State v. Lionberg, 86-7-A
| Decision Date | 04 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-7-A,86-7-A |
| Citation | 533 A.2d 1172 |
| Parties | STATE v. Brian LIONBERG. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
O P I N I O N
This case comes before us on appeal from a judgment in the Superior Court finding the defendant, Brian Lionberg, guilty of murder in the first degree of Mary Burroughs (decedent) and imposing a life sentence as required by statute, to run consecutively with a life sentence being served in the State of Kansas.
The record before us indicates that on February 28, 1984, neighbors noticed that the outside and inside lights of Mary Burroughs' house were on all night. The neighbors notified Mrs. Burroughs' relatives since she had recently been widowed, lived alone, and was seventy years of age. Three relatives arrived at the house and discovered the decedent in a closet of a back bedroom. According to the medical examiner, decedent had bled to death from multiple stab wounds. Nothing in the house had been disturbed, and there were no signs of forced entry. The decedent's car, a 1981 two-door blue Grand Prix with Rhode Island registration number B-378, was missing from the garage; and parked approximately 150 yards away from the house was a 1971 Pontiac Lemans, registered to Brian Lionberg. The defendant's roommate, Matthew Iadeluca, testified that he had seen defendant driving decedent's car at 8 p.m., on February 27, 1984. Later that evening Iadeluca returned to his apartment and noticed that food and clothes were missing and a large sum of money was gone from his room. He found a note from the defendant that read, "Everything I'll triple, send in the mail." Also, Iadeluca found a receipt on defendant's dresser for a shotgun and shells bought the day before.
Relying on this information, the East Greenwich police secured an arrest warrant and posted a bulletin for Lionberg's arrest on the National Crime Information Computer system.
According to the record, defendant had headed west, and on Friday, March 2, 1984, he was driving on Interstate Highway 70 in Kansas. Lionberg stopped at a rest area, murdered a forty-three-year old man, and took his wallet and gold wedding band. 1 The following morning, Saturday, March 3, 1984, defendant started out traveling further west on Interstate 70. Suddenly, the defendant turned the car around and traveled east, at which time Trooper Michael Hover of the Kansas Highway Patrol noticed the blue Grand Prix speeding at seventy miles per hour. Trooper Hover activated his flashing lights, defendant responded by increasing his speed to approximately ninety miles per hour, and a chase then ensued for twenty miles. Hover was informed by the dispatcher that the car was stolen and wanted in connection with a homicide. The trooper, with the assistance of other officers, was finally able to stop the car by firing two shotgun rounds into the tires.
The defendant was arrested and given his Miranda rights by Trooper Hover, and the car was impounded. Subsequent investigation and a search of the car provided evidence linking defendant to the Kansas homicide.
In Rhode Island, defendant was charged with the murder of Mary Burroughs, the burglary of Mrs. Burroughs' home, and larceny of goods valued over $500 (the Grand Prix). Various pretrial motions were heard and denied during March and April of 1985, and on April 26, 1985, trial commenced before a jury. On May 2, 1985, defendant's motions for judgments of acquittal on the charges of burglary and larceny were granted. On May 3, 1985, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder, and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment to run consecutively with the sentence in Kansas. On May 8, 1985, defendant's motion for new trial was denied.
The defendant first contends that the trial justice erred in denying defendant's pretrial motion to suppress incriminating statements made to the Kansas and East Greenwich police. Second, he claims that the trial justice erred in finding that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights under the totality of circumstances. Third, he claims that the trial justice erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress incriminating statements on the grounds that his statements were induced by an unreasonable delay in presenting him for arraignment. Fourth, he claims that the Superior Court justice erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the state had violated provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act by failing to bring defendant to trial within 180 days following the request for disposition of the Rhode Island indictment. Fifth, he claims that the trial justice erred in overruling defendant's objection to the medical examiner's testimony. Sixth, he claims that the trial justice committed reversible error in allowing the state to introduce photographs of decedent. Additional facts will be supplied as needed in the discussion of these issues.
First, Lionberg filed a pretrial motion to suppress statements that he made to the Kansas and East Greenwich police following his arrest on Saturday, March 3, 1984. The defendant asserts that he invoked his rights to remain silent and to speak with counsel after his arrest on Saturday morning. He asserts that three separate violations occurred subsequent to the invocation of his rights. The defendant claims (1) that his discussion with Hollis Worthen (a corrections officer) that resulted in a confession to the Burroughs murder constituted an interrogation, thus violating his Miranda rights; and (2) defendant contends that the Kansas and East Greenwich police failed to honor scrupulously his rights to remain silent and to an attorney by questioning him after he invoked those rights. We do not agree with defendant's contentions.
Trooper Hover testified that immediately following Lionberg's arrest he apprised defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Hover testified that he informed Lionberg that he was being held for possession of a stolen motor vehicle which was wanted in connection with a homicide. Upon arriving at the Salina County jail, Trooper Hover read Lionberg his Miranda rights for the second time. Hover asked Lionberg if he wanted to discuss the stolen motor vehicle. The defendant responded that he wanted to speak with an attorney and Hover ended the conversation.
