State v. Lynn
Decision Date | 15 April 2003 |
Docket Number | No. COA02-382.,COA02-382. |
Citation | 578 S.E.2d 628,157 NC App. 217 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Michael Scott LYNN. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General E. Burke Haywood, for the State.
Kurtz and Blum, P.L.L.C., by Seth A. Blum, Raleigh, for the defendant.
Defendant, Michael Scott Lynn, appeals his convictions of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The evidence tended to show, in relevant part, the following: In the fall of 1997, defendant was hired as a cook at the Garner, North Carolina, Waffle House restaurant. Sylvia Groves (Sylvia) was a supervisor at the restaurant. She was married to the victim in this case, David Groves (Groves). Sylvia introduced Groves to the defendant on at least one occasion, when Groves ate at the restaurant. After defendant was hired at the Waffle House, he and Sylvia became friends, and later began a romantic and sexual relationship. After about six months, Sylvia and defendant began to discuss "shooting Dave [Groves] to get [him] out of the way[.]" Sylvia testified that these conversations began "as a little joke" but then the two "planned to shoot him so he would not be there because [she] could not ... leave [Groves]."
On 7 May 1998, defendant called in sick at work. Sylvia went to defendant's home and picked him up. At trial, defendant's mother testified that defendant returned home in about an hour. However, Sylvia testified that she and the defendant drove to her house, where defendant waited outside. Sylvia further testified that when they arrived at her house, she went in, retrieved a gun from the bedroom that she and Groves shared, and took it outside to defendant. The defendant waited until she signaled that Groves was asleep. Then he snuck into the house and shot Groves twice while he lay in bed. Groves awoke, shouted that defendant had shot him, and called 911. Sylvia testified that she gave false statements to the police on the night of the shooting, denying that she knew the assailant, whom she described as wearing red checked pants. Nonetheless, Sylvia was arrested that evening, and later pled guilty to conspiracy to commit murder, attempted first degree murder, and assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury.
Groves testified that on the night of 7 May 1998, while he was in bed, the defendant came into his bedroom and shot him several times. He saw the defendant clearly because "the light hit him right across the face," and Groves saw "the profile that was so distinctive[.]" Groves recognized the defendant immediately, because he had met the defendant several times before the shooting. He ran out of the bedroom, shouting to Sylvia that "her cook" had shot him. When an ambulance arrived, Groves was taken to the hospital, where he was treated and released. On cross-examination, Groves was questioned about the description of the defendant he had given law enforcement officers the night of the shooting, and denied telling officers that his assailant had worn "checkered pants."
Greg and Brenda Kehle, the Groves' next door neighbors, testified that Sylvia called them after the shooting. Greg Kehle immediately went to the Groves' trailer to help. Before the ambulance arrived, Groves told Kehle that the defendant, whom Kehle and Groves had met several times, was the person who shot him. Other evidence indicated that the defendant's fingerprints were found on Groves' truck the day after the shooting.
Defendant has presented three arguments on appeal, two of which concern Sylvia's medical records. The defendant argues first that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his pretrial motion to require that the State learn the names of any mental health professionals who had treated Sylvia, so that defendant could subpoena their records for an in camera inspection by the trial court. The transcript of pretrial proceedings indicates that the defendant had filed a written motion, requesting that the court order the State to conduct an inquiry to determine who, if anyone, had previously treated Sylvia for emotional or psychological problems. However, the motion is not a part of the record. This omission violates N.C.R.App. P. 9(3)(i), which requires that the record on appeal include "copies of all ... papers filed ... which are necessary for an understanding of all errors assigned[.]" Our review of this issue is, therefore, based upon the statements of counsel and of the trial court as they appear in the transcript of pretrial proceedings.
In the pretrial hearing, defendant asked that the trial court order the State to determine the identities of any mental health professionals "who [were] treating her for whatever her psychological problems were[.]" He alleges that the court's denial of this motion denied his due process right to material exculpatory evidence. We disagree.
As a general rule, a criminal defendant is entitled to potentially exculpatory evidence:
`Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt, or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.'... The duty to disclose encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. Evidence is material `if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'
State v. Holadia, 149 N.C.App. 248, 256-257, 561 S.E.2d 514, 520-521 ( ), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 497, 562 S.E.2d 432 (2002). "`A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" State v. Thompson, 139 N.C.App. 299, 306, 533 S.E.2d 834, 840 (2000) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d at 494). Therefore, in determining whether the defendant's lack of access to particular evidence violated his right to due process, "the focus should be on the effect of the nondisclosure on the outcome of the trial, not on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial." State v. Hunt, 339 N.C. 622, 657, 457 S.E.2d 276, 296 (1994).
"`Impeachment evidence, ... as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.'" State v. Soyars, 332 N.C. 47, 63, 418 S.E.2d 480, 490 (1992) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. at 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d at 490). See also State v. McGill, 141 N.C.App. 98, 102-103, 539 S.E.2d 351, 355-356 (2000) () (new trial required where defendant denied access to files "tend[ing] to show that [previous] false accusations were made against [defendant]") (quoting United States v. Trevino, 89 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir.1996)).
Moreover, such impeachment evidence may include evidence that a witness suffers from a serious psychiatric or mental illness. The rationale behind allowing impeachment by evidence of prior treatment for psychiatric problems is that although "instances of ... mental instability are not directly probative of truthfulness, they may bear upon credibility in other ways, such as to `cast doubt upon the capacity of a witness to observe, recollect, and recount[.]'" State v. Williams, 330 N.C. 711, 719, 412 S.E.2d 359, 364 (1992) (quoting 3 Federal Evidence § 305, at 236). See State v. Newman, 308 N.C. 231, 254, 302 S.E.2d 174, 187 (1983) () (citing 1 H. Brandis on North Carolina Evidence, Witnesses, § 44 (2d. Rev.1982)). See also, e.g., United States v. Golyansky, 291 F.3d 1245, 1248 (10th Cir.2002) ( ); East v. Johnson, 123 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir.1997) ( ).
However, failure to disclose evidence relating to a witness's mental health is not reversible error where there is no likelihood that the outcome of the trial was affected. See United States v. Cole, 293 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 387, 154 L.Ed.2d 296 (2002) ( ); United States v. Burns, 668 F.2d 855, 860 (5th Cir.1982) ( ).
In State v. Chavis, 141 N.C.App. 553, 556, 540 S.E.2d 404, 408 (2000), the defendant sought discovery of the "psychiatric history of [the prosecuting witness] ... to impeach the witness's ability to perceive, retain, or narrate." The trial court ruled that the...
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