State v. Maia
Decision Date | 11 November 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 15623,15623 |
Citation | 243 Conn. 242,703 A.2d 98 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Eric MAIA. |
Louis S. Avitabile, Special Public Defender, for petitioner (defendant).
Mitchell S. Brody, Asst. State's Atty., for respondent (State).
Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.
We agree with the petitioner that the Appellate Court erroneously concluded that this court, in State v. Altrui, 188 Conn. 161, 448 A.2d 837 (1982), rejected a claim that, under the state constitution, a criminal defendant has "automatic standing" to challenge the legality of a police search. In Altrui, we considered the defendant's claim of automatic standing in the context of a federal constitutional challenge to the search. Whether the state constitution embraces the principle of automatic standing remains an open question. See State v. Hill, 237 Conn. 81, 97 n. 23, 675 A.2d 866 (1996) (). Because the issue is an important one; see id., at 98 n. 23, 675 A.2d 866 (); we ordinarily would have granted certification on the question of whether a defendant had automatic standing under the state constitution to contest an allegedly illegal search. In this case, however, it is clear that the defendant, Eric Maia, was not a tenant of the searched premises and had no reason to be there other than to use it as a sanctuary from the police. In such circumstances, it is apparent that the defendant would not be entitled to suppression of the seized narcotics even if we were to conclude that the state constitution does, in fact, embody the doctrine of automatic standing.
The defendant's petition for certification is denied.
Before the trial court, at a hearing to suppress evidence of drugs found on or near his person, the defendant, Eric Maia, argued that when the police pursued him beyond the closed door of an enclosed porch common to two apartments, 1 he had standing to contest that he was seized in violation of article first, § 7, of the state constitution. 2 In other words, the defendant claimed that, under the state constitution, he is entitled to automatic standing. "Under the rule of automatic standing, a defendant may seek to suppress evidence as the fruit of an illegal search if he or she was legitimately on the invaded premises or has been charged with an offense of which possession of the seized item is an element." State v. Hill, 237 Conn. 81, 107, 675 A.2d 866 (1996) (Norcott, J., dissenting). Although the automatic standing doctrine was originally embraced under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264, 80 S.Ct. 725, 732-33, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); it was subsequently abandoned in favor of the more restrictive "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) ( ); 3 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 89-95, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2551-55, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) ( ). Nevertheless, the federal constitution merely sets the floor for constitutional rights below which the states cannot go under their state constitutions. State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 160, 579 A.2d 58 (1990). "We have also, however, determined in some instances that the protections afforded to the citizens of this state by our own constitution go beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).
The Appellate Court in this case refused to review the claim of the defendant that the state constitution requires automatic standing under the mistaken belief that this court had previously decided the issue in State v. Altrui, 188 Conn. 161, 179 n. 6, 448 A.2d 837 (1982), State v. Maia, 45 Conn.App. 679, 685 n. 4, 697 A.2d 707 (1997). The court in Altrui, however, relied on United States v. Salvucci, supra, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, which involved standing under the federal constitution. Indeed, as pointed out by Justice Norcott in his dissent in our recent case of State v. Hill, supra, 237 Conn. at 107, 675 A.2d 866, "we have not yet addressed the question whether the doctrine of automatic standing is incorporated" under the state constitution.
The automatic standing doctrine has been adopted by several states under their state constitutions. See Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 600, 550 N.E.2d 121 (1990) ( ); State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 901 P.2d 61, 69 (1995) (). State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 228, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981) ( ); Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 67-68, 470 A.2d 457 (1983) (); State v. Wood, 148 Vt. 479, 489, 536 A.2d 902 (1987) ( ); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 180, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) ( ); see also State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202, 1204-05 (La.1984) ( ); State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214, 218, 447 A.2d 1284 (1982) ( ).
The reasoning of these courts is persuasive. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court pointed out that "[a]dherence to the vague 'legitimate expectation of privacy' standard, subject as it is to the potential for inconsistent and capricious application, will in many instances produce results contrary to commonly held and accepted expectations of privacy." State v. Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 226, 440 A.2d 1311. Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opined that the "United States Supreme Court's current use of the 'legitimate expectation of privacy' concept needlessly detracts from the critical element of unreasonable governmental intrusion." Commonwealth v. Sell, supra, 504 Pa. at 66-67, 470 A.2d 457. Finally, the Vermont Supreme Court has concluded that the reasonable expectation of privacy test curtails the "function of the judiciary by focusing on the defendant's ability to present a challenge rather than on the challenge itself, and by unduly limiting the class of defendants who may invoke the right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures." State v. Wood, supra, 148 Vt. at 489, 536 A.2d 902.
Furthermore, even after Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, and United States v. Salvucci, supra, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, this court questioned the wisdom of abandoning the automatic standing doctrine in State v. Conger, 183 Conn. 386, 439 A.2d 381 (1981). 4
I would grant the defendant's petition for certification on the following issue: Under the state constitution, should the court adopt the rule of automatic standing?
Accordingly, I dissent. 5
1 The trial court believed that, in order to establish standing to challenge the warrantless entry into the building and the seizure of the defendant (as well as the subsequent seizure of the drugs), it was required to find that the defendant had a "property interest" in the premises. The trial court specifically found that the police officer ...
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