State v. Lujan

• Decision Date: 18 February 2015
• Docket Number: 33,349.
• Citation: 345 P.3d 1103
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Nodee LUJAN, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

345 P.3d 1103

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Nodee LUJAN, Defendant–Appellee.

33,349.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Feb. 18, 2015.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

{1} Defendant Nodee Lujan was charged with two counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor in the fourth degree. See NMSA 1978, § 30–9–13(A), (D)(1) (2004). The State appeals the district court's order that dismissed Defendant's charges based upon a violation of Defendant's right to a speedy trial under the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} On March 16, 2012, the State arrested and filed a criminal complaint against Defendant for two counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor in the fourth degree. Defendant was released on March 22, 2012, and his trial was set for October 16, 2012.

{3} On August 16, 2012, Defendant notified the State that he took and passed a polygraph test and that he intended to use the test results at trial. On September 24, 2012, the State filed a motion to compel Defendant to take another polygraph examination, which the district court denied. On October 4, 2012, twelve days before the trial was to begin, the State notified Defendant's counsel that the victim had also taken and passed a polygraph test. Defendant objected to the State's motion to admit the results of the victim's polygraph examination on the basis of late disclosure. See Rule 11–707(D) NMRA (“A party who wishes to use polygraph evidence at trial must provide written notice no less than thirty (30) days before trial or within such other time as the district court may direct.”). The State moved to continue the trial. The district court denied the State's continuance motion, and it scheduled a hearing to resolve the State's motion to admit the victim's polygraph results for the day of trial.

{4} On October 15, 2012, the day before the trial was to begin, the State dismissed the charges against Defendant. It refiled identical charges eight days later. Defendant pleaded not guilty to the refiled charges at his May 2013 arraignment. Trial on the refiled charges was set for October 15, 2013, one year after his first trial had been scheduled to begin.

{5} On July 11, 2013, five months before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on speedy trial grounds. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion on October 8, 2013, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the case.

{6} On appeal, the State concedes that the delay presumptively prejudiced Defendant and that “the reasons for the delay should be attributed to the State.” However, it argues that the district court should not have weighed the delay heavily against the State “because Defendant caused some of the delay and much of the delay was beyond the control of either party.” The State also contends that Defendant did not assert his speedy trial right and that any prejudice he suffered was not “undue.”

DISCUSSION

A. General Principles and Standard of Review

{7} The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The New Mexico Constitution affords a similar right: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to ... a speedy public trial.” N.M. Const. art. II, § 14. “Though speed is an important attribute of the right,” the right “does not preclude the rights of public justice”—“if either party is forced to trial without a fair opportunity for preparation, justice is sacrificed to speed.” State v. Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387(alteration, internal quotations marks, and citations omitted). We therefore analyze “the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.” Id.

{8} In determining whether a defendant's speedy trial right was denied, our Supreme Court has adopted the balancing test that the United States Supreme Court created in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶¶ 9, 13, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. Under the Barker framework, we weigh “the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant” under the guidance of four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the timeliness and manner in which the defendant asserted his speedy trial right, and (4) the particular prejudice that the defendant actually suffered. Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶¶ 13, 32, 35, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. “Each of these factors is weighed either in favor of or against the State or the defendant, and then balanced to determine if a defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated.” State v. Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 17, 283 P.3d 272. Because none of these factors is “talismanic[,]” we analyze speedy trial claims on a case-by-case basis. State v. Palacio, 2009–NMCA–074, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 594, 212 P.3d 1148.

{9} Before applying the balancing test, we first assess whether the length of the delay was “presumptively prejudicial,” depending on the complexity of the case. See Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 21, 283 P.3d 272 ; see also Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (“[A] ‘presumptively prejudicial’ length of delay is simply a triggering mechanism, requiring further inquiry into the Barker factors.”). “A delay of trial of one year is presumptively prejudicial in simple cases, fifteen months in intermediate cases, and eighteen months in complex cases.” Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 21, 283 P.3d 272. The State concedes that the length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial. We agree with the State's concession. See State v. Urban, 2004–NMSC–007, ¶ 13, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 1061 (agreeing with the state's concession that a sufficient lapse of time is presumptively prejudicial). We therefore proceed to inquire further into the Barker factors. See Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.

{10} Although we defer to the district court's factual findings concerning each factor, we independently review the record to determine whether a defendant was denied his speedy trial right, and we weigh and balance the Barker factors de novo. Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 19, 283 P.3d 272 ; Palacio, 2009–NMCA–074, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 594, 212 P.3d 1148 ; see also State v. Collier, 2013–NMSC–015, ¶ 41, 301 P.3d 370 (stating that the Barker factors are “factually based”).

B. Discussion and Weighing of the Factors

1. Length of Delay

{11} In determining what weight to give the length of any delay, we consider the extent to which the delay stretched beyond the presumptively prejudicial period. State v. Ochoa, 2014–NMCA–065, ¶ 6, 327 P.3d 1102, cert. granted, 2014–NMCERT–006, 328 P.3d 1188. “[T]he greater the delay [,] the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [s]tate.” Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 24, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. A delay that “scarcely crosses the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim” will “not weigh heavily in [a d]efendant's favor.” Id. ¶¶ 23–24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); compare State v. Steinmetz, 2014–NMCA–070, ¶ 6, 327 P.3d 1145 (concluding that a delay of twenty-eight months beyond the presumptive threshold weighed “moderately” against the State in a case of intermediate complexity), cert. denied, 2014–NMCERT–006, 328 P.3d 1188, with Urban, 2004–NMSC–007, ¶ 20, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 1061, (concluding that an eighteen-month delay beyond the presumptive threshold weighed heavily against the State in a simple case); State v. Marquez, 2001–NMCA–062, ¶ 12, 130 N.M. 651, 29 P.3d 1052 (concluding that a nine-month delay beyond the presumptive threshold weighed heavily against the State in a simple case), and State v. Montoya, 2011–NMCA–074, ¶ 17, 150 N.M. 415, 259 P.3d 820 (concluding that a six- month delay beyond the presumptive threshold weighed slightly against the State in a case of intermediate complexity).

{12} The district court found that this was a simple case, because “[t]he only contested issue ... is the credibility of the witnesses [,]” and “the issues regarding the competing polygraph test results [would] have been resolved pretrial[.]” The State disagrees. It argues that the case was “more complicated” because it “involved minor children” and the results of Defendant's and the victim's polygraph tests “were at odds with each other.” We defer to the district court's finding that this was a simple case because it was in the best position to make that determination. See State v. Coffin, 1999–NMSC–038, ¶ 57, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477 ; State v. Johnson, 2007–NMCA–107, ¶ 7, 142 N.M. 377, 165 P.3d 1153.

{13} The State and Defendant disagree on how we should calculate the length of time that Defendant's trial was delayed. Both agree that Defendant's speedy trial right accrued on March 16, 2012—the day that the State filed its first criminal complaint and arrested him. However, the State argues that the delay should be calculated at sixteen months because we should stop counting the delay on the date that Defendant filed his motion to dismiss. Defendant argues that the delay was nineteen months because we should stop counting the delay on the date that the charges were dismissed. We generally agree with Defendant. Under these circumstances, where Defendant's trial was set for October 15, 2013, the district court heard Defendant's motion to dismiss on October 8, 2013, and the order dismissing the charges was entered on October 30, 2013, we conclude that the calculation of the delay extends to either the date that the charges were dismissed or the date the trial was scheduled to begin. See Marquez, 2001–NMCA–062, ¶ 11, 130 N.M. 651, 29 P.3d 1052 (concluding that the length of delay includes the entire...