State v. Linders
| Decision Date | 14 November 1949 |
| Docket Number | 41302 |
| Parties | State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Edwin Zacharias Linders, Jr., Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
From the Circuit Court of St. Louis County Criminal Appeal Judge Amandus Brackman
Affirmed
Edwin Z. Linders, Jr., appeals from a judgment imposing a sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment for the "second degree" murder of Mrs. Grace McAndrew. Appellant has filed no brief here and we look to the twenty-four assignments of error, some embracing several issues, in his motion for new trial. They present issues respecting the voir dire examination of the jury, the admissibility and exclusion of evidence, all the instructions, given and refused, and the argument.
Appellant who was thirty-six years old, after being advised of his rights and that what he said might be used against him testified at the Coroner's inquest. He also testified at the trial. The facts essential to the State's case may be briefly stated.
Mrs. McAndrew's sister Alma was the second wife of Edwin Z. Linders, Sr., and appellant's step-mother. The Linders had had Christmas dinner at Mrs. McAndrew's in 1944. Mr. Linders, Sr., became ill soon thereafter and died December 29, 1944. Mr. Linders, Sr., died of natural causes but appellant claimed his father's death was the result of arsenic poisoning and that appellant had not been treated fairly after his father's death.
On Sunday evening, September 7, 1947, appellant loaded a Colt's 45-automatic pistol, which he had purchased recently for the purpose of killing Mrs. McAndrew, and about 8:30 p.m. proceeded in a taxi from his home in St. Louis to the vicinity of the McAndrew home in Kirkwood, St. Louis county. He carried the pistol in a wrapped box, but placed it in his belt and underneath his coat as he approached the McAndrew home.
Appellant arrived at the McAndrew home about 9:45 p.m. Mrs. McAndrew and her daughter, Mary Jean, were upstairs and Mrs. McAndrew went to the door. Mary Jean heard her mother talking with someone for ten or fifteen minutes, then she heard several shots. She called and ran downstairs and found her mother slumped down beside a divan and dead.
According to appellant's testimony at the inquest, Mrs. McAndrew admitted him to the living room. They talked. He accused Mrs. McAndrew of poisoning his father with arsenic, which she denied, and he told her he had had a "filthy deal" from her and her relatives. He complained of some law suits. [Consult Linders v. Linders, 356 Mo. 852, 204 S.W.2d 229.] He said he went there to kill Mrs. McAndrew. He took out his pistol and He shot Mrs. McAndrew three times in rapid succession. He then walked to the door, "thought he would give her another," and shot her a fourth time. The bullets struck her in the chest and abdomen, one tearing through the wall of her heart. He left, and threw the box he was carrying on the lawn across the street and the pistol in a sewer. He returned to his home on the streetcar. He sent his wife out for sandwiches, and while she was gone he took off his shirt and suit, placing them in a shopping bag. Upon his wife's return he told her he would be back in a few minutes, and proceeded to throw the package in a sewer. The box, the pistol, and the clothing were recovered. The four empty shells were found at the scene. The fingerprints on the pistol were established to be appellant's, and the bullets in Mrs. McAndrew's body came from appellant's pistol.
Appellant's testimony at the trial differed somewhat, but need not be developed. The defense was insanity, on which issue there was testimony pro and con.
Assignment No. 1 embraces several assertions that the court unduly restricted the voir dire examination of the prospective jurors' understanding of insanity instructions. The excerpts bearing thereon presented for review disclose the court permitted appellant's inquiries to take a wide range. Appellant was permitted to ascertain the attitude of the jurors respecting the defense of insanity, including whether the instructions thereon would be followed; but objections were sustained to detailed inquiries concerning instructions counsel was couching in his own words. The court is vested with discretion in the scope of the voir dire examination. The motion for new trial presents nothing indicating an abuse of this discretion. State v. Bolle (Mo.), 201 S.W.2d 158, 159[2, 3]; State v. Hoffman, 344 Mo. 94, 125 S.W.2d 55, 57[2,3]; State v. Tally (Mo.), 22 S.W.2d 787, 788[3, 4]; State v. McKeever, 339 Mo. 1066, 101 S.W.2d 22, 27[6-9].
