State v. Maday

Decision Date05 April 2017
Docket NumberNo. 2015AP366-CR,2015AP366-CR
Citation2017 WI 28
PartiesState of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Stanley J. Maday, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

ATTORNEYS:

For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause was argued by Thomas Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief(s) was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.

For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief and oral argument by Megan Sanders-Drazen, assistant state public defender.

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed.

¶1 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. We review an unpublished, per curiam decision of the court of appeals that reversed the Columbia County circuit court's1 judgment of conviction taken against Stanley J. Maday Jr. ("Maday") and which granted Maday a new trial. State v. Maday, No. 2015AP366-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).

¶2 On January 15, 2013, following a jury trial, Maday was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual assault of achild. Maday moved for postconviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because: (1) his counsel failed to object to two questions the prosecutor asked Catherine Gainey ("Gainey"), the social worker who conducted a cognitive graphic interview with the child victim in this case, and (2) his counsel should not have withdrawn an objection to the introduction of evidence about Maday's job-related training in the use of weapons and the use of force.

¶3 We hold that Gainey's testimony about the absence of indications during the cognitive graphic interview, either that K.L. had been coached or that K.L. was being dishonest, does not violate the Haseltine2 rule, and is therefore admissible. We so hold for three reasons. First, Gainey's testimony was limited to her observations of indications of coaching and dishonesty. Second, by limiting her testimony to indications of coaching and dishonesty, Gainey did not provide a subjective opinion as to K.L.'s truthfulness. Third, testimony, such as Gainey's, may assist the jury. Accordingly, we conclude that Maday's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Gainey's testimony and counsel's performance was therefore not deficient.

¶4 Furthermore, we conclude Maday's counsel was not ineffective for withdrawing his objection to the introduction of evidence of Maday's job-related training in the use of weaponsand the use of force because Maday was not prejudiced by that testimony.

¶5 The decision of the court of appeals is, therefore, reversed.

¶6 We begin our analysis with a brief factual background and procedural history. We then turn to a discussion of forensic interview techniques, the Haseltine rule, and the application of the Haseltine rule to Gainey's testimony in this case. After concluding Gainey's testimony does not violate the Haseltine rule, we address Maday's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶7 In November 2011, the mother of eleven-year-old K.L. found a letter authored by K.L. that described how Maday sexually assaulted K.L. on three occasions. In the letter, K.L. described how, when she slept over at her friend's house, Maday (her friend's father) put his hands in her pants, placed his fingers in her vagina, and slipped his hands under her bra to feel her breasts. After finding this letter, K.L.'s mother reported Maday to the police. Due to the fact that K.L. was eleven years old, the police arranged to have K.L.'s allegations assessed by means of a forensic interview with a social worker. The social worker, Gainey, interviewed K.L. about her allegations. Gainey conducted the interview using a type of forensic interview technique called a cognitive graphic interview.

¶8 For his part, Maday denied K.L.'s allegations, and pled not guilty to three counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b)3 and § 948.02(1)(e).4 The case proceeded to trial by jury.

¶9 The trial began with the prosecutor calling K.L. to the stand. Crying, K.L. read to the jury the letter she wrote to her mother:

Dear Mom, I'm scared to tell you in person so I wrote this letter. Stan has been sexually harassing me while I'm asleep. I wake up to him either sticking his hand down my shirt and bra or down my pants and underwear. I don't do anything because I'm afraid he will hurt me. He's done this three times now. He did it Friday night. He stuck his hand down my pants and started rubbing there, and then he stuck his finger in my vagina. Then he also stuck his hand down my shirt and my bra, grabbed my boob. I was moving and was moving it around. I know I should have told you the first time this happened, but I was too scared. He's done it three times now, and I want it to stop now if I file papers against him or take him to court. Sincerely, [K.L.]

At trial, K.L. explained the letter she wrote to her mother by further describing the sexual assaults. K.L. testified about one of the assaults: "I remember in the middle of the night that I woke up to Stan touching me and the T.V. being on and [my friend] still being next to me sleeping." She also describedhow, on another occasion, she awoke on the top bunk in her friend's bedroom to Maday touching her.

¶10 K.L. testified that she did not open her eyes during these assaults until she knew Maday had left the room "[b]ecause I figured if he knew I was awake, he would end up hurting me." Only during the second assault did K.L. say she opened her eyes, but only briefly, lest Maday realize he woke her up. K.L. also described how, on at least one occasion, Maday placed his finger in her vagina.

¶11 During his cross-examination of K.L., Maday's counsel played portions of K.L.'s videotaped cognitive graphic interview with Gainey for the purpose of showing the jury the inconsistencies—the precise number of fingers Maday inserted into her vagina and the exact dates of the assaults—between K.L.'s trial testimony and what K.L. told Gainey during the cognitive graphic interview. K.L. testified that the inconsistencies were the result of her "remembering new things" from being forced to think about what happened to her.

¶12 The State subsequently called K.L.'s mother, and she testified that, when she returned home from work one day, she found the letter that K.L. had written on her bed. She testified that after finding the letter she went to K.L.'s room where she woke up K.L. to talk about the letter. K.L.'s mother testified that "[K.L.] was having a hard time talking" and that "[s]he was crying, shaking, scared," and "hysterical." It was at this point, K.L.'s mother said, that she alerted the police.

¶13 As part of the defense's case-in-chief, Maday's counsel called Gainey to testify about the cognitive graphic interview she conducted with K.L. Gainey described the type of forensic interview technique, the cognitive graphic interview, that she uses when interviewing children about their sexual assault allegations and how it is "a rather highly structured interview." She testified that she was "specially trained" in using the cognitive graphic interview "to not conduct leading interviews of children"; that she has conducted about fifty of these types of interviews; and that she has "had experiences in the past where children have been essentially prompted by an adult to give a certain type of answer during this interview" but that, by using the cognitive graphic interview, such prompting "become[s] apparent."

¶14 Gainey also described how a cognitive graphic interview is designed to minimize the risk of false allegations by, among other things, avoiding leading questions and "mak[ing] sure there is consistency between what they are telling [the interviewer] or have told other people." The point, according to Gainey, is to use the cognitive graphic interview to minimize the risk that a child's allegations are a result of coaching by another and to determine if the child fully understands the difference between truth and lies, along with the consequences of lying.

¶15 Gainey testified that, when done correctly, the interviewer in a cognitive graphic interview uses open-ended questions to let the child introduce information into theconversation and express what happened in his or her own words. The interviewer also engages in a "truth-lie" discussion in order to determine if the child adequately understands the difference between the concepts of truth and lies, the importance of telling the truth, and the consequences of lying. At the end of an interview using "the proper interview technique," it "become[s] apparent" if a child has "been essentially prompted by an adult to give a certain type of answer." In short, the cognitive graphic interview technique "is a way to insure that a child who has been coached does not continue with the false allegations."

¶16 As it specifically pertains to the truth-lie discussion she had during her interview with K.L., Gainey testified, "We reviewed what's called the children's oath. It's, you know, do you promise to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and the child at that point states typically yes. In this case, [K.L.] did . . . ." Gainey also recounted that "[K.L.] said somebody could get into trouble such as going to jail when asked if there are consequences for when people lie. And then she promised to tell the truth after that."

¶17 After Gainey testified about the cognitive graphic interview technique, her experience with it, and specifics of her interview with K.L., the prosecutor asked Gainey the following questions that are now at issue and that give rise to the first part of Maday's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel:

[Prosecutor:] Was there any indication that [K.L.] had been coached in any way during her interview?
[Ga
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