State v. Manatau

• Decision Date: 07 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 20100908.,20100908.
• Citation: 322 P.3d 739,755 Utah Adv. Rep. 33
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Afuhia MANATAU, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

322 P.3d 739

755 Utah Adv. Rep. 33

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Afuhia MANATAU, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20100908.

Supreme Court of Utah.

March 7, 2014.

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Jeanne B. Inouye, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Lori J. Seppi, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

Justice DURHAM authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice NEHRING, Justice PARRISH, and Justice LEE joined.

Justice DURHAM, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 In this appeal, we address whether the trial court erred by denying defendant Afuhia Manatau's motion to dismiss the charges against him on double jeopardy grounds. We specifically address whether the double jeopardy clause of the Utah Constitution barred Mr. Manatau's retrial when a trial judge declared a mistrial without establishing legal necessity to do so. We conclude that the burden to create a record for and sufficiently justify the mistrial fell on the trial court and the State, not the defendant. We further conclude that legal necessity was not established on the record and hold that Utah's constitutional protections against double jeopardy prohibited Mr. Manatau's retrial.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On May 24, 2009, Mr. Manatau beat his wife in their apartment and pursued her as she fled to two different apartments in their neighborhood. At the third apartment, Mr. Manatau threw a baby gate through a window into the residence, spraying shattered glass on the apartment's occupants, and persisted in pounding on the front door until shortly before the police arrived.

¶ 3 The State charged Mr. Manatau with various crimes, including aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, burglary, criminal mischief, and reckless endangerment. Mr. Manatau's case went to trial on March 2, 2010. Prior to jury selection, bailiffs discovered a pocket knife in the pocket of a suit jacket Mr. Manatau's wife had brought for him to wear in court. Mrs. Manatau claimed she borrowed the suit jacket from her brother and was unaware that he had left a pocket knife he used for Boy Scout activities in the pocket. Because of security concerns caused by this incident, the trial judge excluded Mrs. Manatau from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial.¹ Thereafter the jury was selected, empaneled, and sworn, and the trial proceeded.

¶ 4 On the second day of trial, after several witnesses had testified and the trial judge had ruled on several objections, Mrs. Manatau's attorney asked the court to allow her to reenter the courtroom to observe the proceedings against her husband. Mrs. Manatau'sattorney argued that courtroom security could be maintained if Mrs. Manatau were subjected to a search before entering the courtroom and if a bailiff sat next to her. The State opposed the request, arguing that Mrs. Manatau had attempted to smuggle a knife to her violent husband, was wearing an ankle monitor for unspecified charges against her, and had attempted to intimidate witnesses against her husband. After hearing argument, the judge ruled that Mrs. Manatau could reenter the courtroom if additional security measures were followed. The judge then took a recess.

¶ 5 Following the recess, the trial judge announced sua sponte that she was recusing herself and declaring a mistrial. The judge explained that during the recess she had had an opportunity to reflect on the knife incident, and had concluded that it was affecting her more than she had previously thought. The judge announced that her prior rulings in the case were not biased, but stated that in anticipation of future rulings, she had decided to recuse herself:

[I]n an abundance of caution and to avoid any question of either impropriety or biased decision-making on my part, I am actually going to call a mistrial and recuse myself from the case. As you can probably tell, I'm feeling quite emotional about this, and I think just for the benefit ... of the state, and all of the witnesses in this case, I think it's best that I recuse myself from this case. So I am going to call a mistrial and we'll have the case assigned to a different judge.

¶ 6 Both defense counsel and the prosecutor objected to the mistrial. Defense counsel objected on double jeopardy grounds. The judge overruled these objections, stating that in a mistrial case, “jeopardy doesn't attach and so we can go forward with a new jury.”

