State v. Lindahl

• Decision Date: 20 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 27775-1-II.,27775-1-II.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Peter Anton LINDAHL, Appellant.

56 P.3d 589

114 Wash. App. 1

114 Wn. App. 1

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Peter Anton LINDAHL, Appellant.

No. 27775-1-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

September 20, 2002.

Publication Ordered October 25, 2002.

Montell E. Hester, Wayne Clark Fricke, Law Offices of Monte E Hester, Tacoma, WA, for Appellant.

Michelle Luna-Green, Pierce Co. Dep. Pros. Atty., Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.

SEINFELD, J.

Peter Anton Lindahl appeals the exceptional sentence he received after pleading guilty to second degree felony murder. Lindahl argues that the prosecuting attorney breached the plea agreement, that the trial court erred by allowing the victim's family representative to present both oral and written argument in favor of an exceptional sentence, and that his 330-month sentence is both unjustified and excessive. We affirm.

FACTS

Lindahl beat and stabbed Sheri Wolf to death on October 8, 2000. The State charged him with murder in the second degree and in the alternative with felony murder in the second degree, each with a deadly weapon enhancement.

Lindahl pleaded guilty to one count of second degree felony murder without the enhancement. As part of the plea bargain, the prosecutor agreed to recommend a standard range sentence of 123 months but also agreed that Lindahl could seek an exceptional sentence downward. The prosecutor also agreed that if the court sua sponte raised the possibility of an exceptional sentence upward, the State would oppose any such sentence. The prosecutor subsequently filed a memorandum opposing Lindahl's request for a sentence below the standard range and recommending a low-end standard range sentence of 123 months.

Wolf's family and their attorney appeared at the sentencing hearing. Lindahl argued that if the family's attorney spoke at sentencing, the family members themselves should not be allowed to speak. Lindahl also argued that the sentencing memorandum filed by the family's attorney, which recommended a 330-month exceptional sentence, was inappropriate. When the court asked the prosecutor if he had a response to these arguments or whether the court should hear directly from the family's attorney, the prosecutor asked the court to hear from the family's attorney.

The court, after hearing from the family's attorney and defense counsel, ruled that it had discretion to allow the family's attorney, as the victim's representative, to file a written statement with the court. The court noted that the defense had had the opportunity to respond to the legal issues raised in that statement. The court also ruled that it would permit the family's attorney and family to speak.

In discussing how argument would proceed, Lindahl referred to the prosecutor's agreement to argue against an exceptional sentence upward:

[P]art of the agreement that is not specific in the plea agreement that the Court has in front of it is that the State would advocate against an exceptional sentence upward if that should become an issue. And I am sure that the State will acknowledge that, and that was a material part of our understanding at the time we entered into the plea agreement, and we shared some written memorials of that.

Report of Proceedings (August 8, 2001) (RP) at 30-31. The prosecutor responded:

I agreed with [defense counsel] that if the Court sua sponte raised the topic of an exceptional sentence, the State would oppose that and resist that. You will have our recommendation and we feel that the standard range sentence is appropriate.

There is an unusual component present in this case, as we have all seen, which is the introduction of counsel for the family members addressing the Court and seeking to argue for an exceptional sentence as the statute would allow them to do. [RCW] 9.94A.110 permits argument on behalf of the victim's family. As I have already stated our recommendation differs from theirs, but that introduces an element into this that was never even discussed or contemplated by [defense counsel] and I in settling this case. The State intends to make its recommendation and stand by it, but for [defense counsel] to suggest the State has agreed to resist all efforts of an exceptional sentence upwards, that's not an accurate representation of what we agreed.

RP (August 8, 2001) at 34-35.

Defense counsel then read into the record a letter from the defense to the prosecutor disclosing Lindahl's understanding that "[the prosecutor] would advocate against an exceptional sentence upwards if the Court should head in that direction sua sponte." RP (August 8, 2001) at 37. In summary, the court stated that "[w]hat I am hearing is that the State is not advocating for the recommendation posed by the victim's representative." RP (August 8, 2001) at 38. Defense counsel replied, "Yes, Your Honor." RP (August 8, 2001) at 38.

