State v. La Louche

• Decision Date: 16 May 1933
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. LA LOUCHE.

166 A. 252

116 Conn. 691

STATE v. LA LOUCHE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 16, 1933

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Arthur F. Ells, Judge.

Information charging Elias La Louche with the crime of indecent assault. Verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the defendant.

No error.

Evidence supported verdict that accused was guilty of indecent assault on his minor daughter.

Herman M. Levy and Edward G. Levy, both of New Haven, for appellant.

Abraham S. Uhman, Asst. State's Atty., Samuel E. Hoyt State's Atty., and Lying Sweedler, all of New Haven, for the State.

Argued before MALTRIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

HINMAN, Judge.

The finding is that the state offered evidence that in August 1932, the defendant lived near the shore. His daughter Josephine, aged 10 years, who resided elsewhere, frequently came to his house to change her clothing after bathing, and he was the only other person in his home at these times. A woman who occupied an adjoining cottage testified that on several occasions she saw the girl enter the defendant's house dressed in her bathing suit, and heard him accompany her to a second floor bedroom; that on two successive days she heard her make exclamations. Which she quoted, which aroused suspicion that the girl was being made the victim of indecent assaults, and she reported the circumstances to the West Haven police. Officers obtained a statement from the girl, and in conseqvence she was examined by two physicians; the examination disclosing a healed laceration of the hymen. The doctors testified that in their opinion the laceration had occurred ten days to two weeks prior to the examination, although admitting that it could have been sustained a much longer time before, and conceding, on cross-examination, that it might have been due to any one of a number of causes. Following this examination, the defendant was confronted by the girl and a relative at police headquarters. The record discloses that on the trial the girl was called to the stand but was unable to qualify as a witness.

After the evidence above outlined had been introduced, the chief of police was permitted to testify, over objection, that the defendant admitted that he had assaulted his daughter on three different occasions, giving details which we forbear to recount. Error is assigned in admitting this testimony and in denying the motion to set aside the verdict. Both assignments are based upon the contentions that the corpus delicti-the fact that the specific crime charged has been committed by some one-must be established by independent evidence before a confession by the accused can be introduced, and that it is then admissible only for the purpose of connecting the defendant with the crime. Undoubtedly the general rule is that the corpus delicti cannot be established by the extra-judicial confession of the defendant unsupported by corroborative evidence. 1 Wharton. Criminal Law (12th Ed.) § 357. There are cases which hold in effect that it must be established by evidence independent of the defendant's confession and that without such proof evidence of the confession is in admissible. People v. Tapia, 131 Cal. 647, 651, 63 P. 1001; Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss, 157, 59 Am.Dec. 247; Braxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 82 So. 637; note, 78 Am.Dec. 258; 7 R.C.L. 777.

The overwhelming weight of authority and of reason, however recognizes that such a confession or admission may be considered in connection with other evidence to establish the corpus delicti, and that it is not necessary to prove it by evidence entirely independent and exclusive of the confession. 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (12th Ed.) p. 459, 450; State v. Brinkley, 55 Or. 134, 104 P. 593, 105 P. 708; Groover v. State, 82 Fla. 427, 90 So. 473, 26 A.L.R. 375, 380; State v. Geltzeiler, 101 N. J. Law, 415, 128 A. 240; 7 R.C.L. 777. " In order to warrant a conviction in a given case, it must be shown (1) that a crime has been committed, and (2) that the person charged therewith was the active agent in the commission thereof. But, while it is necessary that both of said essential facts should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not follow that each must be proved independently of, and apart from, the other, or that either must be proved independently of, and without regarding, the confession of the person charged with the crime. The confession is evidence tending to prove both the fact that the crime was committed and the defendant's agency therein. State v. Hall, 31 W.Va. 505, 509. 7. S.E. 422. But it is not sufficient of itself to prove the former, and, without evidence aliunde of facts also tending to prove the corpus delicti, it is not enough to warrant a conviction. There must be such extrinsic corroborative evidence as will, when taken in connection with the confession, establish this fact in the minds of the jury beyond a reasonable...