¶ 7 The case was reassigned for retrial under a new judge. At the retrial, Mr. Manatau moved to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds of double jeopardy. Mr. Manatau argued that because jeopardy had attached when the first jury was empaneled, the mistrial acted as an acquittal. The trial court denied this motion, ruling that the mistrial did not act as an acquittal because the mistrial was legally necessary. At the conclusion of the second trial, Mr. Manatau was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, burglary, criminal mischief, and four counts of reckless endangerment. Mr. Manatau appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 In this case, we review the rulings of two separate trial courts. First, we review the second trial court's (Judge Reese's) ruling that Mr. Manatau's retrial was not barred on double jeopardy grounds. We afford no deference to the trial court's double jeopardy ruling because the trial judge was in “no better position than this court to determine the necessity of a mistrial.” State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 21, 104 P.3d 1250. Second, we review the initial trial court's (Judge Christiansen's) sua sponte order declaring a mistrial to determine whether the mistrial was legally necessary. If a court articulates on the record a factual basis for its determination that a new trial is legally necessary, we review that court's determination for abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 29. Absent record findings, however, we independently assess whether the mistrial was legally necessary. Id. ¶ 30.

ANALYSIS

I. UTAH'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE

¶ 9 In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury has been sworn and empaneled. State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979). Declaring a mistrial after jeopardy has attached automatically invokes the double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. V (“nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”); Utah Const. art. I, § 12 (“nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense”). The declaration of a mistrial before a verdict is entered, as a general rule, operates as an acquittal. State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 24, 104 P.3d 1250;State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 74 P.2d 696, 697–98 (1937).

¶ 10 Once a mistrial has been declared, a retrial may proceed without offendingUtah's constitutional double jeopardy provision only if one of two exceptions applies: (1) the defendant consents to the mistrial or (2) there is “legal necessity” for the mistrial.²Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 24, 104 P.3d 1250. If, as in this case, the defendant has not consented to the mistrial legal necessity is established only if a mistrial is the “only reasonable alternative to insure justice under the circumstances.” Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 358. In order to show that a mistrial is the only reasonable alternative, two elements must be met.

¶ 11 First, the trial judge has a duty to carefully evaluate the circumstances of the particular case and determine that legal necessity requires the discharge of the jury. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 27, 104 P.3d 1250;Whitman, 74 P.2d at 697–98. As part of that inquiry, the judge must “afford the parties adequate opportunity to object to the declaration of a mistrial.” Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 27, 104 P.3d 1250. The judge also must consider possible alternatives to terminating the proceeding and determine that none of the proposed alternatives are reasonable. Id.

¶ 12 While the trial judge must ultimately bear the burden of making the determination that none of the alternatives are reasonable, “the prosecutor must shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar.” Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant, however, does not bear a burden to show a mistrial is legally necessary if the defendant objects to the mistrial. As we noted in Ambrose, a defendant may often have many “valid personal reasons to prefer going ahead with the trial”; the burden is placed on the trial judge to “avoid depriving the defendant of his constitutionally protected freedom of choice in the name of a paternalistic concern for his welfare.” Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 13 Second, the trial court must establish a record of the factual basis for its conclusion that a mistrial is necessary, as well as the reasons why there is no reasonable alternative under the circumstances. Id. If a trial court makes these findings on the record, we afford substantial deference to its determination that legal necessity warrants a mistrial. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 29, 104 P.3d 1250. In the absence of an adequate record, however, the mistrial will operate as an acquittal if we are unable to find a readily apparent factual basis for the mistrial on the face of the record. Id. ¶ 30. Additionally, if the trial court fails to articulate why no reasonable alternatives existed, “the mistrial will operate as an acquittal if we find, based on our own independent assessment, that one or more of the proposed alternatives presented to the trial judge was reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. Absent an adequate record, we resolve uncertainties as to the existence of legal necessity in favor of the defendant. W. Valley City v. Patten, 1999 UT App 149, ¶¶ 13, 15, 981 P.2d 420.

¶ 14 There are sound reasons for strongly encouraging trial judges to consider all of the alternatives before subjecting a defendant to a second trial. The Supreme Court in United States v. Perez stated that a judge...