State v. Lindsey

Decision Date25 June 1969
Citation254 A.2d 601
CourtMaine Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Maine v. Paul A. LINDSEY.

Albert Chick Blanchard, County Atty., Bangor, Peter T. Dawson, Assty. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Edward Stern, Bangor, for defendant.

Before WEBBER, TAPLEY, MARDEN, DUFRESNE, WEATHERBEE, JJ.

TAPLEY, Justice.

On appeal. Appellant was tried and convicted of the crime of taking indecent liberties with a female child of 15 years. He was found guilty of the offense by a jury and sentenced to 5 months in the County Jail. The defendant at the time of the alleged act was 27 years of age.

The indictment was couched in the following language:

'That on or about the twentieth day of April, 1967 in the Town of Dixmont, County of Penobscot, and State of Main, PAUL A. LINDSEY being then and there over the age of twenty-one years, to wit: of the age of twenty-seven years, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously take indecent liberties with the sexual parts or organs of another person, to wit: one (complainant), a female under the age of 16 years, to wit: of the age of 15 years.'

Appellant's points of appeal are:

1. The Court erred in his charge to the jury in stating that sexual intercourse between a 15 year old girl and a man over 21 years is indecent liberties within the meaning of the statute, whether there was consent of not;

2. The verdict was against the law and the evidence;

3. The statute which defendant is alleged to have violated is unconstitutional.

The carnal knowledge statute is 17 M.R.S.A., Sec. 3152 and reads as follows:

'Whoever, having attained his 18th birthday, has carnal knowledge of the body of any female child who has attained her 14th birthday but has not attained her 16th birthday shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than 2 years. This section shall not apply to cases of rape as defined in section 3151.'

Counsel contends that because the evidence shows there was an act of intercourse between the defendant and the girl he should have been indicted and tried under Sec. 3152 rather than the indecent liberties statute, Sec. 1951. Counsel furthers his argument by saying that it would be illegal to punish a respondent for having carnal knowledge of a female between 14 and 16 years of age by charging him with an indictment alleging indecent liberties, as the latter offense carries a much higher penalty.

The question presented in this case is whether or not a person over 21 years of age, who has intercourse with a young girl between 14 and 16 years of age, is guilty of the crime of indecent liberties where there is a carnal knowledge statute covering the same factual situation. Circumstances under which the act was performed determined the category in which the act was placed.

"Indecent liberties' within statute relating to taking indecent liberties with person of girl under age of 16 years, mean such liberties as the common sense of society would regard as indecent and improper, and the liberty taken may be indecent even if consented to by one capable of giving consent * * *.' Words and Phrases, 'Indecent Liberties Vol. 20A, page 528.

In State v. Winger, 41 Wash.2d 229, 248 P.2d 555, at page 557, the Court approved the following instruction as a definition of 'indecent liberties:'

'The term 'indecent liberties' is incapable of a precise legal definition. However, for the purpose of this case you are instructed that an indecent liberty is a privilege or license taken in violation of the laws of propriety, and is such an act or acts as he common sense of society would regard as indecent and improper, and offensive to modesty and decency."

In the recent case of State v. Miller, Me., 253 A.2d 58 (1969) the defendant was charged with two offenses by two counts in a single indictment, one count charging him with taking indecent liberties and the other with carnal knowledge. He pleaded not guilty and upon trial was found guilty on each count. He was sentenced on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The prosecutrix was 14 1/2 years old. The evidence showed sexual intercourse had taken place between the defendant and the prosecutrix, which was the basis of the two crimes. The Court said: 'She described certain conduct on the part of the defendant during her parents' absence which, if properly accepted by the jury, satisfied the requirements of proof of each of the two alleged offenses.' It is to be noted that the Miller case was not up on appeal from any question involving the crimes alleged in the indictment but rather on evidentiary matters.

Maine recognizes the fact that...

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7 cases
  • State v. Allen
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • June 16, 1972
    ...certain proven facts may constitute a violation of two different statutes or of distinct provisions of the same statute. State v. Lindsey, 1969, Me., 254 A.2d 601; Fuller v. State, 1971, Me., 282 A.2d 848. When the same acts constitute two offenses, but these acts are such that the person m......
  • Newell v. State
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • March 16, 1977
    ...criminal statutes, and that each offense may be punished separately. See State v. Thayer, 281 A.2d 315, 318 (Me.1971); State v. Lindsey, 254 A.2d 601, 603 (Me.1969); State v. Barnette, 158 Me. 117, 120, 179 A.2d 800, 801 (1962); State v. Lawrence, 146 Me. 360, 362, 82 A.2d 90, 92 (1951); St......
  • Fuller v. State
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • October 18, 1971
    ...in terms of its legal consequences, more than one criminal offense. State v. Farnham, 119 Me. 541, 112 A. 258 (1921); State v. Lindsey, Me., 254 A.2d 601 (1969) and State v. Thayer, Me., 281 A.2d 315 (1971). Hence, there is neither inconsistency nor manifest incongruity in an initial conclu......
  • State v. Stoddard
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • March 28, 1972
    ...in form the same as the indictments approved by this Court in State v. Farnham, 119 Me. 541, 112 A. 258 (1921) and State v. Lindsey, Me., 254 A.2d 601 (1969). We conclude then the indictment was sufficient to charge violation of the statute (17 M.R.S.A. § 1951) which statute has been held t......
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