State v. Magnuson, 960378

• Decision Date: 02 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 960378,960378
• Citation: 571 N.W.2d 642,1997 ND 228
• Parties: STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Troy J. MAGNUSON, Defendant and Appellant. Criminal
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 642

571 N.W.2d 642

1997 ND 228

STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Troy J. MAGNUSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Criminal No. 960378.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Dec. 2, 1997.

Mark R. Boening, Assistant State's Attorney, Fargo, for plaintiff and appellee.

Leslie Johnson Aldrich, of Johnson Law Office, Fargo, for defendant and appellant.

SANDSTROM, Justice.

¶1 Troy Magnuson appealed from a conviction entered upon a guilty plea to the charge of murder. We hold Magnuson was competent to proceed and assist his defense when he pled guilty and his voluntary guilty plea waived his right to assert the defense of lack of criminal responsibility for the crime. We also hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Magnuson. We affirm.

I

¶2 Magnuson was charged with murder under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1)(a) and (b) for the May 1996 death of Alex Vondal. In June 1996, Magnuson filed a notice of intent to assert the defense of lack of criminal responsibility. The trial court ordered Magnuson committed to the North Dakota State Hospital for an evaluation of his fitness to assist his defense and his mental competency when the crime occurred. A July 1996 evaluation by Dennis Kottke of the State Hospital concluded (1) Magnuson was able to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense, and (2) he did not lack substantial capacity to comprehend the harmful nature or consequences of his conduct when the act occurred, and his conduct was not the result of a serious distortion of his ability to recognize reality.

¶3 In September 1996, Magnuson informed the court he wanted to plead guilty to the charge. At a September 27 hearing, Magnuson, against the advice of counsel, pled guilty to murder. The court ordered a presentence investigation.

¶4 At a sentencing hearing on November 27, 1996, the court questioned Magnuson's mental competency and proposed a hearing to address his competency when the crime was committed and his present ability to assist his defense. The State objected to the proposed inquiry about Magnuson's competency when the crime occurred. After further discussion and a brief recess, the court ruled Magnuson's September 27 guilty plea was not voluntary and vacated it. The judge then recused himself.

¶5 A different judge was assigned to the case, and trial was scheduled for December 27, 1996. Magnuson's counsel then informed the court Magnuson wanted to proceed with his guilty plea. At a December 5, 1996 hearing, Magnuson informed the court he wanted to plead guilty to the charge. The court accepted Magnuson's guilty plea to the class AA felony charge of murder. The State recommended sentencing Magnuson to 40 years in prison with 10 years suspended. The court sentenced Magnuson to 50 years in prison.

¶6 On December 11, 1996, a criminal judgment was entered, and Magnuson moved to reduce his sentence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35. On December 12, 1996, Magnuson appealed the court's "finding that the plea was made voluntary, and that the Defendant was competent at the time of the crime and competent at the time of the plea. The Defendant also appeals the sentence of December 5, 1996, as unduly harsh."

¶7 The trial court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. Magnuson's appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(b), and this Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. Art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 29-28-06(2) to review an appeal by a defendant from a judgment of conviction. We construe notices of appeal liberally. See State v. Clark, 1997 ND 199, p 5, 570 N.W.2d 195; State v. Himmerick, 499 N.W.2d 568, 570-71 (N.D.1993); Kaiser v. State, 417 N.W.2d 175, 177 (N.D.1987). We treat Magnuson's appeal as an appeal from the judgment, and we therefore have jurisdiction to hear his appeal. ¹

II

¶8 Relying on City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789 (N.D.1989), Magnuson argues the trial court erred in not deciding whether he competently, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the defense of lack of criminal responsibility.

¶9 In Nassif at 797, the defendant and his counsel signed a formal withdrawal of the defense of lack of criminal responsibility two days before trial. A jury thereafter found the defendant guilty of disorderly conduct. This Court held the trial court erred in failing to inquire of the defendant to insure he had competently, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the defense of lack of criminal responsibility. Nassif at 798. Because the record did not show the defendant had competently, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the defense, this Court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings on the waiver issue. Nassif at 798.

