State v. Lyons

Decision Date27 November 1991
Docket NumberNo. 2-88-021-CR,2-88-021-CR
Citation820 S.W.2d 46
PartiesThe STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. Thomas Michael LYONS, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Bruce Isaacks, Dist. Atty., Denton, for appellant.

Fred Marsh, Denton, for appellee.

Before WEAVER, C.J., and JOE SPURLOCK, II and FARRIS, JJ.

OPINION ON REMAND

WEAVER, Chief Justice.

This case involves an appeal by the State from the trial court's grant of a new trial to appellee, Thomas Michael Lyons ("Lyons"), following his conviction of driving while intoxicated. Lyons urged three grounds in support of his motion for new trial. The trial court granted his motion without specifying upon which ground or grounds the same was granted. The State appeals, attacking the granting of the motion for new trial by three points of error, each related to one of the grounds urged in the motion for new trial. We reverse.

On our initial disposition of this matter, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based on Lyons' contentions regarding the State's failure to videotape him following his arrest. In so holding, we in effect overruled the State's second point of error, which related to the second ground urged by Lyons on his motion for new trial, and affirmed the trial court's order granting a new trial. State v. Lyons, 785 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1990). Our holding on that point was reversed by the Court of Criminal Appeals and the case was remanded to us to resolve points of error one and three which were unanswered on the original submission. State v. Lyons, 812 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

Under its first point of error, the State claims that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial based on the first ground contained in Lyons' motion for new trial, and by which Lyons contends that by charging the jury in the alternative the trial court removed from the State the burden of proving each and every element contained in the information beyond a reasonable doubt. By its third point of error, the State claims that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial based on Lyons' third ground for new trial, by which he complains of the failure of the officer to inform Lyons of his right to have a blood test. The trial court did not specify upon which ground or grounds the new trial was granted. Accordingly, we conclude that we must affirm the trial court's order on this remand if we determine that the court acted within its discretion in granting the motion under either the first or third grounds which Lyons urged in his motion for new trial.

In its original brief to this court, the State relied upon cited case law to show that there was no error present to justify a new trial under any of the grounds raised by Lyons in his motion for new trial. At the submission on remand, the State submitted only a supplemental letter brief, citing additional authority with respect to its point of error number three, but submitted no further argument respecting either of its points one and three. Lyons, by his supplemental brief on remand, does not specifically address either of the points of error one and three, and argues only generally that the trial court's action in granting a new trial should not be disturbed absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion and that such error is not shown from the record before us.

In light of our instructions from the Court of Criminal Appeals, we now address the State's first point of error to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in granting Lyons' motion for new trial, assuming that the new trial was granted on Lyons' first ground. By that ground, Lyons contended that the court misdirected the jury as to the law in that the charge of the trial court relieved the State of its burden of proving each and every element in the information. The pertinent portion of the information reads as follows [S]aid defendant did not have the normal use of his mental and physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol into the defendant's body and said defendant had an alcohol concentration of at least 0.10 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath; ... [Emphasis added.]

"Intoxication" under the applicable statute is defined as "not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol ...; or having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more." TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6701l-1(a)(2)(A), (B) (Vernon Supp.1991) (emphasis added). The trial court instructed the jury that in order to find Lyons intoxicated, they "must find beyond a reasonable doubt ... that [Lyons] had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties due to the introduction of alcohol into his body; or in the alternative, ... had an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more...." [Emphasis added.] The jury returned a general verdict finding Lyons guilty as charged.

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4 cases
  • Price v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • September 20, 2001
    ...provides two means of proving that a defendant is intoxicated, but only one act is proscribed: driving while intoxicated." State v. Lyons, 820 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1991, no pet.). Neither our reading of Carter nor any subsequent case law offers grounds for altering Lyons' int......
  • Negrini v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 1, 1993
    ...then charge the jury on the elements in the disjunctive. Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 631-32 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); State v. Lyons, 820 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1991, no pet.); Yates v. State, 766 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd). Point of error three is Th......
  • State v. Charlton
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 11, 1993
    ...that rule 30(b) did not provide the exclusive grounds for the granting of a new trial. Id. at 11. The present case is similar to State v. Lyons, 820 S.W.2d 46 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1991, no pet.), where the only grounds asserted for new trial fell within the scope of rule 30(b). Id. at 48. ......
  • State v. Gill
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 24, 1998
    ...(Tex.App.--Texarkana 1995, no pet.) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting new trial in interest of justice); State v. Lyons, 820 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1991, no pet.) (trial court retains discretion to grant new trial in the interest of justice, apparently on an......

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