State v. Lugo

• Decision Date: 09 December 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16553)
• Citation: 266 Conn. 674,835 A.2d 451
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RUPERTO LUGO

266 Conn. 674

835 A.2d 451

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RUPERTO LUGO

(SC 16553)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 15, 2003.

Officially released December 9, 2003.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js. Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Nancy L. Chupak, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Walter D. Flanagan, state's attorney, and Devin T. Stilson, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

ZARELLA, J.

The defendant, Ruperto Lugo, was convicted,¹ after a jury trial, of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c,² attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a) (2)³ and 53a-49 (a),⁴ carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 29-35 (a),⁵ and having a weapon in a vehicle in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 29-38.⁶

The defendant was sentenced to a total effective term of fifty years imprisonment and ten years of special parole. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court improperly: (1) restricted the scope of questioning during voir dire examination in violation of his rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution,⁷ and under the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8,⁸ and article first, § 19, as amended by article four of the amendments;⁹ (2) excluded relevant evidence regarding the defendant's state of mind in violation of his right to a fair trial; and (3) restricted the defendant's cross-examination of one of the state's witnesses in violation of his right to present a defense under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. We reject each of these claims and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In the early evening of July 10, 1999, Barbara Carleton, Mary Pires, Alexis Barnett and the defendant, were driving around Bridgeport discussing plans to drive to Newtown. Prior to leaving Bridgeport, the group picked up Alejandro Melendez,¹⁰ a friend of the defendant. Before Melendez got into the car, the defendant asked him if he "was down for robbing some niggers?"¹¹ Melendez responded affirmatively and joined the group. During the trip, the defendant took a gun owned by Melendez and placed it on the floor of the car, behind the glove compartment.

After arriving in Newtown, the group encountered a group of three boys, Matt Haight, Brandon Jossick, and the victim, Jason Gowdy, all of whom Pires recognized. As they drove toward the boys, Pires warned the group to "watch out" because one of the boys supposedly was a member of the Latin Kings gang. Thereafter, the defendant retrieved the gun and placed it in his waistband and under his shirt. Pires then exited the vehicle and talked with the boys. After Pires returned to the vehicle, the defendant exited the vehicle and approached the boys. After the defendant asked the boys several questions, the defendant and the victim stood face-to-face. The defendant indicated to the victim that he was carrying a gun. The victim responded by stating, "What? You gonna shoot me? Then shoot me ...." The victim then represented to the defendant that he was a member of the Latin Kings and that if he shot him, there would be consequences. The defendant then ordered the victim to "run [his] chain," or, in other words, give him the necklace that he was wearing. A scuffle ensued between the defendant and the victim during which the defendant fired two bullets into the victim's head. The defendant returned to the vehicle and directed Carleton to drive away. Paramedics subsequently transported the victim to Danbury Hospital where he was pronounced dead.

The group eventually returned to Bridgeport. The morning after the shooting, the defendant informed Carleton that he was leaving Connecticut for Pennsylvania. The defendant subsequently was arrested in New Haven before he departed for Pennsylvania.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly restricted the scope of defense counsel's examination of prospective jurors by precluding him from asking them about their knowledge of the Latin Kings. Consequently, the defendant claims, he was deprived of his rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, and the Connecticut constitution, article first, § 8, and article first, § 19, as amended by article four of the amendments. See footnotes 7 through 9 of this opinion. The defendant argues that the victim's status as a member of the Latin Kings was integral to his defense that he never possessed the requisite intent to commit the crime of attempted robbery in the first degree. According to the defendant, because Pires had warned him immediately prior to the shooting that the victim was a member of the Latin Kings, he armed himself prior to exiting the car for the purpose of protecting himself rather than for the purpose of committing a robbery. Thus, the defendant claims that he "should have been allowed to uncover potential bias for or against gangs and specifically the Latin Kings." The defendant claims further that "there was a possibility that a juror might have had relatives that were members of the Latin Kings or another gang and [have] had certain preconceived ideas that might have influenced whether the defendant wished to exercise a peremptory challenge ...." Accordingly, the defendant contends that, because the victim's status as a Latin King was a relevant issue in the case, the trial court's decision to restrict voir dire questioning on that issue constituted an abuse of discretion and resulted in a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.

The following additional facts are necessary to our resolution of this issue. During voir dire, defense counsel asked the second prospective juror¹² the following questions: (1) "Have you ever heard the term `Latin King'?" (2) "If there were some indication of gang membership by anybody involved in this case, would that affect you at all?" (3) "[Y]ou could just deal with those people, that person, or that information, just as you would anyone else?" The prospective juror answered "no" to the first two questions and affirmatively to the third question.

Thereafter, outside the presence of the prospective jurors, the trial court instructed defense counsel regarding the appropriate scope of voir dire questioning.¹³ The court noted that it was improper to elicit a prospective juror's reaction to a particular piece of evidence through voir dire questioning and, thus, instructed counsel to avoid questions concerning the Latin Kings. Defense counsel objected, claiming that, on the basis of the information revealed at the probable cause hearing, it was crucial to determine a prospective juror's attitude toward the Latin Kings or gangs in general. The trial court reiterated that, in its view, defense counsel's proposed question was an inappropriate attempt to elicit the prospective juror's reaction to the potential evidence concerning the victim's status as a member of the Latin Kings. In addition, the trial court assured defense counsel that if evidence were adduced at trial that indicated that the Latin Kings somehow were involved in the case, the court would give the jurors a cautionary instruction regarding their duty to decide the case on the basis of the evidence. Defense counsel then inquired as to whether the court was precluding him from posing that question to any subsequent prospective juror. The court responded, "I'm not going to permit you to ask questions about the juror's knowledge of the Latin Kings or how [the juror] might react to the evidence.... So, you asked me if you're permitted to ask that question. The answer's no."¹⁴

"We have stated that, as a practical matter, the wide range of cases submitted to juries, along with the attendant impossibility of establishing a set pattern of voir dire questions, requires that the trial court be vested with broad discretion in determining the extent of the voir dire examination. See State v. Hernandez, 204 Conn. 377, 381, 528 A.2d 794 (1987); State v. Dolphin, 203 Conn. 506, 511-12, 525 A.2d 509 (1987)." State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 73-74, 530 A.2d 155 (1987). "[I]n exercising its discretion, the court should grant such latitude as is reasonably necessary to accomplish the twofold purpose of voir dire: to permit the trial court to determine whether a prospective juror is qualified to serve, and to aid the parties in exercising their right to peremptory challenges." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Skipper, 228 Conn. 610, 625, 637 A.2d 1101 (1994). It is well settled that "the court's rulings... will not be disturbed unless the court has clearly abused its discretion or it appears that prejudice to one of the parties has resulted. State v. Dahlgren, 200 Conn. 586, 601, 512 A.2d 906 (1986); State v. Rogers, 197 Conn. 314, 318, 497 A.2d 387 (1985)." State v. Pollitt, supra, 74.

"[I]f there is any likelihood that some prejudice is in the juror's mind which will even subconsciously affect his decision of the case, the party who may be adversely affected should be permitted questions designed to uncover that prejudice.... State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 142, 120 A.2d 152 (1956); see also State v. Rogers, [supra, 197 Conn. 318]. The latitude ... afforded the parties in order that they may accomplish the purposes of the voir dire [however] is tempered by the rule that [q]uestions addressed to prospective jurors involving assumptions or hypotheses concerning the evidence which may be offered at the trial ... should be discouraged.... [A]ll too frequently such inquiries represent a calculated effort on the part of counsel to ascertain before the trial starts what the...