State v. Loyd, 43571

• Decision Date: 02 November 1973
• Docket Number: No. 43571,43571
• Citation: 212 N.W.2d 671,297 Minn. 442
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Stanley LOYD, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 671

212 N.W.2d 671

297 Minn. 442

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Stanley LOYD, Appellant.

No. 43571.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 2, 1973.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A confession given by a juvenile before the juvenile court has waived its jurisdiction and referred him to be prosecuted as an adult is admissible in a criminal prosecution if he has been apprised of his constitutional rights and voluntarily and intelligently waives those rights in making the statement.

2. The totality of circumstances supported the trial court's finding that defendant's waiver of his constitutional rights was voluntary.

David P. Murrin, Legal Rights Center, Inc., Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George M. Scott, County Atty., Theodore

R. Rix, Vernon E. Bergstrom, Michael McGlennen, Asst. County Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and ROGOSHESKE, PETERSON, and KELLY, JJ.

KELLY, Justice.

Defendant, Stanley Loyd, age 16, appeals from a conviction of aggravated robbery in Hennepin County District Court after he had been referred by the juvenile court for adult prosecution. The issues presented concern the admissibility in a criminal prosecution of a confession given by a juvenile before the juvenile court has waived its jurisdiction and referred him to be prosecuted as an adult. We affirm.

The events leading to defendant's arrest and ultimate conviction involve the assault and robbery at gunpoint of two elderly widows on the evening of February 15, 1971. Four youths had gained entrance to the home of Mrs. Media Sheppard on the pretext of telephoning for help needed following a nearby automobile accident. The youths obtained a small amount of money after nearly an hour in the home, during which time both women were injured.

Officer Roger Brown of the Minneapolis Police Department was assigned to investigate this and other robberies which had occurred in the area. Officer Brown was the school liaison officer for certain south Minneapolis schools. His duties included the investigation of crimes which youths attending those schools were suspected of having committed. In this capacity he did not wear a police uniform, display a badge, or drive a police squad car.

Based on information from the two robbery victims, a warrant was secured for the arrest of defendant. Defendant was not at home when police stopped to take him into custody on the morning of February 17, 1971. Later that morning, Officer Brown was telephoned by defendant's parents, who said they had heard of the arrest warrant and would bring defendant to the courthouse for questioning.

Defendant was acquainted with Officer Brown through a number of conversations with him on previous occasions. He initially had been contacted by Officer Brown when the latter was investigating another case in which defendant was a suspect. The officer was aware that defendant was on juvenile parole and in other conversations with him had agreed to assist defendant in obtaining a job in order to aid him in discontinuing his associations with certain friends.

At approximately 11:30 a.m. on February 17, defendant, in the company of his parents, met with Officer Brown at the courthouse. Officer Brown informed defendant that he was investigating the robbery of the two widows and that defendant was a suspect in that robbery. He then gave him a standard Miranda warning but did not inform defendant of the possibility that he might be prosecuted as an adult. Defendant and his parents acknowledged that they understood the rights as explained by the officer and defendant admitted involvement in the robbery. Later, after another Miranda warning and waiver of rights, defendant signed a statement to this effect.

There is some conflict concerning the timing of certain representations made by Officer Brown during this interview. Defendant contends that the officer told him before his statement that he would only be sent back to the state training school at Red Wing if he confessed. Officer Brown stated that discussion of defendant's possible punishment did not occur until after he had confessed to the robbery. The trial court accepted Officer Brown's version of the incident.

On April 12, 1971, the Hennepin County Juvenile Court waived its jurisdiction over defendant and referred him pursuant to Minn.St. 260.125 for prosecution as an adult. After denial of defendant's motion to suppress his confession at a Rasmussen hearing, defendant was tried and found guilty of aggravated robbery.

We are called upon to decide whether confessions made by a juvenile during custodial interrogation by police officers while the juvenile is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court may be later admitted against him in a criminal proceeding. The present appeal does not raise the issue of parental presence at a juvenile's interrogation as a prerequisite to a waiver of his Miranda rights or of the admissibility of his spontaneous statements which are not a product of questioning. ¹

1. The issue is one of first impression to this court although we have recognized the need for special precautions in, and the vexatious nature of, custodial interrogation of juveniles concerning delinquent acts subsequently prosecuted as a crime. In State v. Ahlstrand, 288 Minn. 115, 179 N.W.2d 170 (1970), we were not required to decide the question presented here because the voluntariness of the confession was held immaterial in light of the juvenile's plea of guilty.

Juveniles as well as adults are entitled to be apprised of their constitutional rights according to the dictates of Miranda. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). In instances where a juvenile is later prosecuted as an adult, we must also be concerned that the juvenile is not misled by the nature of the juvenile system as to the consequences of his admission. The theory of the juvenile system is to treat the child in a rehabilitative atmosphere rather than in a criminal or punitive setting. The system is rooted in an informal and nonadversary setting to promote free disclosure and a trust relationship between the juvenile and representatives of the juvenile court. A confession of a juvenile must therefore be carefully scrutinized to assure that the juvenile court atmosphere did not encourage the child to confess when, if he had known that criminal prosecution as an adult could result, he might have exercised his right to remain silent.

The exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile offenders is provided in Minn.St. 260.111, subd. 1, which reads in part:

'Except as provided in section 260.125, the juvenile court has Original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child who is alleged to be delinquent * * *.' (Italics supplied.) ²

According to Minn.St. 260.211, subd. 1:

'* * * The disposition of the child Or any evidence given by the child In the juvenile court shall not be admissible as evidence against him in any case or proceeding in any other court * * *.' (Italics supplied.)

We must also consider whether these statutory provisions prohibit the use of statements made while the juvenile is under the juvenile court's jurisdiction.

The string of decisions concerning prereferral confessions of juveniles had its germination in the decision of Harling v. United States, 111 App.D.C. 174, 295 F.2d 161 (1961). That case established a per se exclusionary rule applied to statements made by a juvenile as the result of police interrogation before the juvenile court has waived its jurisdiction of the minor. The Harling court stated (111 App.D.C. 176, 295 F.2d 163):

'* * * (T)he principles of 'fundamental fairness' govern in fashioning procedures and remedies to serve the best interests of the child. It would offend these principles to allow admissions made by the child in the non-criminal and non-punitive setting of juvenile proceedings to be used later for the purpose of securing his criminal conviction and punishment. Such a practice would be tantamount to a breach of faith with the child, since he cannot be charged with knowledge of either his privilege against self-incrimination or the Juvenile Court's power to waive its jurisdiction and subject him to criminal penalties. Moreover, if admissions obtained in juvenile proceedings Before waiver of jurisdiction may be introduced in an adult proceeding After waiver, the juvenile proceedings are made to serve as an adjunct to and part of the adult criminal process. This would destroy the Juvenile Court's Parens patriae relation to the child and would violate the non-criminal philosophy which underlies the Juvenile Court Act.'

See, also, Harrison v. United States, 123 App.D.C. 230, 359 F.2d 214 (1965).

Relying on the Harling decision, the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Maloney, 102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967), adopted a modified rule. Arizona has an almost identical statutory provision to Minnesota in prohibiting the use of evidence given in juvenile court in another court. Compare 2 Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 8--228, subd. B (1956), with Minn.St. 260.211, subd. 1. Speaking to what evidence comes within this statutory provision, the court stated (102 Ariz. 498, 433 P.2d 628):

'As we see it, an inculpatory statement obtained by the police while the child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is part of the evidence gathering function of that court. The fact that such evidence was never offered to the juvenile court in a hearing to adjudicate whether the child is delinquent does not alter the fact that such an inculpatory statement is evidence.'

The court concluded (102 Ariz. 499, 433 P.2d 629):

'* * * We hold as a matter of 'fundamental fairness', and because § 8--228, subsec. B, 2 A.R.S., prohibits the use of such evidence, that inculpatory statements made by a child while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and before that court waives its jurisdiction, cannot later be used...