State v. Malm

• Decision Date: 05 June 1956
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Robert N. MALM. Petition of Antoinette M. MONTANO. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 276

123 A.2d 276

143 Conn. 462

STATE of Connecticut v. Robert N. MALM.

Petition of Antoinette M. MONTANO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 5, 1956.

Cornelius D. Shea, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were Robert R. Potter and Sidney Greenberg, Hartford, for appellant (petitioner).

Albert S. Bill, State's Atty., Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Douglass B. Wright, Asst. State's Atty., Hartford, for appellee (state).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.

BALDWIN, Associate Justice.

The petitioner, hereinafter called the plaintiff, brought a motion to the Superior Court under § 8268 of the General Statutes claiming a reward offered by the governor in the matter of State v. Malm, 142 Conn. 113, 111 A.2d 685. Her motion was denied and she has appealed. The question is whether she fulfilled the terms of the offer for the reward.

On December 10, 1953, the body of Irene Fiederowicz was discovered in the rear yard of a dwelling house in the southwestern part of Hartford. She had been strangled by a scarf tied around her neck, and it was suspected that she had been criminally assaulted. The plaintiff read the account of the murder in 'The Hartford Times' late in the afternoon of December 10. She had been criminally assaulted on November 22, 1953, and her assailant had not been apprehended. She was impressed by the similarity of the circumstances in the Fiederowicz case and her own. The next day, December 11, she communicated with the police and furnished information concerning her assailant which placed Malm under suspicion. He was taken into custody on December 12 and was identified by the plaintiff as the one who had assaulted her. On December 13, after questioning by the police, Malm confessed to the assault on the plaintiff. On December 14, the governor caused to be published an offer of reward in the Fiederowicz case 'to the person or persons who shall give information leading to the arrest and conviction' of the guilty person. On December 15, Malm confessed to the murder of Irene Fiederowicz. Prior to the offer of the reward, the plaintiff had furnished to the police all the information within her possession and Malm had been taken into custody. The trial court concluded that she had failed to comply with the terms of the offer of reward.

Section 8269 of the General Statutes authorizes the governor, when any crime punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison has been committed, to offer publicly, upon application of the state's attorney in the county wherein the crime was committed, 'a reward not exceeding three thousand dollars, to the person who shall give information leading to the arrest and conviction of the guilty person * * *, which reward shall be paid to the informer by the state, by order of the court before which such conviction is had.' In Atwood v. Buckingham, 78 Conn. 423, 428, 62 A. 616, 618, we said that a statute authorizing the offer of a reward 'contain[s] the conditions of a contract.' See also In the Matter of Kelly, 39 Conn. 159, 162. Section 8269, by its express terms, empowers the governor to make an offer of a reward. So long as this offer continues in force it can be accepted only by compliance with its terms. This concept of an offer of a reward as an offer to enter into a contractual relationship which can be accepted by the performance of an act or series of acts is the one which has been generally accepted by the courts. Campbell v. Mercer, 108 Ga. 103, 107, 33 S.E. 871; Kinn v. First National Bank, 118 Wis. 537, 542, 95 N.W. 969; Henderson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Tex.Com.App., 298 S.W. 404, 406; McClaughry v. King, C.C., 147 F. 463, 464; Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73, 76, 23 L.Ed. 697; 46 Am.Jur. 113, § 14.

There is a divergence of view on whether the performance must be with knowledge of the offer in mind, or in other words whether the person claiming the reward must act in response to the offer. 1 Corbin, Contracts, pp. 181, 218; 1 Williston, Contracts (Rev.Ed.) p. 85 § 33, p. 88 § 33a. Where the offer has been made by an agency of the government, some courts have subscribed to the proposition that knowledge of the offer and action based upon it are essential to recovery. Glover v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 77 A.2d 788, 790; 1 Corbin, op. cit., p. 181 & n. 15; Restatement, 1 Contracts § 53. Others have taken the position that such an offer is in effect a grant and that the ordinary rules of contract do not apply. Smith v. State, 38 Nev. 477, 480, 151 P. 512, L.R.A.1916A, 1276; 1 Corbin, op. cit., p. 182 & n. 16. The application of any general rule as decisive of a particular case is not altogether satisfactory. Of necessity, much depends upon the peculiar terms of the offer and the facts of each individual case. For example, in MacFarlane v. Bloch, 59 Or. 1, 3, 115 P. 1056, the published offer was "Lost--Pocketbook. Return to county judge's office; $100.00 reward." The court held that even though the pocketbook was found before the offer of reward was published, the return of the pocketbook entitled the plaintiff to the reward. Similarly, in cases where the public authorities have offered a reward for information leading to the apprehension and conviction of a criminal, some courts have held that even though the performance was begun before knowledge of the reward and completed afterwards, the person rendering the performance was entitled to recover. Coffey v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W. 575, 18 Ky.Law Rep. 646; Genesee County v. Pailthorpe, 246 Mich. 356, 359, 224 N.W. 418; Smith v. Vernon County, 188 Mo. 501, 514, 87 S.W. 949, 70 L.R.A....