State v. Long
Decision Date | 25 November 1994 |
Citation | 320 Or. 361,885 P.2d 696 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Ray LONG, Sr., Petitioner on Review. CC 33681; CA A74762; SC S41205. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
John J. Tyner III, of Tyner & Associates, Hillsboro, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner on review.
Michael C. Livingston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the response were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Defendant appeals his conviction of sodomy in the first degree, former ORS 163.405. He contends that the trial court erred by "allowing the state to amend at trial a material allegation of the indictment" and by "offering an instruction that amounted to an amendment to a material element of the indictment." The Court of Appeals held that the amendment to the indictment did not in any way alter the substantive decision of the grand jury, but was instead simply a permissible amendment as to a defect in form resulting from a scrivener's error, and affirmed. State v. Long, 126 Or.App. 126, 868 P.2d 4 (1994). For the reasons that follow, we also affirm.
The material facts are not in dispute. On July 18, 1984, a grand jury indicted defendant for sodomy. The indictment alleged that the crime occurred "between June 1, 1982 and April 30, 1983." Thereafter, the district attorney sent defense counsel a letter that stated in part:
At the pre-trial omnibus hearing in January 1992, 1 the state presented evidence that the crime was committed on April 22, 1984. Defendant did not object to that evidence on the ground that it was outside the parameters of the dates alleged in the indictment.
At trial in March 1992, the state again presented evidence that the crime was committed on April 22, 1984. 2 Defendant acknowledges that he knew before trial that the state intended to present evidence at trial that the crime was committed on April 22, 1984. 3 As far as the record shows, the district attorney never formally moved to amend the indictment. After the victim and her mother had testified on the first day of trial, the trial court excused the jury for the day. At that time, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had failed to offer evidence that the crime had been committed between June 1, 1982, and April 30, 1983, as alleged in the indictment. As far as the record shows, that was the first time that defendant had raised the issue of the variance between the dates alleged in the indictment and the date relied on by the state at trial. The trial court denied defendant's motion, explaining that the motion was premature, because the state had not yet rested its case-in-chief.
After the state had rested its case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, again arguing that the state had failed to offer evidence that the crime had been committed within the dates alleged in the indictment. He relied on Article VII (Amended), section 5(3), of the Oregon Constitution. 4 The district attorney responded that: (1) time is not a material element of the crime of sodomy; (2) since at least 1987, defendant had access to the relevant police investigation reports describing the offense; (3) before trial, the district attorney had discussed with defense counsel the fact that, because of a typographical error, the dates in the indictment were incorrect and the state would seek to prove at trial that the crime had occurred on April 22, 1984, as "the police reports clearly indicate"; 5 and (4) in testimony at the pretrial omnibus hearing and at trial, the victim and her mother had described defendant's conduct during the period November 1983 through April 1984.
The trial court denied defendant's motion, explaining in part:
' 6
The trial court also specifically found that there had been no actual prejudice to defendant as a result of the variance.
In charging the jury, the trial court stated in part:
Defendant excepted to the court's quoted instructions, arguing:
Defendant was convicted, and he appealed.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred by "allowing the state to amend at trial a material allegation of the indictment" and by "offering an instruction that amounted to an amendment to a material element of the indictment." He argued that "the amendment effected by the instruction was unconstitutional under Article VII (Amended), section 5(3), because it was an amendment of the substance of the indictment and not an amendment as to form." 8
The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that "the amendment to the indictment did not in any way alter the substantive decision of the grand jury, but was instead simply a permissible amendment as to a defect in form" resulting from a scrivener's error, which did not frustrate the constitutional objective served by requiring an indictment by grand jury. State v. Long, supra, 126 Or.App. at 129-30, 868 P.2d 4. The court relied on State v. Wimber, 315 Or. 103, 843 P.2d 424 (1992). 9
On review, defendant contends that the Court of Appeals improperly applied State v. Wimber, supra, to the facts of this case. As noted, defendant mounts his argument in constitutional terms. The Court of Appeals responded in kind. We believe, however, that most of the answer to defendant's argument in this case lies outside the state and federal constitutions.
ORS 135.717 provides:
"The precise time at which [a criminal] offense was committed need not be stated in the accusatory instrument, but it may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the finding thereof and within the time in which an action may be commenced therefor, except where the time is a material element in the offense." (Emphasis added.)
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction that the precise time when a criminal offense was committed is not a material element of the crime involved here, viz., sodomy.
In State v. Howard, supra, the defendant was charged by indictment with having committed sodomy on September 27, 1957. In spite of the date alleged in the indictment, however, the state elected at trial to prove that the crime actually occurred on August 1, 1957. 214 Or. at 612-13, 331 P.2d 1116. At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground, inter alia, that there had been an impermissible variance between the indictment and the proof as to the date of the crime. Id. at 614-15, 331 P.2d 1116.
This court affirmed the conviction, holding that
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