State v. Maddox
| Decision Date | 29 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 27455-8-II.,27455-8-II. |
| Citation | 116 Wash. App. 796,67 P.3d 1135,116 Wn. App. 796 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Christopher Dorian MADDOX, Appellant. |
Leann Shill Larson, Attorney at Law, Vancouver, WA, for Respondent.
Steven Whitman Thayer, Attorney at Law, Vancouver, WA, for Appellant.
Christopher Dorian Maddox was convicted of two counts of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He contends on appeal that the police unlawfully searched his home. We affirm.
On or before September 15, 2000, an informant told the police that he had purchased methamphetamine from Maddox at least 35 times in the past four years, typically in "quantities up to four ounces[.]"1 The record does not show whether those purchases occurred at Maddox's home.
On September 15, the informant arranged a controlled buy at Maddox's house. The informant was searched by officers, furnished with cash, and watched until he entered the house. He emerged a few minutes later with methamphetamine. He related that he had bought the methamphetamine from Maddox and that Maddox had said he might be able to buy more if he "would bring back `cash.'"2
On September 18, 2000, Detective Mary Parsons applied for a warrant to search Maddox's house. She described the September 15 controlled buy and related that the informant had successfully made two other controlled buys. She stated that public or law enforcement records showed that Maddox owned the house in question, that Maddox was the registered owner of a car parked in the driveway of the house, and that Maddox had a 1998 felony drug conviction. She related that the informant could identify methamphetamine, that the informant was "working with law enforcement in exchange for a favorable recommendation on pending felony drug charges[,]"3 and that the informant was wanted on a DUI warrant that was being held in abeyance at police request.
On September 18, 2000, at 4:06 p.m., the search warrant was issued by a magistrate. It authorized a search of the house for methamphetamine; paraphernalia used for packaging, weighing, and distributing methamphetamine; and currency, books, and records.4 In accordance with CrR 2.3(c), it required that the search occur "within 10 days[.]"5
The police did not serve the search warrant immediately. Instead, they had the informant conduct two more controlled buys at Maddox's house.
The first post-warrant buy took place on September 21, 2000. The informant was again searched by officers to insure he did not have drugs on his person. He was given $600, told to buy half an ounce of methamphetamine, and watched until he entered Maddox's house. He emerged a few minutes later with a full ounce of methamphetamine. He explained that Maddox had prepackaged his methamphetamine in full-ounce packets and would not sell part of a packet. Maddox had "fronted" the additional half-ounce for which the informant had not had money, so the informant now owed Maddox a "debt."6
The second post-warrant buy occurred on September 27, 2000. Once again, the informant was searched to insure he did not have drugs on his person. He was instructed "to buy more [m]ethamphetamine if he could[,]" and also "to pay the `debt' from ... September 21, 2000."7 He was furnished with $1,000 in identifiable bills and watched until he entered Maddox's house. He emerged a few minutes later without methamphetamine and with only $280 in cash. He said that he had used $720 to pay "debts" he owed to Maddox, and that Maddox had claimed to be "out of [m]ethamphetamine" for "a couple days."8
On September 28, 2000, at 2:45 p.m., the police served the warrant they had been holding since September 18. They found and seized 881.6 grams of marijuana and 45 ecstasy pills, but no methamphetamine. They found and seized an electronic scale, $2,100 in cash (including the $720 furnished to the informant on September 27), and "misc[ellaneous] papers."9 The "papers" were not offered in the trial court and are not included (or even described) in the record on appeal.
On November 16, 2000, the State charged Maddox with two counts of delivery of methamphetamine (Counts I and II), possession with intent to deliver marijuana (Count III), and possession with intent to deliver ecstasy (Count IV).10 Later, the State added a school-zone enhancement to each count.
In March 2001, Maddox moved to sever Counts I and II from Counts III and IV. The motion was granted, and Counts I and II were tried to a jury later that month. The jury acquitted on both.