After the prosecutor recommended a low-end standard range sentence of 123 months, three members of Sheri Wolf's family spoke briefly about the impact of her death, and their attorney argued for an exceptional sentence upward. The defense argued for an exceptional sentence below the standard range based on Lindahl's alleged mental disorder at the time of the offense. The prosecutor opposed that recommendation.

The court found no mitigating reasons to go below the standard range and imposed an aggravated exceptional sentence of 330 months. The court subsequently entered the following findings and conclusions in support of that sentence.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

That the defendant pled guilty to one count of Murder in the Second Degree. That the standard range sentence is 123 to 220 months imprisonment, the seriousness level is four, and defendant's offender score is zero.

II.

That the defendant and victim Sheri Wolf were in a dating relationship at some point in time which resulted in the birth of their daughter, C.L., born May 7, 1999. CL was 17 months old on October 8, 2000.

III.

That the defendant and Sheri Wolf were living together at the time of the murder.

IV.

That on October 8, 2000, the defendant armed himself with a knife and repeatedly stabbed and beat Sheri Wolf, inflicting 23 separate injuries to the victim, which included:

a. Stab wound to the right thigh.

b. Stab wound to the skull.

c. Two stab wounds to the left arm.

d. Stab wound to the left wrist.

e. Stab wound to the left leg.

f. Stab wound to the right breast.

g. A fatal stab wound to the left lung.

h. A fatal stab wound to the right lung.

i. Bruising to her forehead, eyelid, nose, chin, right eyelid, right shoulder, right arm, upper right thigh, right knee, mid right leg, left thigh, left knee, left foot, and right ear.

j. A severe blow to the ear which resulted in purple contusions.

k. Injuries to the skull, which resulted in subdural hemorrhage to the left and right cerebral hemispheres.

V.

The injuries were caused by defendant's blunt force trauma and knife. They were not inflicted by accidental means, or because of any pre-existing medical condition of the victim.

VI.

That defendant knew victim suffered from asthma.

VII.

That the injuries and pain inflicted on the victim were far greater than that needed to accomplish her death, or to constitute Felony Murder in the Second Degree with the predicate felony of Assault in the Second Degree.

VIII.

That Sheri Wolf was holding C.L. off and on during the assault.

IX.

That the defendant showed no genuine remorse for the crime as evidenced by:

a. Showing no remorse to the presentence investigator and instead explaining to the investigator that Sheri was a person most individuals disliked.

b. Blaming his actions on a failed system who took his other daughter.

c. Stating shortly after the crime during the call to 911:

"There was a fight. I was—she was threatening to throw me out of my house and take my house. Take everything from me. Telling me that it's the law. That she can take my house and take everything

. . .

—away. And that's what she's gonna do. God dammit.

. . .

You've just destroyed my life.

. . .

You've destroyed my life, Sheri. She just—thank you very much—...

—for ruining my life."

X.

After viewing the defendant's demeanor in court during the plea and sentencing, the court finds the defendant not credible as to his statements regarding remorse.

XI.

The defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect such that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired.

XII.

The report of the examination performed by Dr. Kolbell does not establish that defendant suffered from any mental disease or defect that rises to the level of a mitigating factor.

XIII.

The exceptional sentence is not based on any argument made by the prosecutor, and this court considered the prosecutor's statements only inasmuch as they rebutted defendant's request for mitigation.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.

That there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence outside the standard range. Multiple aggravating factors to support the imposition of an exceptional sentence of 330 months are listed below. However, regardless of the finding of multiple factors listed below, each aggravating factor standing alone is sufficient for the exceptional sentence imposed.

II.

That the defendant's conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim.

III.

That the victim suffered multiple injuries far greater than that needed to accomplish her death, or to constitute Felony Murder in the Second Degree with the predicate felony of Assault in the Second Degree.

IV.

That the current offense involved domestic violence as defined in RCW 10.99.020 and the offense occurred within sight or sound of the victim's and defendant's 17 month old child.

V.

That the current offense involved domestic violence as defined in RCW 10.99.020 and the defendant's conduct manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim.

VI.

That the

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