State v. Macias-Medina, 104,159.
| Decision Date | 03 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 104,159.,104,159. |
| Citation | 293 Kan. 833,268 P.3d 1201 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Mauricio MACIAS–MEDINA, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. A guilty plea may be withdrawn for good cause shown and within the discretion of the court at any time before the sentence is adjudged. An appellate court will not disturb a district court's decision to deny a presentence motion to withdraw plea unless the defendant demonstrates that the court abused its discretion.
2. A starting point in the consideration of a plea withdrawal request is to look at three nonexclusive factors, recently dubbed the “ Edgar factors”: (1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made. However, all of the Edgar factors need not apply in a defendant's favor in every case, and other factors may be duly considered in the district judge's discretionary decision on the existence or nonexistence of good cause to withdraw a plea.
3. An attorney who candidly advises his or her client that the outcome of a jury trial could be determined by what the jurors believe the facts to be, rather than by the true facts, has not been dishonest and has not necessarily misled or coerced the client into entering a plea.
Joanna Labastida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.
Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
After being charged with two counts of rape, Mauricio Macias–Medina entered into a plea agreement that required him to plead guilty to the alternative charges of the offgrid version of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. In return, the State agreed that it would not oppose a defense request for a departure to the middle number in the sentencing guidelines grid-box for a severity level 3 person felony; that it would recommend that the sentences be served concurrently; and that the defense would be permitted to seek probation. After entering his plea, but before sentencing, Macias–Medina filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, contending that his attorney and his interpreter had coerced him into accepting the plea agreement. In denying the motion to withdraw pleas, the district court found that defendant received competent legal representation; that his pleas were knowingly and intelligently made; that the pleas were not induced by any dishonest interpretation of information; and that defendant's pleas were not coerced. Giving due deference to the district court, as we must, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding an absence of good cause to permit defendant to withdraw his pleas.
Macias–Medina was originally represented by an attorney, Steve Wagle, who had the ability to speak Spanish, Macias–Medina's native tongue. Nevertheless, Macias–Medina was also provided an interpreter, Ileana Badillo.
Approximately 1 week before the scheduled trial date, Wagle presented Macias–Medina with a proposed plea agreement. Macias–Medina refused the deal because he did not want to plead guilty. On the morning of trial, after ascertaining that the State was still amenable to a plea arrangement, Wagle suggested to Macias–Medina that the plea agreement might be in his best interest. Wagle, with the assistance of Badillo, conducted a verbatim review with Macias–Medina of the written plea agreement and a document entitled “Defendants Acknowledgment of Rights and Entry of Plea.” Macias–Medina agreed to enter a plea.
At the plea hearing, the district court explained the defendant's rights in great detail; advised the defendant that by pleading guilty he was waiving those rights; and explained the consequences associated with such a waiver. The district court also clearly explained that the plea agreement sentencing recommendations would not be binding on the sentencing judge, who could impose the maximum legal sentence. Upon inquiry, Macias–Medina advised the judge that he had understood everything the district court discussed regarding his rights and possible sentencing and that he felt that his attorney, Steve Wagle, had provided satisfactory representation. The court was also presented with the Acknowledgment of Rights and Entry of Plea form, which Macias–Medina had signed. That form contained language indicating the defendant's decision to accept the plea agreement had been made “voluntar[ily] without anyone having threatened [him] or promised [him] anything of benefit, and [wa]s without duress or coercion other than that which the plea agreement provides.” After Macias–Medina provided a factual basis, the district court accepted his guilty pleas to the two counts of aggravated indecent liberties.
Before sentencing, Macias–Medina filed a motion to withdraw his pleas, contending that both Wagle and Badillo had coerced him into signing the plea agreement. Among other allegations, Macias–Medina said that the interpreter had told him that if he took the plea he would be deported after serving only 2 more years, but that without the agreement he would go to prison for life. Further, he said he was told that the jury panel was composed of racist Caucasians who hate Mexicans because they think them to be aggressive, womanizing drunks. Macias–Medina testified that he felt forced into accepting the plea agreement.
Wagle and Badillo both testified. They both said that it had taken a long time to thoroughly review the plea documents with Macias–Medina, but they both denied intentionally misleading or coercing Macias–Medina. Specifically, Wagle denied referring to the jurors as racists, but he said he did explain that jurors have their own prejudices and that sometimes the truth does not always win in the courtroom. Badillo recalled that after she read the plea agreement and the acknowledgment of plea form to Macias–Medina verbatim, he acknowledged that he understood the contents of those documents when he signed them.
The judge hearing the motion to withdraw plea had presided at the plea hearing. In denying the plea withdrawal motion, the court noted that Macias–Medina's testimony at that hearing “did not comport with what occurred at the time of plea.” Further, the court said:
The district court then proceeded to sentence Macias–Medina in accordance with the plea agreement recommendations by imposing a controlling prison sentence of 59 months. Macias–Medina filed a timely appeal, challenging the district court's refusal to grant his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22–3210(d)(1) provides that a guilty plea may be withdrawn “for good cause shown and within the discretion of the court” at any time before the sentence is adjudged. Based on that statutory language, we have held that State v. Denmark–Wagner, 292 Kan. 870, 875, 258 P.3d 960 (2011).
“Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based.” State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 (2011).
To begin, we emphasize that this case involves the presentence “good cause” standard, which is ...
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State v. Ruiz
...presentence motion to withdraw plea unless the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion. State v. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 836, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012). A district court abuses its discretion by taking judicial action that is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) ......
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State v. Jackson
...not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based." State v. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 836, 268 P.3d 1201 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 [2011] ). In reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion ......
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State v. Thompson
...district judge's discretionary decision on the existence or nonexistence of good cause.’ [Citation omitted.]” State v. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 837, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012). Appellate courts will not disturb a ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw plea unless the defendant sufficientl......
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...to withdraw plea unless the defendant sufficiently demonstrates that the district court abused its discretion. State v. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 836, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion “if [the] judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unrea......