State v. Lucio-Camargo
Decision Date | 07 February 2001 |
Citation | 172 Or. App. 298,18 P.3d 467 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Leopoldo Celos LUCIO-CAMARGO, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Peter Gartlan, Chief Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was David E. Groom, Public Defender.
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Defendant appeals from two convictions for burglary in the first degree. ORS 164.225. He contends on appeal that, on the facts of this case, he can be convicted of only one burglary. We reverse.
We state the facts in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Cervantes, 319 Or. 121, 125, 873 P.2d 316 (1994). Late one afternoon, defendant went to an apartment where his girlfriend, Hernandez, her three minor children, her mother, Villa-Lopez, and another couple lived. Hernandez had petitioned for and had obtained a restraining order prohibiting defendant from contacting her or from coming to her residence. Defendant had allegedly threatened to kill Hernandez and himself in the weeks immediately preceding the visit, and he had been physically abusive in the past. Hernandez had talked with defendant on the telephone and had allowed him to come to her residence at times despite the restraining order. On the day in question, defendant knocked on the apartment door, and when Hernandez answered, he said either, "I'm going to do you a favor," or "I need you to do me a favor." He then reached under his coat, and removed an air chisel that resembled a pistol.1 He pointed it in the direction of Hernandez. She immediately slammed the door closed, leaving defendant standing outside, and ran out of her apartment through another door, followed by her oldest child and Villa-Lopez. From another apartment, Hernandez and Villa-Lopez could see that defendant had entered their apartment and was standing at a window, looking out. Villa-Lopez then returned to the apartment because two children remained inside. She confronted defendant, who was then sitting on a chair in the apartment, and asked him why he had frightened Hernandez and what he was doing in the apartment. Defendant picked up the tool from the floor and told Villa-Lopez to "shut up." Villa-Lopez testified that defendant told her that she was the one he was going to kill. Defendant then left the apartment.
Subsequently, defendant was charged with two counts of burglary and two counts of menacing. The two burglary counts alleged that he had entered the apartment unlawfully, intending to assault Hernandez, and that he had remained there unlawfully, intending to menace Villa-Lopez.
He relies on our holdings in State v. Barnum, 157 Or.App. 68, 970 P.2d 1214 (1998), rev. allowed 328 Or. 594, 987 P.2d 514 (1999), and State v. Sparks, 150 Or.App. 293, 946 P.2d 314 (1997), rev. den. 326 Or. 390, 952 P.2d 63 (1998). The state responds first that defendant did not raise the argument to the trial court that he makes on appeal and, second, that defendant was properly convicted twice for burglary.
However, the remainder of counsel's statements to the court clarified that he was in fact requesting that the convictions merge.3 He argued:
Defense counsel then said that he agreed with the state's recommendation that the sentences imposed on the burglary counts should be concurrent. Despite defense counsel's initial inartful statement, we are persuaded that the state and the trial court recognized that defendant was requesting that the convictions merge. We conclude that defendant has preserved the issue that he raises on appeal.
We turn to the issue of whether defendant could properly be convicted of two counts of burglary on these facts. The issue implicates several statutes: ORS 164.215, which defines burglary generally; ORS 164.205, which provides definitions of the terms of the burglary statute; ORS 164.225, which defines first-degree burglary; and ORS 161.067, which delineates the number of separate offenses for which a defendant can be convicted or punished.4
ORS 164.215 provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in ORS 164.255, a person commits the crime of burglary in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein." (Emphasis added.)
ORS 164.225(1) provides, in relevant part:
The term "enter or remain unlawfully" is defined in ORS 164.205(3), which states, in part:
Finally, ORS 161.067 provides, in part:
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State v. J.N.S. (In re J.N.S.)
...constitute criminal mischief in the third degree, ORS 164.345. 2. This court reached the same conclusion in State v. Lucio–Camargo, 172 Or.App. 298, 301, 18 P.3d 467 (2001), rev. allowed, judgment vac'd,334 Or. 491, 52 P.3d 1056 (2002), a merger case that also involved a defendant charged w......
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State v. Lucio-Camargo
...before us, we agreed and reversed and remanded the judgment for the entry of a single conviction of burglary. State v. Lucio-Camargo, 172 Or.App. 298, 18 P.3d 467 (2001). The Supreme Court thereafter allowed review, vacated our decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of State v.......
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State v. McCloud
...criminal conduct to afford him the opportunity to renounce criminal intent." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in State v. Lucio-Camargo, 172 Or.App. 298, 310, 18 P.3d 467 (2001), we treated ORS 161.067(3) as relating to requirements for when "separate convictions * * * can be entered[.]" (Empha......
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State v. Schwartz
...provisions of ORS 161.067 are nearly identical, however, and ORS 161.067 remains effective. See generally State v. Lucio-Camargo, 172 Or.App. 298, 303 n.4, 18 P.3d 467 (2001)(explaining history of the anti-merger statutes); State v. Sumerlin, 139 Or.App. 579, 583 n. 4, 913 P.2d 340 (1996) (......
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CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND COMPUTER CRIME.
...request' means a warning or request communicated in writing."). (309.) N.Y. PENAL LAW [section] 140.10; see also State v. Lucio-Camargo, 18 P.3d 467, 470 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (noting influence of New York statute), vacated on other grounds, 52 P.3d 1056 (Or. 2002); MODEL PENAL CODE [section]......