¶10 Here, Magnuson initially filed a notice of intent to assert the defense of lack of criminal responsibility, but he subsequently pled guilty to murder. A defendant's voluntary guilty plea generally waives constitutional, procedural, and statutory defenses to the charge. See State v. Olson, 544 N.W.2d 144, 145-46 (N.D.1996); State v. Gilley, 289 N.W.2d 238, 240 (N.D.1980); State v. Barlow, 193 N.W.2d 455, 457 (N.D.1971). See also N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) ("a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion"); N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(4) ("by pleading guilty the defendant waives the right to a trial by jury").

¶11 An incompetent criminal defendant cannot enter a valid guilty plea. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2685, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). In Godinez, 509 U.S. at 390, 113 S.Ct. at 2682, the United States Supreme Court held the standard for deciding competency of a criminal defendant to enter a guilty plea is the same competency standard for standing trial. The Court said if a defendant of doubtful competency wants to plead guilty, a trial court must first decide whether the defendant is competent and then must satisfy itself the guilty plea is voluntary. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400, 113 S.Ct. at 2687.

¶12 Although Magnuson postures his argument in terms of a waiver of the defense of lack of criminal responsibility for the crime, his argument is more appropriately framed in terms of his mental competency when he entered the guilty plea. Nassif is not controlling because if Magnuson was competent when he pled guilty and he voluntarily pled guilty, he waived his right to raise the defense of lack of criminal responsibility when the act occurred.

A

¶13 Sections 12.1-04-04 through 12.1-04-08, N.D.C.C., outline our standards and procedures for deciding competency to stand trial. Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-04, "[n]o person who, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against the person or to assist in the person's own defense shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures." See State v. Van Natta, 506 N.W.2d 63, 65 (N.D.1993) (outlining standards for competency). "Whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed, the court may order the detention of the defendant for the purpose of an examination by a psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist." N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-06. "The report of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist must be given in writing to the court, ... [and i]f the findings of the report are contested, the court shall hold a[n evidentiary] hearing prior to deciding whether the defendant currently lacks fitness to proceed or currently lacks ability to effectively communicate with counsel." N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-07.

¶14 Here, after Magnuson filed a notice of intent to assert the defense of lack of criminal responsibility, the court ordered him committed to the State Hospital for an examination under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-06. A July 1996 evaluation by Dennis Kottke, a psychiatrist and medical director at the State Hospital, concluded Magnuson understood the proceedings against him and was fit to assist in his own defense and communicate effectively with counsel. When the court accepted Magnuson's guilty plea at the December 5, 1996 hearing, neither the State nor Magnuson's counsel disputed Magnuson's current competency. The State introduced a December 1996 letter from Kottke which said Magnuson had been returned to the State Hospital in November 1996 for reevaluation. Kottke's letter said Magnuson's current mental condition was no different than outlined in the State Hospital's July evaluation. Magnuson introduced a December 1996 report from Colette Kuznia, a licensed therapist. Kuznia reported she had seen Magnuson in June, July, November and December 1996, and noted a profound improvement in him after he began taking medication. Kuznia reported no serious concerns about Magnuson's present mental competency.

¶15 Although Magnuson's counsel questioned Magnuson's mental competency when the crime occurred, counsel did not dispute Magnuson was competent when he entered the guilty plea. Magnuson did not present any evidence to the trial court which suggested he was not competent when he pled guilty. Compare Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384, 86 S.Ct. 836, 841, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (throughout proceedings counsel insisted defendant's competency to stand trial was at issue); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb.App. 776, 551 N.W.2d 742, 746 (1996) (medical evaluation said defendant not competent to stand trial). The opinions of Kottke and Kuznia about Magnuson's present competency and the State Hospital's previous evaluation were not contested, and an evidentiary hearing was not necessary under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-07 to decide the issue of Magnuson's competency to plead guilty. See State v. Storbakken, 246 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D.1976) (based on record before trial court, there was no "reason to doubt" the defendant's competency). We hold Magnuson was competent when he pled guilty.

B

¶16 Magnuson argues the trial court erred in...