State v. Lynn
| Decision Date | 10 June 1996 |
| Citation | 924 S.W.2d 892 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Clark LYNN, Appellant. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Robert S. Peters, Swafford, Peters & Priest, Winchester, for Appellant.
Charles W. Burson, State Attorney General and Darian B. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, for Appellee.
In this case we must determine what effect a total failure to follow statutory jury selection procedures has on a criminal jury trial. Under the circumstances here, we conclude that the failure to comply with those important procedures was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Consequently, we reverse the conviction and remand this case for a new trial. We discuss the other issues raised on appeal in the event they reoccur on retrial.
Appellant, Clark Lynn, was charged with the first-degree murder of Joe Webb who was killed when he was struck from behind during an altercation at Lynn's Warren County tavern. When the first trial resulted in a mistrial, the state amended the indictment and charged Lynn with second-degree murder. A new trial was scheduled to begin on November 18, 1992. Before the trial, the judge conducted a hearing regarding allegations of jury tampering. Ultimately, the judge found evidence that the entire venire was tainted. Without notice to either side, the judge directed the clerk to draw new names for a venire from which jurors would be selected.
On either November 5 or 6, the clerk of the court took the jury box into his office, unsealed it, and drew sufficient names to constitute a special jury panel. The sheriff summoned the new jurors. On November 15, defense counsel learned that an entirely new venire had been impaneled. 1 On November 16, counsel filed a motion to challenge the selection procedures, to quash the special jury panel, and to request a list of the new jurors. On November 18, before the beginning of jury selection, the clerk provided counsel with a list of the jurors. Selection commenced and was completed on November 19.
Before swearing the jury, the trial judge heard arguments on defendant's motion to quash the special panel. 2 Over the state's objection, the trial judge accepted defense counsel's suggestion that he defer the decision until the trial was completed. 3 After a five-day trial, the jury convicted Lynn of criminally negligent homicide. Lynn was sentenced to two years as a Range 1 standard offender.
In the motion for new trial, defense counsel challenged the impaneling procedure and other rulings. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense counsel presented the clerk's testimony. The court denied the motion.
On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court concluded that violations of the statutory procedure for selecting, summoning, and impaneling the jury were of no consequence. Furthermore, the court concluded that substantial, albeit not technical, compliance with Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 24(g) had been accomplished.
We granted appellant's application for permission to appeal to consider whether a verdict rendered by a jury impaneled in direct contravention and violation of state law must be set aside despite the absence of proof of actual prejudice. Because strict adherence to statutory jury selection procedures is essential to the integrity of the judicial process and the instilling of public confidence in the administration of justice, we hold that proof of actual prejudice is not required in circumstances such as this when the deviation is flagrant, unreasonable, and unnecessary.
The clerk, the state, the defendant, the Court of Criminal Appeals, and this Court agree that the prescribed procedures for impaneling a jury once an existing panel is disqualified or determined to be inadequate were not followed in this case. The procedures, set out in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 22-2-308, are as follows:
(2) In the event by reason of the disqualification of proposed jurors, or other cause, the required number of jurors cannot be obtained from the venire, the clerk of the court shall produce in open court the jury box, and the box shall be opened by the court and there shall be drawn therefrom, as directed by the court, the number of names deemed by the judge sufficient to complete the juries. This process shall, if necessary, continue until the grand and petit juries are completed; but the judge of the court instead of following the last mentioned procedure may, if the judge shall deem proper, furnish a sufficient number of names of persons to be summoned to the sheriff, or the judge may, if the judge thinks proper, direct the sheriff to summon a sufficient number to complete the juries.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 22-2-308(a)(2) (1994 Repl.). 4
Thus, the statute describes three procedures which may be used to replenish or impanel a jury. The trial judge has discretion to choose between the three, but if the judge does not select the second or third option, the first is mandatory. That option requires the court clerk to produce the jury box in open court where the judge is required to open it and direct the drawing of sufficient jurors. 5
None of these procedures were followed in this case. The clerk, not the judge, opened the box. The box was opened in the clerk's office, not in open court and not in the presence of the judge. The clerk, not the judge, drew the names and resealed the box. Neither party was advised that a new panel was being drawn. These circumstances, unlike those present in prior cases, are not an insignificant departure from technical statutory requirements. Rather, they represent a complete deviation from the directives established by our legislature.
