State v. MacDonald

• Decision Date: 17 November 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75-1206,75-1206
• Parties: , 2 O.O.3d 219 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. MacDONALD, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 66

48 Ohio St.2d 66

357 N.E.2d 40, 2 O.O.3d 219

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. MacDONALD, Appellee.

No. 75-1206.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Nov. 17, 1976.

Syllabus by the Court

1. R.C. 2945.71(D) is applicable only to those defendants held in jail in lieu of bail solely on the pending charge.

2. R.C. 2945.71(C) is the appropriate time limit for felony trials in cases in which the accused is not entitled to the triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71(D).

3. R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 became effective January 1, 1974, and are not applied retroactively. Computation of the time limit derived from these sections is from January 1, 1974, for actions then pending, rather than from the actual earlier date of arrest.

Gary, MacDonald, defendant-appellee, was arrested on April 16, 1973, for armed robbery and for carrying a concealed weapon. A preliminary hearing was held in Cleveland Municipal Court. The appellee posted a $500 bond and was released.

On June 14, 1973, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned two indictments charging the appellee with armed robbery and carrying a concealed weapon. Appellee failed to appear in court, and a capias was issued for his arrest on June 26, 1973.

On October 17, 1973, appellee was arrested by federal agents on federal charges. From October 17, 1973 to April 24, 1974, he was held pursuant to federal authority in the Mahoning County jail in Youngstown, including four two-day periods in the Cuyahoga County jail. A capias on the original state charges was sent to the Mahoning County jail on December 26, 1973. Appellee was convicted of the federal charges on April 24, 1974, and was sentenced to serve two years in the federal prison at Terre Haute, Indiana.

On June 25, 1974, appellee filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking that the charges by the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury still pending be dismissed for lack of a speedy trial. On July 1, 1974, the Cuyahoga County prosecutor filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum requesting that the appellee be returned to Cuyahoga County to be tried on the pending state charges. He was subsequently returned on July 29, 1974. The petition for writ of mandamus was heard on August 29, 1974, which the court treated as a motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.73.

On September 3, 1974, the trial court denied appellee's motion, and appellee was ordered to stand trial on both charges on the following morning. At the request of appellee's attorney, a continuance was granted on each charge until the week of October 14th.

Prior to each of his trials, appellee filed a motion to suppress all physical evidence and a motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial. In each case, the motions were heard and overruled. Appellee was subsequently convicted of armed robbery and of carrying a concealed weapon.

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of the trial court, and, in each case, discharged appellee for lack of a speedy trial.

The causes are now before this court upon the allowance of the state's motions for leave to appeal.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and George J. Sadd, Cleveland, for appellant.

Jeffrey T. Zucco, Cleveland, for appellee.

PAUL W. BROWN, Justice.

A defendant's right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967), 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1. Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, also affords an accused the same guarantees as the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See State v. Butler (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818.

The United States Supreme Court, in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, declined to establish the exact number of days within which a trial must be held. While the court declared that its approach must be less precise, it also stated that '(T)he States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards * * *.' 407 U.S., at page 523, 92 S.Ct., at page 2188.

The General Assembly has utilized this authority by enacting R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 to implement the right to a speedy trial. The pertinent portion of R.C. 2945.71 states:

'(C) A person against whom a charge of felony is pending:

'* * *

'(2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after his arrest.

'(D) For purposes of computing time under divisions (A), (B), and (C) of this section, each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three days.'

The Court of Appeals in each case herein concluded that since appellee was not brought to trial within 90 days of January 1, 1974 (the effective date of the statute), he was denied a speedy trial as defined in R.C. 2945.71(D) and should be discharged. The court ruled further that no extension was warranted under R.C. 2945.72(A) because the prosecutor did not exercise the required reasonable diligence to secure the availability of the appellee.

The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting R.C. 2945.71, and, accordingly, we reverse those judgments. Appellee was tried within the statutory mandate, and therefore was not denied his right to a speedy trial.

The speedy trial statutes now in force became effective January 1, 1974, and are not to be applied retroactively. State v. Walker (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 157, 346 N.E.2d 687. The appellate court correctly concluded that the time limitation is thus computed from January 1, 1974, rather than from the actual earlier date of arrest.

The appellate court reasoned, however, that since appellee was in jail from January 1, 1974, until the trial dates of October 11 and 15, 1974, respectively, he was entitled to the reduction of the time limit for trial from 270 to 90 days. Such reasoning is erroneous. The triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71(D) is to be invoked only if the 'accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge * * *.' Appellee was incarcerated on unrelated federal charges. Further, appellee had posted bail in April 1973, on the pending state charges and was released. Thus, he did not meet either of the requirements that are concurrently necessary for invoking the triple count: (1) being held in jail 'in lieu of bail,' and (2) being held in jail 'on the pending charge.'

Clearly, the time spent by appellee in the Mahoning County jail and the federal prison in Terre Haute, does not invoke the triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71(D).

The next issue is whether the triple-count provision should have applied after July 20, 1974, the date that appellee was returned to Cuyahoga County. Certainly appellee was being 'held on the pending charge,' because such charges were the very reason he was returned to the county. Further, since no bond was offered, he was arguably being held 'in lieu of bail.'

In interpreting R.C. 2945.71, settled Ohio case law has required the defendant's detention in jail to be solely because of the pending charge. State v. Gray (1964), 1 Ohio St.2d 21, 203 N.E.2d 319; State, ex rel. Hodges, v. Coller (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 164, 249 N.E.2d 885; and State v. Fairbanks (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 34, 289 N.E.2d 352. These cases, however, construed the former speedy-trial statutes, and not the 1974 version now in question.

Former R.C. 2945.71 required that when an accused was detained in jail, his trial was to commence within two terms after the term in which his indictment was presented. Former R.C. 2945.72 applied only to persons released on bail, and provided for a limit of three terms with a built-in extension if there was not enough time to schedule the trial...