State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi

• Decision Date: 08 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 292-E,292-E
• Citation: 104 R.I. 28,241 A.2d 625
• Parties: , 32 A.L.R.3d 1265 STATE ex rel. Richard A. COLVIN v. Andrew J. LOMBARDI. x. &c.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 625

241 A.2d 625

104 R.I. 28, 32 A.L.R.3d 1265

STATE ex rel. Richard A. COLVIN v. Andrew J. LOMBARDI.

No. 292-Ex. &c.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 8, 1968.

Herbert F. DeSimone, Atty. Gen., James O. Watts, Town Sol. of Town of Narragansett, for plaintiff

Aram K. Berberian, Cranston, for defendant.

OPINION

POWERS, Justice.

The defendant was charged in the second judicial district court with operating a motorcycle on a public highway in the town of Narragansett without wearing a helmet as required by P.L.1967, chap. 27, now G.L.1956, § 31-10.1-4. Specifically it provides:

'Operators of motorcycles, motor scooters and motor driven cycles shall wear helmets of a type approved by the registrar. Every motorcycle, motor scooter and motor driven cycle shall be equipped with a rear-view mirror. The registrar is hereby authorized to set forth rules and regulations governing the use of other equipment on such vehicles.'

At the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute in question is in derogation of the due process clauses of art. I, sec. 10, of the Rhode Island constitution, and art. XIV, sec. 1, of amendments to the United States constitution. Additionally, the motion challenged the statute as being ultra vires of the police power of the state.

The constitutionality of § 31-10.1-4, having thus been brought into the case, the district court justice reserved decision as provided by G.L.1956, § 12-22-10, and the case proceeded as further provided by the cited statute. At the close of the trial, the district court justice found defendant guilty on the facts proven and, as further provided by § 12-22-10, certified the constitutional questions thus raised to this court for our determination. In the order of certification they are:

1. Does G.L.1956 31-10.1-4 authorize the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to make rules and regulations with respect to the type of helmet to be worn by motorcycle operators without sufficient standards, limitations and criteria?

2. If the answer to the aforesaid question is in the affirmative, does G.L.1956 31-10.1-4 as promulgated by Public Laws of 1967, Chapter 27, contravene the due process of law provisions in Article I, Section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution and Article XIV, Section 1, of the Amendments to the United States Constitution?

3. Does G.L.1956 31-10.1-4, as promulgated by Public Laws of 1967, Chapter 27, constitute an improper exercise of the police power of this State in attempting to protect people from the consequences of their own carelessness in failing to wear protective head gear?

The question last in order of certification is first to command our attention. Obviously, an affirmative answer to that question would render the other questions academic. However, it is our unqualified judgment that the purpose sought to be achieved by requiring cyclists to wear protective headgear clearly qualified as a proper subject for legislation.

The defendant's contention to the contrary presupposes that protection for the motorcycle operator was the sole motivation for the general assembly's action. Even if this were so, we are not persuaded that the legislature is powerless to prohibit individuals from pursuing a course of conduct which could conceivably result in their becoming public charges. Be that as it may, however, the requirement of protective headgear for the exposed operator bears a reasonable relationship to highway...