State v. Malott

Decision Date10 January 1991
Docket NumberNo. 2,CA-CR,2
Citation169 Ariz. 518,821 P.2d 179
PartiesThe STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Davies MALOTT, Jr., Appellant. 90-0013.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals
OPINION

HOWARD, Judge.

Appellant was indicted on one count each of second-degree burglary, attempted sexual assault and public sexual indecency, and two counts of public sexual indecency to a minor under the age of 15. The state also filed an allegation of prior convictions and an allegation that the offenses were committed while appellant was on probation. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the three public sexual indecency charges and acquitted on the remaining counts. 1 The jury also found the allegation of prior convictions to be true, and the trial court found that the offenses were committed while appellant was on probation. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent five-years terms on convictions for public sexual indecency to a minor, to run consecutively to the sentences imposed on prior convictions. He was also sentenced to six months in the Pima County Jail on the public sexual indecency conviction.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 692 P.2d 272 (1984), the facts are as follows. The adult victim ("P.") and her two minor children lived in one-half of a duplex in Tucson; the other half was occupied by a couple who were friends of appellant. On May 15, 1988, P. met appellant at the neighbors' home as the neighbors were getting ready to go to a party. Appellant invited P. to accompany them, but she declined. P. testified that her children were discussed with appellant. Before leaving, appellant told P. that if she were up after the party, he would come back to her house, but she declined and told him she would be in bed.

P.'s home has only one bedroom. She testified that, although she normally slept on the sofa bed in the living room, on that night she had slept in the bedroom with her children. She further testified that she had locked all the doors before retiring. In the middle of the night, she was awakened by the touch of hands on her back and buttocks. She awoke to find appellant standing naked in the room. When P. asked him what he was doing there, he responded that she had left the door open for him and he wanted to get into bed with her. He then grabbed her face and began licking it. She pushed him away and told him to leave. Instead, he stood there masturbating and told P. that he wanted her to "jerk him off." He further tried to persuade her to have intercourse with him, but she refused and insisted that he leave. After 10 to 15 minutes, he finally left the room. After a few minutes, she went out to the kitchen and found him getting dressed. P. threatened him with a baseball bat and appellant left. After inspecting the premises, she discovered that he had entered by forcing open a window. P. testified that she did not believe that her children had awakened while appellant was present in the house.

On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict as to the charges of public sexual indecency to a minor on the grounds that there was no evidence that the two children awoke and saw appellant and there was insufficient evidence to support a finding as to the mens rea of recklessness. We disagree and affirm.

A.R.S. § 13-1403 provides in pertinent part:

A. A person commits public sexual indecency by intentionally or knowingly engaging in any of the following acts, if another person is present, and the defendant is reckless about whether such other person, as a reasonable person, would be offended or alarmed by the act:

1. An act of sexual contact.

* * * * * *

B. A person commits public sexual indecency to a minor if he intentionally or knowingly engages in any of the acts listed in subsection A and...

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3 cases
  • Rebilas v. Mukasey
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • November 2, 2007
    ...was upheld to see if any of these convictions were based on conduct that would not violate the federal generic crime. Arizona v. Malott, 169 Ariz. 518, 821 P.2d 179 (1991) falls in that First, under ARS § 13-1403(B), the minor involved does not need to be touched, nor does the minor even ne......
  • State v. Jannamon
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • September 12, 1991
    ...A.R.S. § 13-1403(A) proscribes the activities described when performed "in the presence or view of others...." In State v. Malott, 169 Ariz. 518, 821 P.2d 179 (App.1991), Division Two of this court noted that the court in Hamilton used the words "presence" and "view" in the disjunctive to d......
  • Shepherd v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
    • September 1, 2015
    ...Ariz. 97, 98, 244 P.3d 101, 102 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Jannamon, 169 Ariz. 435, 819 P.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Malott, 169 Ariz. 518, 821 P.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Whitaker, 164 Ariz. 359, 793 P.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1990). Comparing the elements of the Texas and Arizona sta......

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