The opening statement of appellant's counsel fully advised the jury of his defense of insanity, going into considerable detail with respect to specific events, and alleged error in assignment No. 2 that the court would not so permit is refuted by the record. Consult 23 C.J.S. 531, § 1086.
Examination of the record discloses that witness Mary Jean McAndrew specifically answered several of the inquiries mentioned in assignment No. 3. Some matters mentioned in the assignment were not inquired about. Objections were sustained to certain other inquiries because they related to irrelevant and immaterial matters so far as the case had been developed up to that point, and other inquiries called for a conclusion and not the statement of a fact on the part of the witness. There was no improper restriction of counsel's cross-examination as charged.
Assignments Nos. 4, 5, and 19 relate to the exclusion of certain testimony on behalf of appellant. The only witnesses specifically mentioned in the assignments are Albert Heeg and Dr. Val B. Satterfield. In these circumstances under § 4125, R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., we are not required to search the testimony of each of appellant's witnesses, more than twenty in number, covering in excess of 400 pages of transcript, in an effort to ascertain if appellant had in mind witnesses in addition to Heeg or Satterfield. State v. Nienaber, 347
Mo. 615, 148 S.W.2d 1024, 1026[3]; State v. Boyer, 342 Mo. 64, 112 S.W.2d 575, 580[7]; State v. Thorpe (Oct. 10, 1949).
We have read the evidence and appellant's assertions the court unduly limited testimony covering his early life on his defense of insanity are not sustained. Great latitude is indulged in admitting evidence on this issue. The doctrine however has limitations. The evidence should be relevant and material; and the scope of the inquiry to some extent is within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Jackson, 346 Mo. 474, 142 S.W.2d 45, 48[2-9]; State v. Douglas, 312 Mo. 373, 278 S.W. 1016, 1025; State v. Dunn, 179 Mo. 95, 77 S.W. 848, 855; Lee v. Ullery, 346 Mo. 236, 140 S.W.2d 5, 9 [5 et seq.].
Margaret Riesner was appellant's first wife. They had two children; one of whom, Edwin Z., III, is living and testified. Mrs. Riesner, after living with appellant eight years, divorced him in 1942. They continued their acquaintance thereafter. She testified regarding their marital life; their work at appellant's father's store; appellant's peculiar actions, and gave her opinion that appellant was insane on September 7, 1947. Other witnesses also testified concerning appellant's actions in early life. The court was of opinion that if there existed a continuity between appellant's early and later actions establishing insanity, the testimony was admissible; but evidence tending merely to show animosity and hatred between appellant and relatives of deceased was not admissible.
Witness Heeg, 61 years of age, married appellant's mother about 1920 when appellant was 9 years old. She died June 5, 1944. The court was of the opinion this witness' testimony that he, the witness, had been "ill most of his life" was irrelevant, and considered an offer of proof to the effect the family's lack of finances worked a hardship upon appellant in early life was too speculative and remote to establish appellant's insanity at the age of thirty-six in 1947. Heeg, who was a layman, was not permitted to give his conclusions with respect to the result of certain purported facts upon appellant's mind or to testify to matters occurring between appellant and his father and his step-mother of which he did not possess testimonial qualifications and was attempting to give hearsay evidence. His testimony of facts bearing upon appellant's sanity was received, as was his conclusion that appellant was insane.
Appellant's witness Dr. Val B. Satterfield, a psychiatrist, examined appellant four times about a month prior to trial. His diagnosis was that appellant was insane, suffering from dementia praecox. He told how he made his examination; of his examination of a hospital record covering appellant's treatment for arthritis; of the substance of conversations with appellant; of the delusion appellant had that his step-mother had poisoned his father, et cetera. Appellant's claim that Dr. Satterfield was prevented "from describing upon what his expert opinion was based" is not sustained by the record.
The assignment (No. 6) that error was committed in failing to instruct on manslaughter is without merit. There was no evidence calling for an instruction on manslaughter. Consult State v. Carroll, 333 Mo. 558, 62 S.W.2d 863, 867[14]; State v. Dodson (Mo.), 29 S.W.2d 60, 61[4]; State v. Biswell, 352 Mo. 698, 179 S.W.2d 61, 65[5, 6].
Assignments Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 claim error in the giving of instructions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8, respectively. It would unnecessarily extend this opinion to copy or state fully the assignments herein. Many assertions within the several assignments are too general. We think the issues may be disposed of...
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