State v. Macemon

Citation113 Wis.2d 662,335 N.W.2d 402
Decision Date01 July 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-1322,82-1322
PartiesSTATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert J. MACEMON, Defendant-Appellant. CR.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

Mark Lukoff, First Asst. State Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.

Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., and E. Gordon Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent.

CECI, Justice.

A jury found the defendant-appellant, Robert J. Macemon, guilty of first-degree sexual assault, in violation of sec. 940.225(1)(b), Stats. On November 24, 1981, the circuit court of Racine county, Honorable Dennis J. Flynn, sentenced Macemon to not more than twenty years' imprisonment.

On June 8, 1982, Macemon filed a motion to modify sentence, alleging, in part, that the proposed felony sentencing guidelines 1 were a "new factor" that should be considered by the court. Racine county had not adopted the felony sentencing guidelines. The issues presented are: (1) Whether evidence that the defendant's sentence was substantially more severe than the norm set by the guidelines constitutes a "new factor" that entitles him to a sentence modification hearing; and (2) whether the sentence must be modified because it was unduly harsh. The trial court concluded that the information in the guidelines was not a "new factor" and dismissed the motion.

This court accepted the certification of the defendant's appeal from the court of appeals. Because we conclude that sentencing guidelines do not supersede the sentencing court's discretion and do not constitute a new factor entitling a defendant to a sentence modification hearing, and because we believe the sentence imposed was not unduly harsh, we affirm the trial court's order denying the defendant's motion.

During the early morning hours of September 18, 1981, the defendant, Robert Macemon, accosted a car going into the parking lot of an Open Pantry store in Racine. J.Q., a young woman, was alone in the car. The defendant opened the car door and asked J.Q. for a ride home. (It was raining.) J.Q. agreed.

At the defendant's request, J.Q. first drove to a nearby Taco Bell, where the defendant purchased some food. The defendant then gave J.Q. directions concerning which way to drive. Eventually, he directed her to drive into Tabor Sokol Park. The defendant then attempted to kiss J.Q. She immediately resisted, biting his tongue and pulling his hair.

The defendant then pulled a knife that was ten to twelve inches long and placed it on J.Q.'s neck. He directed her into a wooded area and ordered her to remove her pants. The defendant had J.Q. lie on the ground, and he placed the knife in the ground beside her. The defendant then had sexual intercourse with J.Q. After the assault was over, J.Q. drove off alone and reported the rape to the Caledonia Police Department.

On November 10, 1981, a jury rendered a verdict of guilty to the charge of first-degree sexual assault. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to not more than twenty years' imprisonment. The judge noted that twenty years was the maximum penalty for first-degree sexual assault. In explaining the sentence being imposed, he cited the defendant's history of problems with the law as a juvenile and as an adult. The judge stated that there was "an indication of significant involvement with and perhaps dependency upon chemicals, particularly alcohol." He noted that the crime for which the defendant had been convicted was a crime against a person. He cited factors to show the aggravated nature of the crime, including the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time the offense occurred. The judge noted that the victim was a stranger who was trying to help the defendant by giving him a ride home on a rainy night and that the defendant used a deadly weapon to carry out the assault.

On June 8, 1982, the defendant brought a motion to modify his sentence. The first basis of his motion was that at the time of the sentencing, the trial court was not informed of the proposed felony scoring guidelines. The defendant stated that under the guidelines, "only 37 percent of individuals with defendant's criminal history, and offense severity are incarcerated. The analytic sample of length of incarceration shows that the vast majority of sentences does not exceed ten years." As an alternative basis for his motion, the defendant asserted that the twenty-year sentence imposed (the maximum permissible sentence) was unduly harsh under the circumstances and constituted an abuse of discretion, under State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis.2d 467, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975).

The trial court denied the motion because of its determination that the information presented by the defendant did not constitute a new factor under Wisconsin law. The trial court discussed the sentencing guidelines, but rejected the contention that a trial court in a county not involved in the study should modify a sentence because the preliminary data from the study indicated that a substantial number of other courts in the state would have given a lesser sentence. The defendant appealed the order. 2

I.

