State v. Loprinzi
| Decision Date | 23 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 20120513–CA.,20120513–CA. |
| Citation | 338 P.3d 253,2014 UT App 256 |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Sarah Ann LOPRINZI, Defendant and Appellant. |
Michael P. Studebaker, Ogden, for Appellant.
Sean D. Reyes and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
1
Opinion
¶ 1 Sarah Ann LoPrinzi appeals her two convictions for unlawful sexual activity with a minor, asserting that the trial court erred in multiple ways. First, she contends that the trial court should have granted her motion to either recuse the entire Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office from prosecuting her case or dismiss the case altogether. Second, she challenges two of the court's decisions regarding jury instructions. Finally, she claims that the court erred in denying her motion for a new trial because the verdicts were inconsistent. We affirm.
¶ 2 In January 2010, LoPrinzi was charged with three counts of unlawful sexual activity with a minor, stemming from sexual acts she had engaged in with a fifteen-year-old boy. Prior to trial, LoPrinzi moved to have the entire Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office disqualified from prosecuting her case or, alternatively, to dismiss the case. Her motion alleged prosecutorial misconduct on the basis that her former attorney had provided the entire defense file to the prosecutor and that the prosecutor's receipt of this file “adversely affected the representation ... and [had] given a significantly undue advantage for the prosecution.”2 The prosecutor opposed the motion on the basis that it had received only LoPrinzi's mental health records and that defense counsel had properly shared that information because LoPrinzi had intended to apply for prosecution in the mental health court. The prosecutor further argued that even though LoPrinzi had since withdrawn her application for the mental health court, the State would still be entitled to those records because LoPrinzi intended to assert a diminished mental capacity defense at trial, which required that her records be made available to the prosecution for review.3 The prosecutor denied receiving any other information from LoPrinzi's defense file. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which LoPrinzi's former attorney testified to the same facts asserted by the prosecutor in his opposition to the motion. Having heard the evidence, the court found that LoPrinzi's former counsel “delivered only the mental health records ..., not other confidential materials in the defense counsel's file” and concluded that “[t]here was no prosecutorial misconduct for the District Attorney to receive[ ] the mental health records ..., as [LoPrinzi] was attempting to apply for mental health court and file a Diminished Mental Capacity defense.” The court denied LoPrinzi's motion to disqualify the prosecutor's office or dismiss the case. LoPrinzi was eventually tried before a jury.
¶ 3 At trial, the complaining witness testified that between July 2 and July 5, 2009, when he was fifteen years old, he and LoPrinzi engaged in multiple acts of oral and vaginal intercourse. He testified that he had planned to go camping with a friend, who was a member of the LoPrinzi family (Friend), and a couple of other friends for the holiday weekend. However, the camping trip fell through, and they decided to spend the weekend at LoPrinzi's house instead. The complaining witness arrived on either Thursday or Friday night and stayed through Sunday. He testified that on the night that he arrived, he had oral and vaginal intercourse with LoPrinzi. He testified that after they finished, he left LoPrinzi's bedroom. On the second day, the complaining witness went to LoPrinzi's bedroom for the purpose of having sex. They again engaged in oral and vaginal intercourse, but this time the complaining witness spent the night in LoPrinzi's bedroom. During one of these two incidents, LoPrinzi's ex-husband arrived at LoPrinzi's home and heard activity consistent with sexual intercourse coming from LoPrinzi's bedroom. On the third morning, the complaining witness and LoPrinzi began having oral and vaginal intercourse but were interrupted by Friend. LoPrinzi's ex-husband arrived soon after, and he confronted the complaining witness about his activities with LoPrinzi before calling the police. The complaining witness then went to another friend's house, where his parents picked him up. He and his parents subsequently reported the events to the police.
¶ 4 LoPrinzi's ex-husband and Friend offered corroboration for the complaining witness's account of two of the incidents. They each testified that over the course of the weekend they had heard and observed activity between LoPrinzi and the complaining witness that was consistent with what he had reported.
¶ 5 LoPrinzi testified in her defense. She denied that she had engaged in any sexual activity with the complaining witness.
