. Town of Oro Valley, 163 Ariz. 527, 529 (App. 1990); Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614, 1616. And certainly, we believe an officer may take the time to answer questions asked of the officer by the driver (or any passengers), as happened in this case. Cf. State v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, 112, ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (). Further, even absent reasonable suspicion, an officer may ask for consent to search the vehicle or ask questions unrelated to the traffic stop if the officer's questions do not extend the time reasonably required to complete the traffic stop's mission. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616; see also Wilkes v. State, 774 A.2d 420, 437-38 (Md. 2001) (). However, once an officer has completed the mission of the traffic stop prior to conducting a dog sniff, any additional detention for the purpose of conducting an unconsented-to dog sniff, absent reasonable suspicion, is unconstitutional. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616; Driscoll, 238 Ariz. at 434, ¶ 10.
¶10 In this case, evidence from the suppression hearing supports the trial court's conclusion that Deputy Watson had reasonable suspicion to detain Lincourt for the limited purpose of permitting Russell to sniff the outside of Lincourt's vehicle. The evidence established that Deputy Watson, at the time of the stop, knew a drug task force was tracking Lincourt's travels in her vehicle via a GPS device. Thus, after Deputy Watson saw Lincourt's suspected traffic violation and stopped her, the deputy's subsequent confirmation of her identity, combined with his knowledge that she was the target of a drug investigation, see State v. La...
To continue reading
Request your trial