State v. Long
Decision Date | 15 March 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 81,81 |
Citation | 187 S.E.2d 47,280 N.C. 633 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Wilbert LONG, Jr., et al. |
T. O. Stennett, Charlotte, for defendant appellants.
Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen., and Claude W. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State of N.C.
Without objection, Will Johnson, Jr., stated on cross-examination that he had been Then the following exchange occurred: (Question) 'Do you deny getting that pistol, Mr. Johnson, in an armed robbery in a Little General Store?' Objection. Overruled. (Answer) 'Yes, I deny it.' The question was repeated over objection and again denied.
In rebuttal, the State examined Joseph Lee Gammeter who, over objection, was permitted to testify that William R. Stack was manager of the Little General Store on Monroe Road where Gammeter worked. Mr. Stack owned the pistol identified as State's Exhibit 2 and left it at the store with the witness Gammeter on 18 January 1971. At approximately 10 p.m. on that date the defendant Will Johnson, Jr., entered the store, held it up and, among other things, took the .22 caliber pistol identified as State's Exhibit 2 and carried it away.
With respect to the foregoing rebuttal testimony of Joseph Gammeter, the judge charged the jury as follows:
Defendants assign as error (1) the admission of the foregoing rebuttal testimony of Joseph Gammeter and (2) the judge's charge with respect to it. Defendants contend that where Will Johnson, Jr., got State's Exhibit 2 was a collateral matter and the State was bound by his answer, thus precluding the rebuttal testimony. Furthermore, defendants say that admission of the rebuttal testimony permitted the State to offer evidence of another, separate and distinct armed robbery allegedly committed by Will Johnson, Jr., but of which hd had never been convicted. Defendants therefore contend that the rebuttal testimony of the witness Gammeter was erroneously received to their prejudice. We now examine the validity of this contention.
It is a general rule of evidence in North Carolina 'that answers made by a witness to collateral questions on cross-examination are conclusive, and that the party who draws out such answers will not be permitted to contradict them; which rule is subject to two exceptions, first, where the question put to the witness on cross-examination tends to connect him directly with the cause or the parties, and, second, where the cross-examination is as to a matter tending to show motive, temper, disposition, conduct, or interest of the witness toward the cause or parties.' State v. Jordan, 207 N.C. 460, 177 S.E. 333 (1934). This has been the rule since State v. Patterson, 24 N.C. 346 (1842). Accord, State v. Carden, 209 N.C. 404, 183 S.E. 898 (1936); State v. Spaulding, 216 N.C. 538, 5 S.E.2d 715 (1939); State v. Wilson, 217 N.C. 123, 7 S.E.2d 11 (1940); State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 30 S.E.2d 230 (1944); State v. Poolos, 241 N.C. 382, 85 S.E.2d 342 (1955); State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C 334, 180 S.E.2d 745 (1971); Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence (2d ed.), witnesses § 48(3).
The proper test for determining what is material and what is collateral is whether the evidence offered in contradiction would be admissible if tendered for some purpose other than mere contradiction; or in the case of prior inconsistent statements, whether evidence of the facts stated would be so admissible. Stansbury, supra; State v. Taylor, 250 N.C. 363, 108 S.E.2d 629 (1959). See Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 1003, 1020. When this test is applied to the challenged evidence, the inapplicability of the foregoing exclusionary rule becomes apparent. The inquiry on cross-examination of Will Johnson, Jr., as to where and how he came into possession of the pistol used in this attempted armed robbery is an inquiry tending to establish an essential element of the very crime for which defendants were on trial rather than an inquiry about a collateral matter. The State is required to show, as an essential element of attempted armed robbery, that the attempt was made with the felonious intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently and to convert it to the use of the taker. State v. McCrary, 263 N.C. 490, 139 S.E.2d 739 (1965). 'The taking must be done Animo furandi, with a felonious intent to appropriate the goods taken to some use or purpose of the taker.' State v. Smith, 268 N.C. 167, 150 S.E.2d 194 (1966).
In this case each defendant, testifying in his own behalf and in behalf of his codefendants, denied having any intention or making any attempt to commit robbery. The disturbance inside the service station was explained as a fight over the refund of a dime which had been deposited in a machine that delivered no merchandise. Thus the...
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