State v. Lyle M. Heyward

• Decision Date: 18 May 1998
• Docket Number: 98-LW-2636,96CA42
• Parties: STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. LYLE M. HEYWARD, Defendant-Appellant Case
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. LYLE M. HEYWARD, Defendant-Appellant

No. 96CA42.

98-LW-2636 (4th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District Pickaway

May 18, 1998

David K. Greer, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.^[1]

Jonathan L. Metzler, Assistant Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee.

DECISION

Stephenson P.J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Pickaway County upon a jury verdict. The jury found Lyle Heyward, defendant below and appellant herein, guilty of murder, in connection with the death of Rondel Sanders. The following errors are assigned for our review:

I.

"THE TRIAL COURT DENIED APPELLANT HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFLICT-FREE COUNSEL WHEN IT REFUSED TO GRANT COUNSEL'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW AFTER APPELLANT HAD FILED A DISCIPLINARY GRIEVANCE AGAINST HIM."

II.

"THE TRIAL COURT DENIED APPELLANT HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN REFUSING TO SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL WHEN AN IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT AROSE BETWEEN APPELLANT AND HIS ATTORNEY."

III.

"APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL."

IV.

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENTS, AS THEY WERE NOT VOLUNTARILY GIVEN, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT."

V.

"THE TRIAL COURT DENIED APPELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO INDIVIDUALLY POLL THE JURY, IN VIOLATION OF R.C 2945.77."

In addition to the above assignments of error set forth by Heyward's assigned counsel, Heyward submits, pro se, two additional assignments of error:

I.

"TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE, DUE TO SIXTH AMENDMENT SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION."

II.

"STATE KNOWINGLY FAILED TO PROVIDE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED DISCOVERY ITEMS AND THE COURTS FAILURE TO DISMISS FOR THE SAME REASON, DENYING APPALLENT [SIC] DUE PROCESS AND FAIR TRIAL."

The record reveals the following facts pertinent to this appeal. On December 31, 1994, Rondel Sanders, an inmate at the Orient Correctional Center, in Orient, Ohio, was stabbed to death in the prison yard. Appellant, Lyle Heyward, had suspected Sanders of stealing a set of stereo headphones belonging to Heyward's friend, and fellow inmate, Michael Milner. Heyward and Milner had confronted Sanders in the prison yard where an argument ensued. Heyward left the area briefly. Immediately upon his return, an altercation broke out between he and Sanders. After a few punches were thrown, Sanders collapsed to the ground and died a short time later from a single stab wound to the chest.

Heyward was indicted for Sanders' murder on February 3, 1995 and the matter came to trial before a jury on September 18, 1996. At trial, Heyward maintained that it was Sanders, and not he, who introduced a knife into the fight. Hayward asserted that he acted in self- defense and that Sanders suffered his fatal wound when he slipped during the fight. On September 25, 1996, the jury returned a verdict finding Heyward guilty of Sanders, murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02. On September 30, 1996, the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict and sentenced Heyward to fifteen years to life, to be served consecutively to the sentence Heyward was serving at the time of the instant offense. Heyward perfected a timely appeal. He now submits for our review the above enumerated assignments of error.

Heyward's first and second assignments of error raise related issues. We will, therefore, address them together.

In his first and second assignments of error, Heyward contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant trial counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel and in failing to appoint substitute counsel when an irreconcilable conflict arose between Heyward and his trial counsel. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

"The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution does not always mean counsel of one's own choosing. The right to counsel must be tempered by the public's right to a prompt, orderly and efficient administration of justice. Attorneys cannot be shed at every stage of the proceeding so as to impede that orderly administration. On the other hand, there is a right to discharge counsel because of the personal nature of the services being performed. Thus, it is the trial court's duty to balance the defendant's right to counsel against the public interest in the administration of justice. Annotation, 73 A.L.R. ad 725, at 731732."

State v. Marinchek (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 22, 23-24.

To warrant substitution of counsel, a defendant must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict. State v. Davis (June 4, 1994), Ross App. No. 96CA2181, unreported. When an indigent defendant challenges the effectiveness and adequacy of assigned counsel, the trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire into the defendant's complaint and make the inquiry a part of the record. State v. Deal (1969), 17 Ohio St.2d 17, 20. Further, where the trial court knows, or reasonably should know, of counsel's possible conflict of interest, the court has an affirmative duty to inquire whether an actual conflict exists. State v. Gillard (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 304, syllabus.

However, the decision whether to appoint substitute counsel rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Dukes (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 263. We will not reverse a trial court's decision on this issue absent an abuse of discretion. Id. The term "abuse of discretion" connotes a decision that is "unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157.

A review of the record in the instant case reveals that on June 25, 1996, six days before a scheduled July 1, 1996 trial date, (which had already been continued a number of times) Heyward's trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. In his motion, counsel represented to the court that on June 24, 1996 he met with Heyward, at which time Heyward informed him that he no longer wished for counsel to represent him and that he had filed a grievance against counsel. Thereafter, on June 27, 1996, Heyward filed a letter with the trial court in which he requested that counsel be relieved from his case.

On July 1, 1996, the day trial was to commence, the trial court conducted a hearing on a number of motions, including counsel's motion to withdraw. At the hearing, the trial court afforded both trial counsel and Heyward the opportunity to explain their differences. Counsel explained that he wished to withdraw because Heyward asked that he do so and because Heyward actions in filing a grievance against him "severely impacts [their] relationship and [counsel's] ability to represent Edward] as his attorney." Heyward, on the other hand, explained that he wished to dismiss counsel because counsel intervened in the grievance he had filed against his prior counsel ("what I got back from them was that [counsel] informed them that he was going to correct the wrongs that [prior counsel] had created * * *"); because counsel failed to file motions Heyward had provided him; because counsel revealed the contents of these motions to the prosecution; and because counsel didn't present any evidence at a suppression hearing regarding coercive tactics allegedly employed against Heyward to force him to submit to a polygraph test and to sign a miranda waiver.

After listening to the respective explanations, the trial court noted that counsel was very qualified, having represented other people before the court. The court also noted that Heyward had moved for dismissal based upon speedy trial violations and that the matter had not yet been tried, in part, because counsel was the third attorney on the case, and, if counsel was permitted to withdraw at this late stage, it would be necessary to continue the case yet again to have new counsel appointed. The court ordered the matter to continue with assigned counsel assisting Heyward.

Under the circumstances presented herein, we conclude that the trial court's decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. In so concluding, the record from the hearing on the motion to withdraw reveals that part of the difficulty between Heyward and counsel resulted from the system itself i.e., Heyward's particular circumstances of confinement made it difficult for Heyward and counsel to communicate effectively. And, although counsel stated that Heyward's filing of a grievance against him severely impacted their relationship and his ability to represent Heyward, there was clearly not a complete breakdown in communication, as evidenced by the fact that counsel and Heyward conferred in private during a recess in the hearing and agreed upon a continuance of the matter for further investigation. Further, while Heyward's filing of a grievance might give rise to a possible conflict of interest, there was no indication at the hearing that an actual conflict did, or would, exist. The United States Constitution is violated by an actual conflict of interest, not a possible one. State v. Gillard (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 548, 552, citing Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 348-350. Finally, we note that it is apparent from the record that counsel had been actively representing his client's interests. In the short time that he had been assigned to the case, counsel had sought and obtained an order for fees for an investigator and, although he presented no independent evidence at the suppression hearing, the hearing transcript reflects that counsel vigorously represented Heyward at the hearing and that he was fully apprised of the issues and the facts...