State v. Luquette

Decision Date26 March 1973
Docket NumberNo. 52695,52695
Citation275 So.2d 396
PartiesSTATE of Louisiana v. John R. LUQUETTE.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

G. Wray Gill, Sr., Gordon Goodbee, Covington, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Woodrow W. Erwin, Dist. Atty., Julian J. Rodrigue, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

SUMMERS, Justice.

Appellant, John R. Luquette, was charged with the murder of Frank Trasher. He was tried, convicted and sentenced to death. On this appeal he assigns fuor alleged erros upon which he relies to set aside his conviction and sentence.

The errors assigned can be grouped into two issues. One involves the mental capacity of the accused both at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial sentence. This issue is presented by a motion to have the defendant examined at the expense of the State, a motion for appointment of a lunacy commission, a motion in arrest of judgment, and a motion for a new trial, all of which were denied. Bills of exceptions were reserved to these rulings.

The insanity issue was raised after verdict and before sentencing.

Evidence received at a hearing on these motions consisted of the testimony of appellant's mother, his wife and several acquaintances. His mother tells of the stepfather's mistreatment of appellant while he was a young boy. It was necessary she said, to send appellant to a psychiatrist for treatment on several occasions at that time. She also stated that there was a history of mental instability in her family. One of her children, appellant's half-sister, committed suicide at the age of thirteen. Another son, appellant's half-brother, is mentally deranged. A letter from a psychiatrist supports her statement that in 1966 she received treatment for a nervous and mental condition, including electro-convulsive treatments. At that time he recommended hospitalization for her in Central Louisiana State Hospital.

Other relevant evidence consisted of testimony by several acquaintances of appellant to the effect that his actions were erratic or violent when he overindulged in intoxicating liquors.

Although the whereabouts of these witnesses was well-known to appellant's wife prior to trial, the question of his mental condition was never gone into with defense counsel until after his trial and conviction.

At the conclusion of the hearing the trial judge ruled as follows:

My review in my own mind of the trial, of the motions that were filed and heard prior to the trial, of the days here in court with the defendant and his lawyer and what has transpired since then, the evidence that went before that jury on the several days that it took to try this case, my conclusion for the record is that I do not have reasonable grounds to doubt his mental capacity to proceed.

On the basis of these findings, all of the motions presenting the issue of appellant's mental capacity were denied. The trial judge had the opportunity to observe the defendant's actions, demeanor and attitude prior to and during a lengthy trial. His determination of fact is entitled to great weight. And the record does not support a contrary finding for the evidence does not preponderate in favor of appellant. The trial court finding will not be disturbed on this appeal.

The law presumes that a man is sane. No absolute right to the appointment of a lunacy commission is assured by the law in every case.

The appointment of a commission to inquire into the mental condition of the accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, the test being whether, from the facts brought to the attention of the judge, he has reasonable ground to believe that the accused is insane or mentally defective to the extent that he is unable to understand the proceedings against him. Under these rules the accused bears the burden of establishing by a clear preponderance of the evidence reasonable grounds to believe that he is mentally defective. Hence the burden was on the appellant to exhibit that there was a manifest abuse of discretion by the judge. This he has not done as the testimony of his witnesses is not of such quality to inspire in the judge a reasonable basis for believing that appellant was or is insane. La.Code Crim.Proc. arts. 641--649. State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135 (1966); State v. Graves, 247 La. 683, 174 So.2d 118 (1965); State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So.2d 785 (1948); State v. Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947); State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305 (1945); State v. Washington, 207 La. 849, 22 So.2d 193 (1945); State v. Messer, 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633 (1940); State v. Hebert, 186 La. 308, 172 So. 167 (1937); State v. Ridgeway, 178 La. 606, 152 So. 306 (1934). Appointment of a commission to inquire into appellant's mental condition was properly refused.

Since the allegation of mental incompetency lies at the foundation of the motion for a directed verdict and motion for a new trial, the finding that defendant was mentally competent during trial and at the time of the hearing makes further consideration of these motions unnecessary insofar as insanity at the time of the trial is concerned. On the question whether there was sufficient evidence of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense which would warrant granting a new trial, the trial judge's ruling is correct. The evidence does not support the defense contention. La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 851--862. Moreover, the proper time to raise this issue is by a plea of insanity at the time of arraignment. La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 552.

The motion for a continuance requests time before sentencing. It is based upon the contention that sentence cannot be imposed upon an insane person and that time was required to establish the present insanity of appellant. Ample opportunity existed to establish the defense contention prior to this last minute motion. The finding that appellant had mental capacity to proceed and that he was not insane when the motion was tried makes this contention insubstantial and without merit. La.Code Crim.Proc. arts. 707--715.

Notwithstanding that the insanity issue furnishes no basis for reversal, it has been considered for the effect our views may have upon the new trial which must be granted on the next issue.

The second and final issue is understood to be a claim of error arising out of the failure of the trial judge to sequester jurors after some of them were sworn, but before the entire jury was chosen. A proper bill of exceptions was not reserved or perfected to preserve this issue for review. The State relies upon this failure to object or reserve a bill to persuade the court it should not consider this contention.

A review of the record discloses the following pertinent minute entry:

The List of Jurors now having been exhausted; the Court stated that after discussing the matter with the Jury and with counsel, and having explained that since no witnesses have been heard and the impaneling of the jury was not complete, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED...

To continue reading

Request your trial
33 cases
  • Watts v. State, 96-DP-01030-SCT.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • 28 Enero 1999
    ......791(B), it was noted that the restriction against wavier was premised on the idea that a "`[d]efendant ought not to be placed in the position of having to consent, or perhaps prejudice the jury by withholding consent.'" State v. Taylor, 669 So.2d 364, 381 (La.1996) ( quoting State v. Luquette, 275 So.2d 396, 400 (La.1973), overruled by Taylor, 669 So.2d at 381 ). As the Taylor court pointed out, concerns about prejudicing the defendant may be remedied by following the proper procedure, that is, by considering the issue of waiver of sequestration outside the presence of the jury ......
  • 96-261 La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/96, State v. Smith
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
    • 30 Diciembre 1996
    ...... Based on the totality of circumstances in that case, the court found that the procedures employed by the trial court did not properly insulate the jurors from outside communication, citing the continuing and substantial failure to adhere to sequestration mandates. Similarly, in State v. Luquette, 275 So.2d 396 (La.1973), the [96-261 La.App. 3 Cir. 16] court set aside a conviction based on the failure of the trial judge to sequester the jurors after some of them were sworn, but before the entire jury was chosen. In that case, the state made no effort to rebut the presumption of prejudice ......
  • State v. Nix
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Louisiana
    • 8 Diciembre 1975
    ...... La.C.Cr.P. art. 643. The judgment of the trial court will not be reversed unless there is a strong showing of clear abuse of discretion. State v. Luquette, 275 So.2d 396 (La.1973); State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135 (1966), Cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923, 87 S.Ct. 2144, 18 L.Ed.2d 1374 (1967). The appointment of a lunacy commission is not a perfunctory matter or a ministerial duty of the trial court, nor is it guaranteed to every accused in ......
  • State v. G.R.H., No. 08-1549 (La. App. 6/3/2009)
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
    • 3 Junio 2009
    ...if it is found that he acquiesced in the failure to sequester the jury. In support of his argument, Defendant cites State v. Luquette, 275 So.2d 396 (La.1973), overruled by State v. Taylor, 93-2201 (La. 2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 860, 117 S.Ct. 162 (1996), and State v. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT