State v. Lloyd
| Decision Date | 21 September 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 19784-KA,19784-KA |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Michael LLOYD and Charisse Lavette Embry Lloyd, Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
E. Orum Young, D.C. Bernhardt, Monroe, for appellants.
James A. Norris, Jr., Robert S. Noel, II, Monroe, for appellee.
Before HALL, JASPER E. JONES and LINDSAY, JJ.
The defendants, Michael and Charisse Lloyd, appeal their convictions and sentences for manslaughter, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:31. We affirm.
The co-defendants, Michael and Charisse Lloyd, are husband and wife. On October 13, 1986, Charisse Lloyd gave birth to the couple's second child, Michael Lloyd, Jr., the victim of the present offense.
On December 22, 1986, Michael Lloyd returned home around noon after going to the unemployment office in Monroe, Louisiana. He began preparing to take two-month old Michael, Jr. to the local health unit for shots and to obtain baby formula. Since the Lloyds had no car, Michael Lloyd had arranged for a ride with a neighbor. Charisse Lloyd went into the couple's bedroom and retrieved the infant. At that time, she noticed the baby was not breathing. When she informed her husband of this emergency, he immediately took the infant from her, went to the neighbor's home and he and the child were given a ride to the North Monroe Community Hospital by the neighbor.
On the way to the hospital, the neighbor flagged down Deputy Danny Bridges of the Ouachita Parish Sheriff's office to ask directions to the hospital. Bridges was informed that the Lloyd baby did not appear to be breathing.
Deputy Bridges, trained in first aid, took the child from Michael Lloyd and found that the child was obviously dead. He also noted that the infant was wearing an extremely dirty diaper with feces leaking from it onto the child's leg.
The child was taken to the emergency room of North Monroe Community Hospital and was pronounced dead. An examination of the body revealed that the child was extremely filthy, had a dirty diaper and was suffering from an obviously infected diaper rash.
The child's body was transported to Bossier City, Louisiana for an autopsy conducted by Dr. George McCormick and his assistant, Mrs. Dawn Fain. Dr. McCormick noted the two-month old child was extremely filthy and appeared never to have been bathed. He noted the child's diaper contained a large amount of both old and fresh feces, as well as blood and skin that peeled off when the diaper was removed. According to the autopsy report, the infant was suffering from severe parental neglect. The infant had marked filth in most of the body creases. Diaper burns were present over the external genitalia, in the inguinal folds, and around the anus. These burns were so severe that the skin sloughing in those areas was comparable to third degree burns. The continued exposure of these open wounds to fecal matter led to sepsis, a blood stream infection, which eventually caused a respiratory infection, respiratory failure, congestive cardiac failure and ultimately, death.
Shortly after the child was pronounced dead, law enforcement officials questioned Michael Lloyd and went to the defendant's residence to question Charisse Lloyd.
The officers found the residence to be utterly filthy with piles of garbage located in various areas of the house. In one garbage pile was found a package labeled "Educational Materials for New Mothers." The only clean area was the master bedroom in which the defendants and the victim had slept. This area appeared to have been freshly cleaned. The bedding was wet. Freshly washed, and still wet, infant clothing was found in a chest of drawers and hanging about the room. The defendants appeared to be using charcoal grills inside the residence for cooking and heating. The smoke alarm in the house was sounding and the charcoal fumes and foul odors were so prevalent that the officers conducting the investigation developed headaches and frequently had to go outside for fresh air.
The defendants were advised of their rights and agreed to questioning regarding the infant. According to Michael Lloyd, he never bathed the child and had never seen his wife bathe the child. He also stated that Charisse simply wiped the baby off with a rag when she changed his diapers. Michael Lloyd said he last saw the child alive at around midnight the previous night.
According to Charisse Lloyd, the child had some diarrhea and chest congestion but otherwise appeared healthy. She had noted a small amount of diaper rash but thought the rash was clearing up. She reported that she only changed the baby when he cried. She claimed to have changed the baby's diaper at approximately 1 a.m. on December 22, 1986. When the baby did not awaken later that morning, she assumed that he was sleeping and she resolved not to disturb him. She attributed any peeling of the child's skin to the use of a harsh soap she claimed to have used in bathing him the day before. No such soap was found at the residence.
The defendants were arrested on December 29, 1986 and on January 14, 1987 were charged by bill of information with manslaughter in the death of their infant son. Both defendants, represented by separate counsel, waived trial by jury. A bench trial was held on April 1--April 3, 1987. Both defendants were found guilty as charged.
Charisse Lloyd filed a motion for a pre-sentence mental examination which was denied by the trial court. Both defendants filed motions for new trial and for post verdict judgment of acquittal. These motions were also denied by the trial court.
On June 25, 1987, both defendants were sentenced to serve sixteen years at hard labor. Both defendants have appealed their convictions and sentences based upon numerous assignments of error.
The defendant, Charisse Lloyd, contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for continuance of the trial of this case because her counsel was engaged in the trial of another unrelated case at the same time. She also argues that because the trial court required her counsel to try two cases simultaneously, she was denied effective assistance of counsel. She further argues that the trial court engaged in unauthorized communications with the prosecution. These arguments are meritless.
The trial of this case was originally set for March 9, 1987, but on that date the case was continued until March 30, 1987. On March 30, 1987, the case was again continued until the morning until April 1, 1987 and Mrs. Lloyd's counsel understood that the present case had priority over other criminal cases set for that section of court.
On March 30, 1987, her counsel began a hearing in an unrelated case before another judge in the Fourth Judicial District. That case was not concluded on March 30, 1987, and was continued until the afternoon of April 1, 1987.
On the morning of April 1, 1987, Mrs. Lloyd's counsel requested a continuance, arguing he could not conduct two trials simultaneously. At that time, the trial court stated that the judge sitting in the unrelated case had been contacted and it was agreed that the present case would be recessed in order to allow counsel to complete the trial of his other case that afternoon as scheduled. Therefore, defense counsel's motion for continuance was denied. The hearing on the unrelated case was concluded on the afternoon of April 1, 1987 and trial resumed in the present case on the morning of April 2, 1987.
Motions for continuance are governed by LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 707 which provides that, when such motions are filed less than seven days prior to commencement of the trial, the trial court may grant the motion upon a showing that the motion is in the interest of justice. The grant or a refusal of a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion and a showing of specific prejudice caused by the denial. State v. Jordan, 420 So.2d 420 (La.1982).
In the present case, as demonstrated by the facts stated above, defense counsel was not required to try two cases simultaneously. Actually, the trial court made every effort to accommodate defense counsel in this case. In addition, the defendant has made no showing that the court's ruling prejudiced her in any way.
The defendant, Mrs. Lloyd, argues that requiring counsel to try two cases at once denied her the right to effective assistance of counsel. As stated above, the allegation regarding simultaneous trials is not supported by the record. Further, Mrs. Lloyd has failed to demonstrate that she was denied effective assistance of counsel. In order to show that the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated, counsel's conduct must have so undermined the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon to have produced a just result. The defendant must show that counsel's conduct was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Cupit, 508 So.2d 996 (La.App.2d Cir.1987) writ denied 514 So.2d 1174 (La.1987).
Defense counsel was not required to try two cases simultaneously. The record supports the trial court finding that the defendant failed to show that counsel's performance was deficient or that she was prejudiced in any way.
Mrs. Lloyd further argues the trial court's actions were improper in that the trial judge engaged in conversations with the prosecutor and with the judge hearing the unrelated matter in which counsel was involved and that as a result, the court made the decision to deny the motion to continue without consulting with defense counsel or allowing the defense an opportunity to present argument on the motion. It...
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