State v. Loomis

• Citation: 115 Mo. 307,22 S.W. 350
• Parties: STATE v. LOOMIS et al.
• Decision Date: 25 March 1893
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

22 S.W. 350

115 Mo. 307

STATE v. LOOMIS et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March 25, 1893.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — CLASS LEGISLATION — PAYMENT OF WAGES — ORDER ON STORE.

Rev. St. 1889, §§ 7058, 7060, making it unlawful for any corporation, person, or firm engaged in "manufacturing or mining" to issue, for the payment of wages, any order, check, or other token of indebtedness, payable otherwise than in lawful money, unless the same is negotiable and redeemable, at its face value, in cash, or in goods, at the option of the holder, at the store or other place of business of the corporation, person, or firm, without placing similar restrictions on others employing labor, is unconstitutional, as class legislation. Barclay, J., dissenting. 20 S. W. Rep. 332, reversed.

In banc. Appeal from circuit court, Macon county; Andrew Ellison, Judge.

Wesley Loomis, Lewis Loomis, and Ezra Snively were convicted of a violation of a statute regulating the payment of wages by manufacturers and mine owners. The conviction was affirmed at the second division of this court, (20 S. W. Rep. 332,) and was transferred to the full bench for final determination. Reversed.

Dysart & Mitchell and J. E. McKeighan, for appellants. John M. Wood, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BLACK, C. J.

This is an information in two counts, filed by the prosecuting attorney of Macon county against the three defendants, engaged in carrying on the business of mining coal in that county. The first count avers that the defendants did unlawfully issue and circulate in payment of wages a certain order, check, etc., payable to P. Daniels otherwise than in money, without being payable, at the option of the holder, in merchandise or money. The second count states, in substance, that defendants unlawfully failed to redeem a certain order, check, etc., issued to P. Daniels in payment for wages, the same having been presented for payment 30 days from the date of the delivery thereof. The information is based upon sections 7058, 7060, Rev. St. 1889. The first of these sections provides: "It shall not be lawful for any corporation, person, or firm engaged in manufacturing or mining in this state to issue, pay out, or circulate for payment of the wages of labor, any order, check, memorandum, token, or evidence of indebtedness, payable, in whole or in part, otherwise than in lawful money of the United States, unless the same is negotiable and redeemable at its face value, without discount, in cash or in goods, wares, or merchandise or supplies, at the option of the holder, at the store or other place of business of such firm, person, or corporation; * * * and the person who, or corporation, firm, or company which, may issue any such order, check, memorandum, token, or other evidence of indebtedness, shall, upon presentation and demand within 30 days from date or delivery thereof, redeem the same in goods, wares, merchandise, or supplies at the current cash market price for like goods, wares, merchandise, or supplies, or in lawful money of the United States, as may be demanded by the holder of any such order, memorandum, token, or other evidence of indebtedness: provided," etc. Section 7060 makes it a misdemeanor for any person, firm, or company engaged in mining or manufacturing to issue or circulate, in payment of wages, any order, check, etc., payable otherwise than as provided in section 7058; or to fail to redeem any such order, check, etc., in money when presented for payment. The circuit court, sitting as a jury, found the defendants guilty as charged in the first count of the information, and assessed their punishment at a fine of $10, and they appealed.

The evidence discloses the following facts: The defendants, composing the firm of Loomis & Snively, were the owners of coal mines, and in connection with that business carried on a store. Peter Daniels worked for them as a miner. At the end of January, 1891, he owed them $43.20. On the 18th of the following February he had earned, as wages during that month, $5.50, and on that day he requested, and the defendants' clerk gave him, a "credit coupon check book" upon their store. The coupons were in sums of five, ten, and twenty-five cents, and aggregated five dollars. It is stated on the back of the book that "the coupons in this book are not good if detached, and are payable only in merchandise when presented by P. Daniels." Each coupon says: "Good for merchandise at our store. Not transferable. Loomis & Snively." Daniels assigned this check book to Burge, who assigned it to Hughes, and he transferred it to Mr. Williams. The latter presented it to the defendants for payment on the 2d of April, 1891, and they then refused payment. The proof shows that defendants had monthly pay days. On these days they gave out no orders or checks, but paid the miners what was due them in cash. At the close of the evidence the defendants asked the court to discharge them, because the statute upon which the information was founded was unconstitutional, and therefore void, which request the court refused. The contention is that the two sections of the statute before mentioned are in conflict with several clauses of the constitution of this state, and especially the following: (1) "That all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry;" (2) "that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;" (3) and that they violate that part of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States which declares: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws."

The words "due process of law," as used in these clauses of both constitutions, mean the same as "the law of the land." Story, Const. (5th Ed.) § 1943; Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed. 430.) It was said in Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110: "In England the requirement of due process of law, in cases where life, liberty, and property are affected, was originally designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary actions of the crown, and to place him under the protection of the law. The words were held to be equivalent of `law of the land;' and a similar purpose must be ascribed to them when applied to a legislative body in this country." It is now axiomatic that "everything which may pass under the form of an enactment is not, therefore, to be considered the law of the land." Speaking of these words, Mr. Justice Johnson said: "They were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice." Bank v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235. "Law of the land" is said to mean a law binding upon every member of the community under similar circumstances. Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554. The word "liberty," as used in these constitutional declarations, means more than freedom of locomotion. It includes and comprehends, among other things, freedom of speech, the right to self-defense against unlawful violence, and the right to freely buy and sell as others may. Story, Const. (5th Ed.) § 1590.

From the foregoing descriptions and definitions of "due process of law," or its equivalent, "law of the land," it must be evident that this constitutional safeguard condemns arbitrary, unequal, and partial legislation; and it is equally clear that the right to make contracts, and have them enforced, as others may, is one of the rights so secured to every citizen. There is no doubt but many of our legislative enactments operate upon classes of individuals only, and they are not invalid because they so operate, so long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. Thus, it is perfectly competent to legislate concerning married women, minors, insane persons, bankers, common carriers, and the like; and the power of the legislature to prescribe police regulations applicable to localities and classes is very great because such laws are designed to protect property, and the safety, health, and morals of the citizen. But classification for legislative purposes must have some reasonable basis upon which to stand. It must be evident that differences which would serve for a classification for some purposes furnish no reason whatever for a classification for legislative purposes. The differences which will support class legislation must be such as, in the nature of things, furnish a reasonable basis for separate laws and regulations. Thus the legislature may fix the age at which persons shall be deemed competent to contract for themselves, but no one will claim that competency to contract can be made to depend upon stature, or color of the hair. Such a classification, for such a purpose, would be arbitrary, and a piece of legislative despotism, and therefore not the law of the land. When speaking upon this subject, Judge Cooley says: "The doubt might also arise whether a regulation made for any one class of citizens, entirely arbitrary in its character, and restricting their rights, privileges, or legal capacity in a manner before unknown to the law, could be sustained, notwithstanding its generality. Distinctions in these respects must rest upon some reason upon which they can be defended, like the want of capacity in infants and insane persons; and if the legislature should undertake to provide that persons following some specified lawful trade or employment should not have capacity to make contracts, or to build such houses as others were allowed to erect, or in any other way to make such use of their property as was permissible to others, it can scarcely be doubted that the act would transcend the due bounds of legislative power, even though no express constitutional provision could be pointed out with which it would come in conflict. To forbid an individual or a...