State v. Lytle
| Decision Date | 23 December 1895 |
| Citation | 23 S.E. 476,117 N.C. 799 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. LYTLE. |
Criminal Law—Venue — Presumption—ArsonEvidence.
1. Code, § 1194, provides that it shall be presumed that the offense was committed within the county in which the indictment charges it to have been committed. Held, that where the indictment charged an offense in a certain county, but there was no evidence of venue, the presumption is that it was committed in the state.
2. On a trial for arson, it was not error to permit a witness to testify that, a short time before the burning, defendant was complaining that the prosecutor claimed too much rent of him; that the witness asked him what he was going to do about it, and defendant replied, "I'll burn it."
3. It was not error to permit a witness to testify that on the night of the burning, about 7:30, he met a man whom he took to be defendant; that he was within seven steps of the man, in the road, near witness' house; that he was a low, chunky man; that it was too dark to see whether he was white or black; that he had his back to witness, and had on a dark sack coat; and that he had known defendant 10 years, and seen him often.
Appeal from criminal court, Buncombe county; Ewart, Judge.
Minor Lytle was convicted of arson, and appeals. Affirmed.
Adams & Parker, for appellant.
The Attorney General and Lock Craig, for the State.
The exceptions not appearing very plainly from the record, it was agreed by the attorney general and Mr. Adams, who represented the defendant, to submit the case on three exceptions: (1) That there was no evidence that the offense charged (burning a barn) was committed in Buncombe county; (2) as to the admission of evidence that defendant had threatened to burn the barn; and (3) the court erroneously allowed the evidence of Dawkins as to seeing defendant the night of the fire.
The first exception cannot be sustained. The indictment charged the offense to have been committed in Buncombe county. Defendant pleaded not guilty, and went to trial, and there was no evidence introduced to show that the offense was committed in Buncombe county, or any other county. It was in evidence that it was within 11 miles of Asheville. But we will leave this evidence out of the case in considering this exception. There was no such point made on the trial; no request that the court should rule upon this question; no instruction asked as to this point. But the question is attempted to be raised by the exception as to the charge of the court that, there being no evidence on this point, the court should have directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. For this position the counsel for defendant cited State v. Revels, Busb. 200, which tends to sustain his position. And, while this case was decided in 1853, it seems to have been put upon the question of sufficient evidence, and a case in 6 E. C. L. 413, is cited as authority. And the statute of 1844 (Code, § 1194) seems to have been entirely overlooked. This statute reversed the rule which seems to have obtained on trials of criminal cases before its enactment. It was intended to do so, and we must hold that it did do so. It provided that it should be presumed that the offense was committed within the county in which the indictment charges it to have been committed, and makes it a matter of defense, if this is denied by defendant, to be taken advantage of by plea in abatement, if it is alleged to have occurred in another county of this state, as held in State v. Outer-bridge, 82 N. C. 617; or, where it is insisted that it was not in this state at all, it may be shown as a matter of defense under the general issue, as in State v. Mitchell, 83 N. C. 674. These cases clearly establish the rule in such cases, under the statute of 1844, supra, to be a matter of defense, and overrule the case of State v. Revel, supra. But it was insisted by counsel for defendant that the act of 1844 only made this presumption as to the county in which the offense was committed, and it made no presumption that it was committed within the state. But it would be so illogical to say that it was committed in Buncombe county, which is a part of the state, and then say it was not committed within the state, that we must decline to give this proposition our assent.
The second exception cannot be sustained. One Van Allen, among other things, testified that in a...
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State v. Lane
... ... The testimony of E. Hillman, that the man he saw ... coming towards Joab Lane's house looked like the ... defendant, was competent in connection with the other ... evidence of identity. Similar rulings have been sustained by ... the following authorities: 17 Cyc. 132; State v ... Lytle, 117 N.C. 799, 23 S.E. 476; State v ... Costner, 127 N.C. 566, 37 S.E. 326, 80 Am. St. Rep. 809; ... and more recently by State v. Carmon, 145 N.C. 481, ... 59 S.E. 657, where the impression of the witness as to ... identity, based upon knowledge of the person, was less ... pronounced. But ... ...
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