State v. Lloyd
| Decision Date | 01 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-0860 |
| Citation | 2022 Ohio 4259 |
| Parties | The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Lloyd, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Submitted June 14, 2022
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 109128 2021-Ohio-1808.
Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Katherine Mullin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Noelle A Powell, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
{¶ 1} Cronie W. Lloyd was convicted of felony murder for a one-punch homicide. He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask for jury instructions on lesser-included and inferior-degree offenses. And he contends that the usual presumption that an attorney's decision to take an all-or-nothing approach is a matter of trial strategy should not apply here, because his attorney misunderstood the elements of felony murder.
{¶ 2} As evidence that his attorney misunderstood the law, Lloyd points to statements she made in closing argument to the effect that Lloyd could not have known that one punch could kill the victim. Lloyd contends that because felonious assault requires only an intent to cause serious physical harm, these statements evince a misunderstanding of the law. And under Lloyd's theory, had his attorney not misunderstood the law, she would have asked for instructions on lesser-included and inferior-degree offenses.
{¶ 3} We are not convinced. Viewing counsel's closing argument as a whole, we conclude that Lloyd has failed to demonstrate that his counsel misunderstood the law. Moreover, Lloyd has not established that he would have been entitled to the additional jury instructions had his attorney requested them. Lloyd's attorney cannot be ineffective for failing to make a fruitless request. As a result, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, which upheld Lloyd's conviction.
{¶ 4} Cronie Lloyd and Gary Power were involved in a fender bender early one morning while both men were leaving a bar in their separate vehicles. They pulled into a gas station to inspect the damage. Security cameras show that Lloyd pulled in behind Power, exited his Jeep, and walked slowly up to Power's vehicle, flicking his cigarette to the ground as he approached. The two men looked at the damage together and exchanged words. Then, without warning, the 47-year-old Lloyd punched the 83-year-old Power in the face, causing him to crash to the ground, strike his head on the concrete, and immediately lose consciousness. Lloyd stood over Power and stared down at him, searched Power's pockets, and then calmly walked back to his Jeep and drove away. Power died from his injuries.
{¶ 5} The case proceeded to trial on charges of felony murder and felonious assault. At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on the law, including the elements of the offenses. The court made clear that for Lloyd to be convicted of felony murder, the state had to prove that he caused the death of Power as a proximate result of committing or attempting to commit felonious assault. The court then explained that to find Lloyd guilty of felonious assault, the jury would need to find that he "knowingly caused serious physical harm" to Power.
{¶ 6} When it came time for Lloyd's attorney to present her closing argument, she advanced two theories. First, she argued that Lloyd was not guilty because he did not "knowingly" cause serious physical harm. She reminded the jury that "knowingly" was an element of the offense and asserted that Lloyd could not have known that one punch would lead to Power's death. She explained: Ending her argument, she said,
{¶ 7} Next, Lloyd's attorney theorized that Lloyd should be found not guilty of felony murder because there was an independent, intervening cause of Power's death. She claimed that Power may have hit his head on the concrete a second time when police officers attempted to move him, and she speculated that this second impact might have been the cause of death. "There is a reasonable doubt there," she claimed. Alternatively, she suggested that Power could have died from two doses of Narcan that paramedics administered to him in the belief that he may have overdosed on drugs. Unconvinced, the jury found Lloyd guilty of felony murder and felonious assault.
{¶ 8} Lloyd appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, claiming, among other things, that he was "denied the effective assistance of counsel where trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offenses of assault and involuntary manslaughter" and "on the inferior offense[s] of aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter." On appeal, Lloyd conceded that the evidence supported convictions on lesser-included or inferior-degree offenses, and he asserted that trial counsel should have "provide[d] the jurors with a meaningful middle ground verdict." He claimed that his attorney made the decision to go all-or-nothing because she misunderstood the law, and that had she understood the law, she would have requested instructions on the other offenses. Lloyd also asserted that the trial court committed plain error by not giving these instructions sua sponte.
{¶ 9} The lesser-included offenses identified by Lloyd were involuntary manslaughter and misdemeanor assault. To find a defendant guilty of misdemeanor assault, a jury must find that a defendant "knowingly cause[d] or attempted] to cause physical harm to another." R.C. 2903.13(A) and (C)(1). When a misdemeanor assault results in death, a defendant is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. R.C. 2903.04(B) and (C).
{¶ 10} The inferior-degree offenses identified by Lloyd were aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter. An aggravated assault occurs when a defendant knowingly causes serious physical harm in response to a serious provocation by the victim. R.C. 2903.12(A)(1). When an aggravated assault results in death, a defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. R.C. 2903.03(A).
{¶ 11} The court of appeals rejected the contention that Lloyd's attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to request jury instructions on the lesser-included and inferior-degree offenses. 2021 -Ohio-1808, ¶ 22, 35. It presumed that his attorney's decision not to seek those instructions was part of an all-or-nothing trial strategy. Id. at ¶ 31-32. Trial strategy, it explained, should not be second-guessed by the court, but rather is a decision left to the defense attorney after consultation with his client. Id. at ¶ 32, 34.
{¶ 12} The court of appeals also concluded that "the trial court did not commit error, plain or otherwise," by not sua sponte instructing the jury on the lesser-included offenses. Id. at ¶ 44. It reached a similar conclusion as to the inferior-degree offenses. Id. at ¶ 45. The court of appeals explained that lesser-included- and inferior-degree-offense charges are warranted only when a court finds that "there is sufficient evidence to allow a jury to reasonably reject the greater offense and find the defendant guilty on the lesser-included or inferior offense." Id. at ¶ 25, citing State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 632-633, 590 N.E.2d 272 (1992). The court said that when a victim suffers serious physical harm (e.g., death), rather than mere physical harm, the charge of misdemeanor assault is not appropriate. Id. at ¶ 44, citing State v. Koch, 2019-Ohio-4099, 146 N.E.3d 1238, ¶ 84 (2d Dist), State v. Thornton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20652, 2005-Ohio-3744, ¶ 48, and State v. Brisbon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105591, 2018-Ohio-2303, ¶ 27. And, because a conviction on involuntary manslaughter would have depended on a conviction for misdemeanor assault, there was no basis to provide an involuntary-manslaughter instruction. Id. Similarly, the court found that an instruction on aggravated assault was not warranted, because that offense requires evidence of serious provocation by the victim-evidence that was entirely absent in this case. Id. at ¶ 45. And because an instruction on aggravated assault was not warranted, neither was an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
{¶ 13} Lloyd appealed to this court, asking us to review (1) whether a person could knowingly cause serious physical harm with one punch, and (2) whether the presumption of reasonable trial strategy could be rebutted by evidence that trial counsel misunderstood the elements of the charged offense. We accepted jurisdiction over the second question only.[1] 164 Ohio St.3d 1446, 2021-Ohio-3336, 173 N.E.3d 1237.
{¶ 14} In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Inherent in the right to counsel is "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), fn. 14. Attorneys are "strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, that presumption can be overcome.
{¶ 15} The "benchmark" for determining ineffectiveness is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just...
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