Thereafter, according to Hover's testimony, Hover contacted the East Greenwich police and informed Detective Larry Campion that Lionberg was in custody. Campion inquired about defendant's feelings regarding extradition. Hover returned to the cell and reminded Lionberg of his rights. He then asked Lionberg if he had any feelings about waiving extradition. When Lionberg responded that he felt he should talk to an attorney about the matter, Hover ended the conversation and exited from the cell. Hover contacted Detective Campion and explained that when he read Lionberg his rights, he invoked his right to counsel, and consequently, Hover told Campion, he would not pursue questioning defendant. Hover also contacted the Office of the Public Defender for Salina County and informed them that Lionberg was in custody and had requested to speak with counsel.
Lionberg was placed in a Salina County jail and had no contact with any investigating police officers during Saturday or Sunday.
During this time the Kansas police were investigating a murder that had occurred in Wabaunsee County on the Friday night prior to Lionberg's arrest. They had a description of a car connected to the homicide which fit Burroughs' Grand Prix. Further, it was known that a twelve-gauge shotgun had been used in the murder, and a shotgun was discovered in the car operated by defendant.
On Monday, March 5, 1984, Hollis Worthen was the corrections officer on duty at the Salina County jail. He testified that his duties required that he visit each cell at intervals of thirty minutes and attend to the basic needs of prisoners and verify their well-being. According to Worthen, at approximately 1:30 p.m. he visited Lionberg and asked, "How ya doing, Brian?" to which Lionberg responded, "I'm all right." Lionberg then asked Worthen "When are they going to extradite me to Rhode Island?"
Worthen replied that an extradition proceeding "takes time; that he probably would not be going before a judge until the next day, and I also told him, I said at this time I am not even sure if they will extradite you because I don't know what you're wanted for in Rhode Island."
Worthen testified that Lionberg then stated, Lionberg then stated "Boy, I fucked up." Worthen described Lionberg's demeanor at this time as remorseful and stated defendant was sitting on his bunk with tears in his eyes. Worthen testified that he left the cell and reported the statements to the investigating officers, Agents Donald Winsor and Lanny Grosland of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation.
During the afternoon of March 5, 1984, Agents Winsor and Grosland went to Lionberg's cell, identified themselves, and told him that they were investigating a murder that had taken place in Wabaunsee County and wanted to ask him questions. Lionberg when admonished of his Miranda rights, said he understood them. Grosland testified that he then placed a waiver form on the shelf of the cell door and pointed to each part as he read it aloud so Lionberg could read the waiver form. Grosland then read from the bottom of the Kansas form, which provides:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Sims
... Page 537 ... 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 ... 5 Cal.4th 405, 853 P.2d 992 ... The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, ... Mitchell Carlton SIMS, Defendant and Appellant ... (State v. Lionberg (R.I.1987) 533 A.2d 1172, 1177.) I conclude that defendant initiated further conversation with ... ...
-
State v. Picerno, C.A. No. P1-02-3047B (R.I. Super 1/30/2004)
...being no unnecessary delay, no evidence exists to indicate that the delay induced defendant Picerno's confession. See State v. Lionberg, 533 A.2d 1172, 1178 (R.I. 1987). D. Compliance with Fifth Amendment Right to After arriving at State Police headquarters and prior to the afternoon interr......
-
State v. Barros, 2008–292–C.A.
...if it is to render a confession inadmissible, must have been operative in inducing the confession.” Id. at 622 (quoting State v. Lionberg, 533 A.2d 1172, 1178 (R.I.1987)) (emphasis in original); see also Nardolillo, 698 A.2d at 199. We have similarly stated that, in making the determination......
-
Simeone v. Charron
...irrelevant and prejudicial material. State v. Ellis, 619 A.2d 418 (R.I.1993); State v. Mora, 618 A.2d 1275 (R.I.1993); State v. Lionberg, 533 A.2d 1172 (R.I. 1987). In those cases, this Court held that the trial justices did not abuse their discretion in finding that the disputed material w......
-
Other grounds for suppressing confessions
...other grounds. Rhode Island holds there is reason to suppress if the delay is “operative in inducing the confession.” State v. Lionberg , 533 A.2d 1172, 1178 (R.I. 1987). A defendant who seeks to have an inculpatory statement suppressed because of an unnecessary delay in presentment “must d......
-
Other grounds for suppressing confessions
...other grounds. Rhode Island holds there is reason to suppress if the delay is “operative in inducing the confession.” State v. Lionberg , 533 A.2d 1172, 1178 (R.I. 1987). A defendant who seeks to have an inculpatory statement suppressed because of an unnecessary delay in presentment “must d......
-
Other Grounds for Suppressing Confessions
...other grounds. Rhode Island holds there is reason to suppress if the delay is “operative in inducing the confession.” State v. Lionberg , 533 A.2d 1172, 1178 (R.I. 1987). A defendant who seeks to have an inculpatory statement suppressed because of an unnecessary delay in presentment “must d......
-
Other Grounds for Suppressing Confessions
...other grounds. Rhode Island holds there is reason to suppress if the delay is “operative in inducing the confession.” State v. Lionberg , 533 A.2d 1172, 1178 (R.I. 1987). A defendant who seeks to have an inculpatory statement suppressed because of an unnecessary delay in presentment “must d......