State v. Lombardi
| Decision Date | 29 December 1972 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 1461-E,s. 1461-E |
| Citation | 110 R.I. 776,298 A.2d 141 |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. Andrew J. LOMBARDI. STATE v. Gerard E. LUTYE. x. &c., 1462-Ex. &c. |
These two criminal appeals were heard together before a justice of the Superior Court sitting without a jury. Each defendant was charged with operating a motorcycle on the public highways of this state without wearing a helmet as required by P.L.1967, ch. 27, now G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 31-10.1-4. 1 It was stipulated during the trial that each defendant did operate a motor vechicle on a public highway 2 on the day charged without wearing a helmet. The state offered in evidence the regulation promulgated by the registrar of motor vehicles prescribing the type of helmet to be worn. The trial justice admitted the regulations over defendants' objections and found them guilty as charged. Each defendant has prosecuted a bill of exceptions to this court.
The regulations involved in this case were filed in the Department of State, office of the Secretary of State, on June 1, 1967. They read, in pertinent part, as follows:
'Final Copy
The narrow issue presented by both cases involves the validity of the regulations promulgated by the registrar of motor vehicles. The defendants have raised this question by their exception to the trial justice's ruling allowing the introduction of the regulations as an exhibit.
The defendants' argument, that the regulations promulgated by the registrar of motor vehicles on June 1, 1967, are invalid because they were promulgated pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, is without merit. This question was decided adversely to the defendant in State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625 (1968), where this court held that the statute authorizing the registrar of motor vehicles to prescribe the types of helmets permitted was not an improper exercise of the police power, and, that the term 'helmet' was sufficiently definite in context so that there was no improper delegation.
The defendants' next assignment of error is that the regulations promulgated on June 1, 1967, are invalid because there was no public hearing prior to their promulgation and adoption. For the reasons which follow, we hold that this argument is also without merit. Procedures for adoption of rules under the Administrative Procedures Act are set forth in G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 42-35-3, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
'(a) Prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule the agency shall:
(1) give at least twenty (20) days' notice of its intended action. The notice shall include a statement of either the terms or substance of the intended action or a description of the subjects and issues involved, and of the time when, the place where, and the manner in which interested persons may present their views thereon. The notice shall be mailed to all persons who have made timely request of the agency for advance notice of its rule-making proceedings, and published in a newspaper or newspapers having aggregate general circulation throughout the state, provided, however, that if said action is limited in its applicability to a particular area, then said publication may be in a newspaper having general circulation in said area.
(2) afford all interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing. In case of substantive rules, opportunity for oral hearing must be granted if requested by twenty-five (25) persons, or by a governmental subdivision or agency, or by an association having not less than twenty-five (25) members. The agency shall consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule. Upon adoption of a rule, the agency, if requested to do so by an interested person, either prior to adoption or within thirty (30) days thereafter, shall issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its adoption, incorporating therein its reasons for overruling the considerations urged against its adoption.
'(c) No rule hereafter adopted is valid unless adopted in substantial compliance with this section, but no contest of any rule on the ground of non-compliance with the procedural requirements of this section may be commenced after two (2) years from its effective date.'
Section 42-35-3(a)(1) requires that twenty days' notice of intended action must be mailed to all persons who...
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