State v. Little, 80-304

Decision Date01 July 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-304,80-304
Citation400 So.2d 197
PartiesSTATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert L. LITTLE, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and C. Michael Barnette, Asst. Atty., Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Raymond E. Cramer, St. Cloud, for appellee.

DAUKSCH, Chief Judge.

We have for consideration before us an order of the trial court declaring

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Section 732.663 F.S. (sic) 1 does not charge a crime. It mere sets our a penalty for unlawfully poaching. Further, if this Section states a crime the State would have to prove the elements of poaching, that is the trespass and violation of sporting rights. Therefore the Motion to Dismiss is granted.

The order of the trial court is unclear. We are confused first by the "order that Section 732.663 (sic) does not charge a crime." We assume the order was meant to say "state" a crime and, if so, the implication is that the trial judge felt the statute was unconstitutionally vague. We have also been led to suspect the trial judge might have meant to say the statute does not allow for a prosecution for a crime because it fails to define the elements of poaching which were, at common law, as the order says, the trespass upon another's land and the violation of his "sporting rights." That means, essentially, the taking of game animals from another's property, either private or public. In order to take a wild animal, a game animal, it is obviously necessary to kill or capture it. Of course this is true of any animal which does not want to come, or cannot, by its own volition.

As has been often said it is our obligation to find an allegedly unconstitutionally vague statute constitutional if the application of ordinary logic and common understanding would permit. Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 So.2d 693 (Fla.1969). See Newman v. Carson, 280 So.2d 426 (Fla.1973) (test of statutory vagueness is whether language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice).

Having read this statute and the information charging the crime we must conclude there is nothing vague or indistinct about what the Legislature meant when it wrote the statute and what the appellees were alleged to have done to violate it. This statute is surrounded by others which are obviously meant to protect alligators. Although this particular statute is the only one we have found which uses the word "poaching" or the word poach in any form, we cannot see how a person would be misled as to what acts are proscribed by the statute.

There are a number of statutes which provide for the penalty for the commission of acts which were under the common law, and still are, crimes. Just because the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Deehl v. Knox, s. 81-592
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 11, 1982
    ...not in this instance, the legislature clearly indicates otherwise. Akins v. Bethea, 160 Fla. 99, 33 So.2d 638 (1948); State v. Little, 400 So.2d 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (elements of common law crime of poaching deemed incorporated into Florida statute); see also, Purvis v. State, 377 So.2d ......
  • State, Dept. of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Div. of Consumer Services v. Quick Cash of Tallahassee, Inc.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 4, 1992
    ...common or ordinary meanings of the words used to apply. See, e.g., State v. Buckner, 472 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); State v. Little, 400 So.2d 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The courts are "without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit its expr......
  • Houck v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 4, 1994
    ...threatens, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm." Chapter 775 does not define "weapon"; therefore, as we held in State v. Little, 400 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), we must apply the common or ordinary meaning of that word. See also, State v. Buckner, 472 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 2d DCA 19......
  • State v. Hoyt, 91-02415
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 7, 1992
    ...of the act or conduct proscribed. [citations omitted] Accord, Southeastern Fisheries, supra at 1353-1354; State v. Little, 400 So.2d 197, 198-199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Courts cannot require that the Legislature draft laws with such specificity that much of what is sought to be regulated woul......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT