State v. Lucio-Camargo
Decision Date | 05 February 2003 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Leopoldo Celos LUCIO-CAMARGO, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Peter Gartlan, Chief Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was David E. Groom, Public Defender.
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, and DEITS, Chief Judge,1 and ARMSTRONG, Judge.
Defendant appeals from two convictions for burglary in the first degree, ORS 164.225, arguing that he can be convicted of only one burglary. When the case was originally before us, we agreed and reversed and remanded the judgment for the entry of a single conviction of burglary. State v. Lucio-Camargo, 172 Or.App. 298, 18 P.3d 467 (2001). The Supreme Court thereafter allowed review, vacated our decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of State v. Barnum, 333 Or. 297, 39 P.3d 178 (2002). State v. Lucio-Camargo, 334 Or. 491, 52 P.3d 1056 (2002). On reconsideration, we again reverse.
We described the facts in our previous decision and therefore summarize them here. Late one afternoon, defendant went to an apartment where his girlfriend Hernandez, her three children, her mother Villa-Lopez, and a married couple lived. Defendant had previously threatened Hernandez, who had obtained a restraining order but continued to communicate with him at times. When Hernandez opened the door, defendant removed an air chisel, which resembled a pistol, from under his coat and pointed it in her direction. She slammed the door and ran out of the apartment, accompanied by one child and Villa-Lopez. Defendant then entered the apartment. Because the other children were still inside, Villa-Lopez returned and confronted defendant. He threatened her verbally and with the air chisel. As a result of his actions, defendant was indicted for, and convicted of, two counts of first-degree burglary, ORS 164.225, and two counts of menacing, ORS 163.190. The first burglary count alleges that he unlawfully and knowingly entered and remained in the apartment with the intent of committing the crime of assault and that he caused or threatened physical injury to Villa-Lopez. The second count alleges that he entered and remained unlawfully in the apartment with the intent of committing the crime of menacing and that he caused or threatened physical injury to Hernandez.2 One count of menacing involved defendant's actions towards Hernandez, while the other involved his actions toward Villa-Lopez; the menacing convictions are not at issue on appeal. The court ordered that the sentences on the second burglary count and on the two menacing counts be concurrent with the sentence on the first burglary count.
The issue on appeal is whether the two burglary counts are separately punishable offenses under ORS 161.067 and, if they are not, whether separate convictions on each count are proper. ORS 161.067 is the controlling statute, providing when multiple convictions and punishments arising out of the conduct or criminal episode are permissible. It provides:
Under ORS 164.215(1), a person commits the crime of burglary if the person "enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein." The crime is burglary in the first degree if the building is a dwelling, ORS 164.225(1), or if the person, while effecting entry, while in the building, or while in immediate flight from the building, causes or attempts to cause physical injury to any person. ORS 164.225(1)(b).
In our previous opinion, and in light of the evidence, we treated Count I as alleging an unlawful entry into the premises with the intent to assault Hernandez and Count II as alleging an unlawful remaining on the premises with the intent to menace Villa-Lopez. Lucio-Camargo, 172 Or.App. at 301,18 P.3d 467.3 The issue was whether under ORS 161.067 the evidence supported separate convictions for Count I and Count II.
In our previous opinion, we first considered the wording and legislative history of ORS 161.067 and the burglary statutes and concluded that the two burglary counts did not allege separately punishable offenses. We reasoned that ORS 164.225 constitutes a single statutory provision that could be violated in two different ways. We began our analysis by taking our cue from State v. Barrett, 331 Or. 27, 33, 10 P.3d 901 (2000), and observing that the relevant wording of former ORS 161.062(1), repealed by Or. Laws 1999, ch. 136, § 1, is identical to ORS 161.067(1). We inquired whether the legislature intended the "unlawfully entering" portion of ORS 164.215 and ORS 164.225 to address a discrete concern from the "unlawfully remaining" portion of ORS 164.215 and ORS 164.225. Ultimately, we determined that ORS 164.225 is a single statutory provision that can be violated in two different ways. Lucio-Camargo, 172 Or.App. at 308, 18 P.3d 467. That inquiry led us to determine that ORS 161.067(2) was also inapplicable. We observed that, for the purpose of determining whether the burglary counts were separately punishable offenses, burglary has only one victim, even though there may be more than one occupant of the invaded property. Id. We then considered whether defendant's conduct constituted repeated violations of the same statutory provision under ORS 161.067(3). The evidence showed that defendant's conduct directed at Villa-Lopez continued without interruption after his unlawful entry and his threats made against Hernandez. Id. at 309-10, 18 P.3d 467. Because the facts did not support multiple convictions under ORS 161.067, we remanded the case for the trial court to enter a single burglary conviction. Id. at 310, 18 P.3d 467.
The Supreme Court has now instructed us to reconsider our previous decision in light of Barnum. However, applying the rule of Barnum to these facts presents a difficulty. To explain that difficulty, we trace the development of the law to its current state. Former ORS 161.062 was enacted in 1985, followed by ORS 161.067 in 1986. In State v. Crotsley, 308 Or. 272, 276-77, 779 P.2d 600 (1989), the court explained the import of those statutes:
(Footnotes omitted.)
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