State v. Magers, 54816
| Decision Date | 13 April 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 54816,54816,1 |
| Citation | 452 S.W.2d 198 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Richard MAGERS, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Peter H. Ruger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
R. M. Gifford, Green City, for appellant.
WELBORN, Commissioner.
Appeal from sentence and judgment of six years' imprisonment, imposed under Second Offender Act, after jury found appellant, Richard Magers, guilty of receiving stolen property.
On October 29, 1967, Kathryn Ray parked her 1965 Chevrolet Bel-Air sedan on the parking lot at her place of employment in Centerville, Iowa. When she came out, the vehicle was missing.
In December, 1967, James H. Grubb, Jr., the son-in-law of Mrs. Ray and a student at Northeast Missouri State College in Kirksville, saw an auto in a filling station at Kirksville which he believed was Mrs. Ray's Chevrolet. When he saw the car, it was stripped, with the hood, fenders, transmission and motor missing, as well as the front door on the driver's side. Grubb had driven the vehicle before it was stolen. From examination of a chrome trim which he had repaired, he identified the vehicle as that of Mrs. Ray.
David Gerstley, the operator of the service station where Grubb found the vehicle, needed a new motor for his wrecker. He went to John Middleton's body shop and arranged to purchase for $150 the motor from Mrs. Ray's auto. Payment was by way of credit on a $200 account owed Gerstley by Middleton. The motor was to be removed and delivered to Gerstley. A few days later, Gerstley stopped by Middleton's body shop and talked to defendant, Richard Magers, and an otherwise unidentified 'Russell' and inquired whether they had removed the motor. They had not done so. Gerstley needed the motor badly so Magers and Middleton brought the entire vehicle to Gerstley's station, where he removed the motor.
Ray Bratton, operator of a body shop in Kirksville, had previously purchased the front end off a 1965 Chevrolet from Magers for $300. The color was the same as that of Mrs. Ray's automobile. According to Bratton, the front end came from an auto of the same body style as Mrs. Ray's. The vehicle also had a 283 cubic inch engine, as did Mrs. Ray's, indicated by numerals on the fender.
Mrs. Ray's auto had been driven somewhat more than 20,000 miles. It had received no significant collision damage. No evidence of collision damage appeared on the portion of the car at the Gerstley station or on the front end assembly purchased by Bratton.
At the trial, the state adduced evidence substantially as set out above. No evidence was offered on behalf of the appellant. His sole contention on this appeal is that the evidence adduced did not warrant the submission to the jury of the issue of his guilt of the offense, defined by § 560.270, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., of receiving stolen property knowing the same to have been stolen.
Although the main thrust of appellant's argument is directed at what he asserts is inadequate proof of his knowledge that the vehicle with which he dealt was stolen and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Webb
...to say he has received it from another.' (Emphasis added.) Accord: State v. McAnulty, 491 S.W.2d 259 (Mo.1973); State v. Magers, 452 S.W.2d 198 (Mo.1970); State v. Goffstein, 342 Mo. 499, 116 S.W.2d 65 (1938); State v. Coppersmith, 231 Mo.App. 711, 105 S.W.2d 991 (1937); and State v. Willne......
-
State v. Hayes
...that the possessor is guilty of the offense of receiving stolen property from another under § 560.270, RSMo 1969. State v. Magers, 452 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Mo.1970)." State v. Johnson, 580 S.W.2d 254, 259 (Mo. banc Missouri decisions have held that the guilty knowledge, required in a case of re......
-
State v. Montgomery, 10981
...590 S.W.2d 418 (Mo.App.1979) (No. 11150, So.Dist.). To similar effect see State v. Inman, supra, 578 S.W.2d at 338(5); State v. Magers, 452 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Mo.1970). One cannot at the same time be a principal in the larceny and in the legal sense a receiver of stolen property. State v. Inm......
-
State v. Davis, 61988.
...that defendant was the receiver rather than the taker of stolen property.1 State v. Delay, 455 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo.1970); State v. Magers, 452 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Mo. 1970); State v. Miller, 433 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Mo.1968). While an unexplained possession of recently stolen property can give rise to......