Meanwhile, Maddox moved to suppress the marijuana underlying Count III and the ecstasy underlying Count IV. He also waived a jury on Counts III and IV. In June 2001, the trial court denied his motion to suppress, convened a bench trial on stipulated facts, and convicted him on Counts III and IV. He now appeals those convictions, contending that the search of his home was unlawful.
Maddox claims that the warrant was not lawfully issued on September 18. This is true, he says, because (A) there was no probable cause to believe that methamphetamine would be found in his home; (B) there was no probable cause to believe that evidence of methamphetamine dealing would be found in his home; and (C) the warrant purported to authorize a search for books and records not related to methamphetamine dealing, and thus was "overbroad."
As just indicated, Maddox claims that there was no probable cause to believe methamphetamine would be found in his home. To determine whether there was probable cause, we must examine whether the facts presented to the magistrate were sufficient to support a reasonable inference that methamphetamine would probably be found in Maddox's home.11
According to Parsons' affidavit, the informant claimed to have bought methamphetamine from Maddox, in amounts up to four ounces, on at least 35 prior occasions over the past four years.12 On September 15, the informant claimed to have bought methamphetamine from Maddox in Maddox's house, and to have been told Maddox might have more if the informant returned with cash. The informant had a "track record" sufficient to support an inference of veracity because he had previously conducted two successful controlled buys.13 The police corroborated the September 15 transaction by searching the informant before he went into the house, watching him as he entered and returned, and searching him afterward. The police corroborated other facts through public or law enforcement records (i.e., that Maddox owned the house and the car parked in the driveway, and that Maddox had a prior felony conviction for drugs). Given both the informant's "track record"14 and independent corroboration by the police, the magistrate had discretion to credit the informant's assertions; to find that Maddox probably had methamphetamine in his house; and to issue a warrant for the house on September 18.
Relying on State v. Thein,15 Maddox claims that Parsons' affidavit "does not establish probable cause to believe that any evidence of methamphetamine dealing would be found inside [his] residence."16 We disagree. Parsons' affidavit showed (1) that the informant had bought methamphetamine from Maddox many times over the past four years, and (2) that on September 15, just three days earlier, the informant had bought methamphetamine from Maddox at Maddox's house. If the magistrate chose to believe those facts, as he obviously did, he could reasonably infer that Maddox was currently dealing methamphetamine out of his home; and if the magistrate could infer that much, he could also infer that Maddox had evidence of such dealing in his home.
Maddox's reliance on Thein is misplaced. The question in Thein was whether a magistrate could reasonably infer, from the fact that a person was dealing drugs from a location other than his or her home, the additional fact that the person probably had drugs or evidence of drug dealing in his or her home.17 The question here is whether a magistrate can reasonably infer, from the fact that a person is dealing drugs from his or her home, the additional fact that the person probably has drugs or evidence of drug dealing in his or her home. The answer to the first question is no, but the answer to the second question is yes. When the magistrate issued the warrant on September 18, there was probable cause to believe Maddox had evidence of methamphetamine dealing in his home.
Maddox claims that the search warrant for his home was overbroad and thus "invalid[] in its entirety."18 The State argues that the warrant was not overbroad or, if the warrant was overbroad, that "the severability doctrine" operates to save its valid parts.19 We address overbreadth first and severability second.
A warrant can be "overbroad" either because it fails to describe with particularity items for which probable cause exists,20 or because it describes, particularly or otherwise, items for which probable cause does not exist.21 Regardless of which reason is claimed, the warrant must be read "in a commonsense, practical manner, rather than in a hypertechnical sense[,]"22 "keeping in mind the circumstances of the case[.]"23 The warrant in this case authorized the police to search for a number of items that were supported by probable cause and described with particularity. Such items included methamphetamine; paraphernalia used for weighing, packaging, and distributing methamphetamine (including scales and baggies); and records indicating methamphetamine distribution and its profits (including books, notebooks, ledgers, check book ledgers, handwritten notes, journals, calendars, and receipts related to methamphetamine distribution).24 At the same time, however, the warrant authorized the police to search for many items for which there was no probable cause whatever: books and records showing "the identity of co-conspirators"; photographs of...
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