The legislature has vested a discretion in the sentencing judge, which must be exercised on a rational and explainable basis. A sentencing decision is reviewable by this court in the same manner that all discretionary acts are to be reviewed. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 276-77, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971). "[T]here should be evidence in the record that discretion was in fact exercised and the basis of that exercise of discretion should be set forth." State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis.2d 754, 764, 159 N.W.2d 733 (1968). In State v. Tew, 54 Wis.2d 361, 367-68, 195 N.W.2d 615 (1972), this court enumerated some of the factors this court has recognized as properly considered in sentencing:

"A past record of criminal offenses, Brown v. State (1971), 52 Wis.2d 496, 190 N.W.2d 497; a history of undesirable behavior patterns, Triplett v. State (1971), 51 Wis.2d 549, 553, 187 N.W.2d 318; Deja v. State (1969), 43 Wis.2d 488, 168 N.W.2d 856; the defendant's personality, character and social traits, Waddell v. State (1964), 24 Wis.2d 364, 368, 129 N.W.2d 201; Deja v. State, supra, [43 Wis.2d] at 493 ; State v. Morales (1971), 51 Wis.2d 650, 658, 187 N.W.2d 841; the results of a presentence investigation, State v. Schilz (1971), 50 Wis.2d 395, 184 N.W.2d 134; State v. Burgher (1972), 53 Wis.2d 452 at 457, 192 N.W.2d 869; the vicious or aggravated nature of the crime, State v. Wells (1971), 51 Wis.2d 477, 187 N.W.2d 328; State v. Schilz, supra, [50 Wis.2d] at 402 ; the degree of the defendant's culpability, State v. Schilz, supra, at 402 ; the defendant's demeanor at trial, State v. Schilz, supra, at 403 ; the defendant's age, educational background and employment record, State v. Cole (1971), 50 Wis.2d 449, 184 N.W.2d 75; State v. Schilz, supra, [50 Wis.2d] at 402 ; the defendant's remorse, repentance and cooperativeness, McCleary v. State (1971), 49 Wis.2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512; Finger v. State (1968), 40 Wis.2d 103, 113, n. 1, 161 N.W.2d 272; the defendant's need for close rehabilitative control, McCleary v. State, supra [49 Wis.2d] at 289 ; and the rights of the public, Embry v. State (1970), 46 Wis.2d 151, 157, 174 N.W.2d 521."

The rule in Wisconsin is that it is inappropriate for a sentencing court to make a change in an imposed sentence unless new factors are made known. 3

"A trial court should not reduce a sentence on 'reflection' alone or simply because it has thought the matter over and has second thoughts. It must base its modification on 'new factors' brought to its attention."

State v. Foellmi, 57 Wis.2d 572, 582, 205 N.W.2d 144 (1973).

As we stated in Rosado v. State, 70 Wis.2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975):

"[T]he phrase 'new factor' refers to a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of original sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or because, even though it was then in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all the parties."

The defendant contends that the data from the sentencing studies in other counties constitutes such a "new factor." We disagree. The results of the study do not amount to a "fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of the sentence."

It is well established in Wisconsin that the mere fact of disparity in the sentences received by persons committing similar crimes does not establish denial of equal protection. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d at 272, 182 N.W.2d 512; Price v. State, 37 Wis.2d 117, 154 N.W.2d 222 (1967); Jung v. State, 32 Wis.2d 541, 145 N.W.2d 684 (1966).

"It is not the philosophy of modern criminal law that the punishment fit the crime alone and that for every violation of a particular statute there be an identical sanction. In light of the function of the law to deter similar acts by the defendant and others and to rehabilitate the individual defendant, it is essential that a sentencing court consider the nature of the particular crime, i.e., the degree of culpability--distinguishable from the bare-bones legal elements of it--and the personality of the criminal." McCleary, 49 Wis.2d at 271, 182 N.W.2d 512.

See also, Drinkwater v. State, 73 Wis.2d 674, 679, 245 N.W.2d 664 (1976); Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis.2d 179, 187, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975).

Accordingly, we conclude that the sentencing guidelines are not a new factor which entitles the defendant to a sentence modification hearing. The guidelines are voluntary only and were an experiment in the counties in which they were used. Moreover, in State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis.2d 544, 335 N.W.2d 399, also decided today, this court held that a subsequent statutory change in the maximum sentence for a crime to less than that imposed on the defendant does not constitute a new factor the trial court must consider for possible sentence modification. Arguably, the situation in...

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