State v. Maddux
| Decision Date | 09 October 1978 |
| Citation | 571 S.W.2d 819 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee v. Ronald MADDUX and Ruby Wanda Gibson Maddux. In re Petition of Robert T. BYRD, III. 571 S.W.2d 819 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
E. E. Edwards, III, Nashville, Jerry H. Summers, Chattanooga, for petitioner, Robert T. Byrd, III.
Brooks McLemore, Jr., Atty. Gen., Robert A. Grunow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for respondent, State of Tennessee.
We granted certiorari in this case to consider a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed, with modifications, an order of the Criminal Court of Bradley County adjudging the petitioner to be in contempt. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse, and dismiss.
This controversy arose in connection with the criminal case, of State v. Ruby Wanda Gibson Maddux. The petitioner, Byrd, is an attorney practicing in Bradley County, where the Maddux case originated. He also is the state senator from the district which includes Bradley County. The petitioner was appointed by the trial judge to represent Mrs. Maddux. Upon learning of his appointment, the petitioner immediately moved that he be relieved, giving as the reasons for his request certain alleged conflicts of interest, as well as his personal prejudice against the defendant and his prejudgment of the case. The trial judge denied the motion. Some two weeks later the petitioner renewed his motion to be relieved as counsel for the defendant. During the course of the discussion, the trial judge questioned the petitioner concerning several out-of-court statements. In those statements the petitioner allegedly had stated that he believed his appointment had been politically motivated, and he had discussed reducing the trial judge's district so as to remove Bradley County from it. After learning from the petitioner that he had not as yet worked on the case, and after a further assertion by the petitioner that he did not feel able to represent the defendant, the trial judge summarily held the petitioner in contempt. 1 When the cause came before the Court of Criminal Appeals, that court, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but reduced the punishment imposed. 2
In so far as is material to this petition, there are two species of contempt, direct and indirect, which differ, among other ways, in the minimal procedures that will satisfy the requirements of due process in the case of each. Direct contempt is based upon acts committed in the presence of the court, and may be punished summarily. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888). Cf. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974). Indirect contempt is based upon acts not committed in the presence of the court, and may be punished only after the offender has been given notice, and the opportunity to respond to the charges at a hearing. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 29 L.Ed.2d 423 (1971); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925). See generally, Am.Jur.2d Contempt, §§ 6-7, 88. With respect to these criteria, an act not committed in the presence of the court is treated as indirect contempt even though the act may be admitted by the offender in open court. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925).
With the exception of the petitioner's supposed refusal to accept appointment in this case, which will be discussed below, the acts which prompted the citation for contempt did not take place in the presence of the court, and constituted indirect contempt. The petitioner had neither notice of nor a hearing on the charges stemming from these alleged out-of-court acts. As a result, under the rule set forth above, the petitioner's conviction may not be predicated on those acts and, if it is to stand, must rest upon some other ground.
The sole remaining ground relied upon by the trial judge in his order citing the petitioner for contempt was the petitioner's refusal to accept appointment in the cause. Upon consideration of the record, we can find no material evidence to support this finding by the trial judge. To the contrary, the record shows rather that the petitioner did accept the appointment. Although the record shows as well that, up to the time that he was cited for contempt, the petitioner devoted most, if not all, of his efforts to seeking to be relieved of...
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