The circumstances presented by previous cases involving the jury impaneling procedure have seldom impacted the integrity of the selection of an entire venire. None of this Court's prior decisions involve a situation in which the established statutory procedures for the selection of a venire were totally disregarded. Consequently, none are controlling in this case.
Three of our prior venire selection cases involve the propriety of excluding certain classes from jury service. In Rutherford v. State, 219 Tenn. 331, 409 S.W.2d 535 (1966), defendant argued that the jury commissioners had exceeded their authority by excluding certain classes of persons from the jury list without statutory authority. 409 S.W.2d at 536. Although the commissioners had, in fact, exceeded their authority by the exclusions, Rutherford was denied relief since counsel failed to object before the jury was sworn. 6 409 S.W.2d at 536.
In State v. Strouth, 620 S.W.2d 467 (Tenn.1981), defendant argued that the selection procedure and its statutory basis systematically excluded women from jury service. 620 S.W.2d at 470. The Court denied relief finding that women were fairly represented on the jury. 7 Id. More recently, in State v. Bell, 745 S.W.2d 858 (Tenn.1988), this Court upheld the exemption statutes in the face of a challenge that the statutes deprived defendants of juries drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. 745 S.W.2d at 860-861 (upholding Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 22-1-102 et seq. (1994 Repl.)). As this review aptly demonstrates, none of these cases involved a disregard for statutory procedures that were designed to protect the integrity of the jury selection process.
In three reported decisions, the Court of Criminal Appeals has addressed irregularities of venire selection procedures. See State v. Boyd, 867 S.W.2d 330 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992), perm. to appeal denied, 1993 WL 64234 (Tenn.1993); State v. Elrod, 721 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1986); State v. Wiseman, 643 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1982). The most recent, State v. Boyd, resolved a challenge to a Hamilton County jury procedure established by local act. It is irrelevant to the issues in this case. 867 S.W.2d at 337. State v. Wiseman involved a challenge to grand jury selection procedures. 643 S.W.2d at 358. Several deviations were alleged, including the failure to swear a deputy sheriff to keep the writ of venire facias secret and the failure to have the deputy sign the original of the facias when it was released to him. Id. at 358-359. The court deemed the deviations to be minor and found substantial compliance with the statute. Id. at 359-361.
In the case most similar to this one, State v. Elrod, two of the three jury commissioners were absent when the names were drawn from the box. 721 S.W.2d at 821. One of the commissioners had resigned. The clerk was unable to reach the second commissioner who was out of town. Id. As a result, the presiding judge drew the names in the presence of the remaining commissioner and the clerk of the court. The commissioner and the judge signed the report. Id. The court upheld this necessary method of selection of the venire. Id. at 822.
The circumstances in Elrod differ significantly from those in this case. Elrod did not involve the selection of a special venire. The clerk did not draw the names in secret. 721 S.W.2d at 821. Rather, the judge in Elrod exercised his statutory discretion and followed the statutory procedures to the extent possible under the circumstances. Id. at 822. Even given the limited deviation, the Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized in Elrod that "a trial judge does not have carte blanche to deviate arbitrarily from the prescribed statutory procedure." Id.
We wholeheartedly agree. As we recently stated:
[r]ules prescribing jury selection procedures are intended to protect the integrity of the jury system by providing a uniform and ordered method that ensures the accused a fair and impartial jury chosen from a fair cross-section of the community.... Compliance with the procedure set forth [regarding selection of a petit jury] safeguards the...
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