¶ 6 The investigating officer testified that on July 9 or July 10, 2009, he had talked with LoPrinzi by phone and told her about the allegations of sexual activity with the complaining witness made by her ex-husband, the complaining witness, and the complaining witness's parents. The police scheduled an appointment for LoPrinzi to come in to talk with the police about the matter. When LoPrinzi failed to appear for the appointment, the officer contacted LoPrinzi's ex-husband and discovered that LoPrinzi had moved. The ex-husband testified that he had gone to LoPrinzi's house on July 24 or July 25, 2009, and the house appeared to have been abandoned: “Things had been dumped everywhere,” “[t]he place had been ransacked,” “[t]he walls ... had been scrubbed down,” “Ms. LoPrinzi's house key was hanging on her bedroom door,” and the pets, LoPrinzi's teenage son, and LoPrinzi were “gone.” Some months later, the investigating officer learned that LoPrinzi was living in Wyoming, and a warrant for LoPrinzi's arrest issued in January 2010.
¶ 7 LoPrinzi admitted that she relocated to Wyoming shortly after her initial conversation with the police. She denied, however, that she had abandoned her home or that she had left the house “ramshackle” or “trashed.” She claimed that she was not trying to evade the investigation, explaining that she was not aware of any obligation to meet with the police when she moved and citing her return to Utah once she became aware of the arrest warrant. On cross-examination, the investigating officer acknowledged that although LoPrinzi had failed to show up for a scheduled appointment, he had told her that she was not obligated to come to that appointment and had not otherwise indicated that she was under arrest.
¶ 8 Counsel for LoPrinzi and the State presented arguments for and against giving the jury two instructions. First, LoPrinzi argued that the jury should be instructed on the lesser included offense of sexual battery. The court declined to give the sexual battery instruction, reasoning that there was neither a sufficient overlap of elements for unlawful sexual activity with a minor and sexual battery nor “a rational basis for a verdict acquitting of the primary offense, and convicting her of the included offense.” See Utah Code Ann. § 76–1–402(4) (LexisNexis 2012)4 (). Second, LoPrinzi opposed giving the jury a flight instruction because LoPrinzi had never been advised that she had any obligation to cooperate with law enforcement or to remain in the state. The State argued that a flight instruction was warranted because LoPrinzi's sudden departure after talking to the police implied a consciousness of guilt. The trial court agreed that there was a basis in the evidence and gave the flight instruction. The jury convicted LoPrinzi of two counts of unlawful sexual activity with a minor (Counts 1 and 3) but acquitted her of the third (Count 2). LoPrinzi now appeals.
¶ 9 LoPrinzi first contends that the trial court improperly denied her motion either to disqualify the entire Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office from prosecuting her case or to dismiss the case based on prosecutorial misconduct. We review a decision on a motion to dismiss under rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure for abuse of discretion, noting that dismissals “grounded solely on prosecutorial misconduct are rarely appropriate.” State v. White, 2011 UT App 155, ¶¶ 7, 12, 256 P.3d 255 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Utah R.Crim. P. 25(a) ). We have stated that “[t]rial courts are generally allowed considerable discretion in granting or denying motions to disqualify counsel, and such decisions will only be overturned when the discretion is exceeded.” State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, ¶ 11, 198 P.3d 471. Normally, in “situations implicating [attorney ethical] rules,” we review the trial court's legal interpretation of the requirements of those rules for correctness. Id. But LoPrinzi has not challenged, or even acknowledged, the finding of fact underlying the trial court's determination that there was no misconduct, nor has she identified any rule that the conduct the court found to have occurred would violate. Accordingly, we have no occasion to decide whether the court correctly applied any rule of conduct to the unchallenged facts. We therefore simply affirm the trial court's determination that LoPrinzi has failed to show that any misconduct occurred.
¶ 10 Second, LoPrinzi challenges the trial court's decisions to deny her request for an instruction on sexual battery as a lesser included offense and to give the jury a flight instruction. We review a trial court's decision not to give a lesser included offense instruction...
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