State v. Madagoski

• Citation: 59 Conn. App. 394,757 A.2d 47
• Decision Date: 15 August 2000
• Docket Number: (AC 18789)
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT MADAGOSKI

59 Conn. App. 394

757 A.2d 47

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT MADAGOSKI

(AC 18789)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 28, 2000.

Officially released August 15, 2000.

Landau, Schaller and Spear, Js. Francis L. O'Reilly, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Frederick W. Fawcett, supervisory assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and C. Robert Satti, Jr., assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

LANDAU, J.

The defendant, Robert Madagoski, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-59 (a) (1), one count of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2), one count of assault on a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1) and one count of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (1). The defendant was sentenced to an effective term of forty-five years incarceration.¹ He claims that the court improperly (1) failed to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the count of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, (2) charged the jury on reasonable doubt and thus violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial, (3) exercised its discretion in denying his motion for a bill of particulars and (4) excluded certain evidence and thus denied him his constitutional right of confrontation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On February 11, 1997, Sergeant Thomas W. Guyette, a twenty-two year veteran of the state police who was assigned to the Connecticut auto theft task force (task force),² was in Bridgeport to attend a meeting with chiefs of police. Prior to the meeting, Guyette dispatched the members of his task force group to patrol the streets of Bridgeport in search of motor vehicles that had been reported stolen within the last twenty-four hours. At approximately 11 a.m., while he was in the meeting, Guyette was contacted by John Pribesh, a Bridgeport police department detective, who reported that three stolen vehicles had been located in the vicinity of Anson and North Main Streets.

Guyette, who was dressed in a business suit, met with members of the task force at the intersection of Anson and Salem Streets, and dispatched the officers in teams of two throughout the area. At about 4:30 p.m., Pribesh informed Guyette that he was following a stolen van on Salem Street and that he thought that the driver knew he was a police officer.³ Guyette ordered Leonard Schroeder, a Fairfield police department detective, to help him and Pribesh box in the van at the intersection of Salem and Main Streets.⁴ Guyette and Schroeder blocked the intersection.

Before he got out of his vehicle, Guyette placed his police badge on the breast pocket of his coat and called the Bridgeport police department for help. When he got out of his vehicle, Guyette ran toward the van shouting, "Police, stop!" The defendant, the van's sole occupant,⁵ moved the van toward Guyette and struck him on the left side. Guyette jumped over the hood of the van and landed between Schroeder's vehicle and the van. The van struck Schroeder's vehicle, and Guyette grabbed the door handle of the van with his left hand and grabbed his weapon with his right hand. Guyette pointed his weapon at the driver and yelled, "Police, give it up!" He had no intention of shooting the driver; his intent was to stop the vehicle. The van suddenly moved forward, twisting Guyette's leg. Guyette's weapon discharged, shattering the window on the driver's side. As the vehicle accelerated, Guyette was dragged by it and, had he not let go, he would have struck a parked car.

The defendant drove away and was not apprehended until March 7, 1997. At that time, his jacket, which had a bullet hole under the left sleeve and to the rear, was seized. A spent bullet seized from the defendant's trouser pocket was determined to be the bullet that was fired from Guyette's weapon. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

I

The defendant's first claim is that the court improperly failed to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the count of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-49⁶ and 53a-59 (a) (1)⁷ because the state failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally sought to cause serious physical injury to Guyette. In essence, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. We disagree.

The standards by which we review claims of insufficient evidence are well established. "When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, our courts apply a two-prong test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perry, 48 Conn. App. 193, 196, 709 A.2d 564, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 931, 711 A.2d 729 (1998).

"It is within the province of the jury to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the facts proven.... The jury may draw reasonable inferences based on other inferences drawn from the evidence presented.... Our review is a fact based inquiry limited to determining whether the inferences drawn by the jury are so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable.... We note that the probative force of the evidence is not diminished because it consists, in whole or in part, of circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence.... It has been repeatedly stated that there is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force is concerned. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.... [T]he inquiry into whether the record evidence would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence... established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In doing so, we keep in mind that [w]e have not had the jury's opportunity to observe the conduct, demeanor, and attitude of the witnesses and to gauge their credibility." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Radzvilowicz, 47 Conn. App. 1, 17-18, 703 A.2d 767, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 955, 704 A.2d 806 (1997).

"Intent is generally proven by circumstantial evidence `because direct evidence of the accused's state of mind is rarely available.' State v. Greenfield, [228 Conn. 62, 77, 634 A.2d 879 (1993).] Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct; id., 76; and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom." State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 126, 646 A.2d 169 (1994). "It is axiomatic that a factfinder may infer an intent to cause serious physical injury from circumstantial evidence such as the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events leading up to and immediately following the incident." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Commerford, 30 Conn. App. 26, 34, 618 A.2d 574, cert. denied, 225 Conn. 903, 621 A.2d 285 (1993).

The substance of the defendant's argument is that he could not be convicted of attempt to commit assault in the first degree because Guyette did not suffer a serious physical injury.⁸ The state did not charge the defendant with causing Guyette serious physical injury, but rather, charged him with the attempt to cause such injury. The issue for the jury was whether the defendant attempted to inflict a serious physical injury. On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that the jury could have found that the attempted assault occurred when the defendant drove the van at Guyette and attempted to run him over, when he dragged Guyette through the intersection or when he drove toward the parked car while Guyette was holding onto the handle of the driver's door. Driving the van directly at Guyette would have caused serious physical injury if Guyette had not been able to jump on the hood of the van to avoid being sandwiched between it and a police vehicle. Guyette also rolled away from the van when the defendant attempted to drive the van into a parked car. The defendant cannot benefit from Guyette's own actions in minimizing his injuries. "We afford great deference to findings of fact consistent with guilt unless they are improbable and unconvincing." State v. Wolff, 29 Conn. App. 524, 529, 616 A.2d 1143 (1992). We conclude that after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

II

In his second claim, the defendant asserts that the court improperly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt when it stated: "While the state of Connecticut does not desire the conviction of any innocent person, also it does not wish to have a guilty person acquitted. It is the sworn duty of the jury, if and when the evidence presented overcomes the presumption of innocence and proves the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, to enforce the law and render a verdict of guilty." In support of his claim, the defendant cites United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 533 (2d Cir. 1997),...