State v. Lynch

• Citation: 100 S.E. 284
• Parties: STATE. v. LYNCH.
• Decision Date: 09 September 1919
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

100 S.E. 284

STATE.

v.LYNCH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Sept. 9, 1919.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Case Certified from Circuit Court, Mason County.

V. S. Lynch was Indicted for an attempt to intimidate a witness summoned to testify before a grand jury, and by means thereof to obstruct the administration of justice. Motion to quash indictment and a demurrer thereto overruled, and question certified. Demurrer and motion to quash sustained, and decision certified to circuit court.

E. T. England, Atty. Gen., and Chas. Ritchie, Asst Atty. Gen., for the State.

Pendleton, Mathews & Bell, of Spencer, for defendant.

POFFENBARGER, J. The question certified in this case is whether an indictment charging an attempt to intimidate a witness summoned to give evidence before a grand jury, and, by means of such intimidation, to obstruct and impede the administration of justice in the circuit court of Mason county is sufficient. A motion of the accused to quash the indictment and his demurrer to it were overruled.

The indictment purports to charge an offense under section 30 of chapter 147 (sec. 5283) of the Code, reading as follows:

"If any person by threats, force, or otherwise, intimidate or impede, or attempt to intimidate or impede any judge, justice of the peace, juror, witness, arbitrator, umpire, or any officer or member of any court in the discharge of his duty as such, or by any means obstruct or impede, or attempt to obstruct or impede the administration of justice in any court, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and unless otherwise provided by law, he shall be fined not less than twenty-five nor more than two hundred dollars, and be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding six months."

It avers that the accused "did unlawfully attempt to intimidate by means of threats and otherwise" a certain person, "a witness who was then and there duly and legally summoned to appear and give evidence before the grand jury of Mason county, West Virginia, at the June term, 1915, of the circuit court of said Mason county, " for the purpose of preventing "said person" from giving evidence before the said grand jury in obedi ence to said summons, whereby the said V. S. Lynch attempted to obstruct and impede the administration of justice in the said circuit court of said Mason county, West Virginia, by attempting by threats and otherwise to intimidate the said "person, " and "prevent his appearance before the said grand jury of the said circuit court to give evidence therein, " etc.

Two principal grounds of attack upon the indictment are: (1) Its failure to disclose the nature of the threat or other means of intimidation employed in the alleged attempt; and (2) lack of an averment of knowledge on the part of the accused that the person upon whom the attempt is alleged to have been made was a witness before the grand jury.

Ordinarily, it suffices to charge an offense in the language of the statute creating it. State v. Chafln, 78 W. Va. 140, 88 S. E. 657; State v. Jones, 53 W. Va. 613. 45 S. E. 916; State v. Boggess, 36 W. Va. 713, 15 S. E. 423; State v. Rifle, 10 W. Va. 797. But this rule has its well-defined exceptions. It does not apply, unless the language of the statute embraces all of the essential elements of the offense. Church's Case, 4 W. Va. 745; State v. Boggess, 36 W. Va. 713, 15 S. E. 423.

"Though generally sufficient to charge in an indictment an offense in the words of a statute, yet if this does not sufficiently define the particular wrongful act, and give notice to the defendant of the offense he is required to meet— the particular criminal act in its essentials—the statute words must be expanded by such specification of the essentials as will define the offense with particularity." State v. Mitchell, 47 W. Va. 789, 35 S. E. 845.

To the same effect see Boyd v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 55; 21 Ency. P1. & Pr. 672; 22 Cyc. 339-341.

In respect of pleading, there seems to be a well-defined distination between offenses charged as having been accomplished and those charged as having been attempted. In State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767, it was held that an indictment alleging the accused did slay, kill, and murder a, named person was sufficient to inform him fully and plainly of the character and cause of the accusation; but it would not be sufficient to charge merely that the accused had attempted to slay, kill, and murder a named person. In such case, an overt act constituting the attempt must be averred, and an averment of such an act must necessarily include specification of the means employed in the attempt Com. v. Clark, 6 Grat. (Va.) 675; State v. Bailer, 26 W. Va. 90, 53 Am. Rep. 66. If the indictment had charged...