State v. Mack

• Decision Date: 04 February 1897
• Docket Number: 1,487.
• Citation: 47 P. 763,23 Nev. 359
• Parties: STATE ex rel. JONES v. MACK, District Judge.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

47 P. 763

23 Nev. 359

STATE ex rel. JONES v. MACK, District Judge.

No. 1,487.

Supreme Court of Nevada

February 4, 1897

Original application for a writ of certiorari, on the relation of Charles A. Jones, against Charles E. Mack, judge of the district court of the state of Nevada, Ormsby county. Proceedings annulled.

Robt. M. Clarke, James F. Dennis, and William Woodburn, for petitioner.

A. J McGowan, Dist. Atty., and J. R. Judge, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

MASSEY J.

This is an original application to the supreme court for a writ of certiorari.

It appears, from the petition and affidavit filed herein, and from the records and proceedings of the district court certified to this court, that the petitioner was indicted by the grand jury of Ormsby county, on the 11th day of December 1896, for the crime of assault with a deadly instrument, with intent to inflict upon the person of another bodily injury that the petitioner was duly arrested for the said offense and taken before said district court; that, when required to plead to said indictment, he interposed a special plea to the jurisdiction of the court, in which it was alleged that the offense charged in said indictment was committed upon certain lands in Carson City, Ormsby county, state of Nevada, purchased by the United States, by the consent of the legislature of the state, for the erection of a courthouse, post office, and other needful public buildings, and upon which lands there had been erected, and same were then used by the United States, the said needful public buildings. To this plea the district attorney demurred, alleging that the facts set up in the plea did not oust the jurisdiction of the state; and the district court sustained the demurrer, and required the petitioner to plead to the merits of the indictment, and proceeded to set the action for trial for a certain day. It also appears, from the record of the district court, that the district attorney admitted that the alleged offense was committed upon lands purchased by the United States, with the consent of the legislature of the state of Nevada, and that the United States had erected a post office and courthouse thereon. Counsel for respondent concede that the special plea to the jurisdiction of the district court, and the proceedings thereon, are regular and proper, and that the proceedings in this court upon certiorari are proper and regular; therefore no opinion is given upon these questions.

From the facts above stated the petitioner contends that the said district court has no jurisdiction over the alleged offense, for the reason that the same was committed upon lands over which, under the provisions of section 8, art. 1, of the federal constitution, the United States has the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction. Section 8, art. 1, of the federal constitution provides that "congress shall have power *** to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district, *** and to exercise a like authority over all places purchased by consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings." By act of congress, approved January 13, 1885 (23 St. 281, c. 19), the secretary of the treasury was authorized and directed "to purchase a site for, and cause to be erected thereon, at the city of Carson City, in the state of Nevada, a suitable building, *** for the accommodation of the United States courts, post office, *** provided that no money to be appropriated for said building shall be available *** until the state of Nevada shall cede to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the same *** for all purposes except the administration of the criminal laws of said state and the service of any civil process therein." By an act of the legislature of the state of Nevada, approved February 24, 1885 (St. Nev. 1885, p. 40), the jurisdiction of the state was ceded to the United States over all lands selected or acquired by the United States, "for the purpose of erecting thereon a public building or public buildings for the accommodation of the United States courts, *** and the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the same *** for all purposes except the administration of the criminal laws of this state, and the service of any civil process therein or thereon." Section 5391 of the Revised Statutes of the United States makes the offense charged in the indictment found by the state grand jury punishable under the laws of the United States when committed in any place "ceded to and under the jurisdiction of the United States." The above are the express provisions of state and federal law bearing directly upon the question to be determined in this action. It has been held that, when a purchase of land has been made by the United States, with the consent of the legislature of the state, for any of the purposes enumerated in section 8 of article 1 of the federal constitution, the land so purchased, by the very terms of the constitution, ipso facto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. U.S. v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 867; Sharon v. Hill, 26 F. 726; Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S.Ct. 995; Story, Const. §§ 1224--1227, inclusive; Hare, Const. Law, pp. 1142--1145; Ordr. Const. Leg. pp. 516, 517. The supreme court of the United States, in the case of Railroad Co. v. Lowe, supra, uses the following language: "When the title is acquired by purchase, by the consent of the legislatures of the states, the federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all state authority. This follows from the declaration of the constitution that congress shall have 'like authority' over such places as it has over the district which is the seat of government; that is, the power of 'exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever.' Broader or clearer language could not be used to exclude all other authority than that of congress, and that no other authority can be exercised over them has been the uniform opinion of federal and state tribunals and of the attorneys general."

Counsel for respondent vigorously contend that the purchase of the land in Carson City by the United States, for the purposes designated in the act of congress approved January 13, 1885 above cited, does not come within the specific purposes named in section 8 of article 1 of the federal constitution, and that the purchase of land for the erection of courthouses and post offices by the United States, with the consent of the legislature of the state, does not, ipso facto, vest exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over such lands. This contention is not tenable. The federal constitution provides for a judicial department and for the establishment of post offices and post roads, and buildings are "needful" for the administration of justice and for post offices. It is too narrow a construction of section 8, art. 1, of the constitution to limit the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction by the United States over lands purchased for the specific purposes enumerated therein. Under such construction, the use of the words "and other needful buildings" adds nothing to that section. Ordronaux, in his work on Constitutional Legislation, supra, says: "The functions of the general government demanding the establishment of forts, magazines, and dockyards, and the erection of post offices, courthouses, mints, and other buildings, in various parts of the United States, the framers of the constitution made provisions accordingly for acquiring the necessary sites. It was contemplated that such places should be purchased either from states or individuals, and, as it was necessary, for their better government, that congress should have exclusive legislation over them, the clause requiring the legislature of the state making the cession was...