State v. Manhattan Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1925
• Docket Number: No. 36730.,36730.
• Citation: 199 Iowa 1213,203 N.W. 301
• Parties: STATE v. MANHATTAN OIL CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

199 Iowa 1213

203 N.W. 301

STATE

v.MANHATTAN OIL CO.

No. 36730.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 8, 1925.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; W. G. Bonner, Judge.

The defendant, Manhattan Oil Company, was indicted by the grand jury of Polk county, Iowa, for a violation of chapter 97, Acts 40th Gen. Assem., as amended by Acts Ex. Sess. 40th Gen. Assem. c. 2. The indictment in substance charged the defendant with the crime of operating a motor vehicle on the public highways of the state of Iowa without a certificate from the board of railroad commissioners, in that on the 16th day of August, 1924, the defendant willfully and unlawfully operated a motor vehicle upon the public highways outside of the limits of any municipality for the purpose of delivering in quantities greater than five gallons, gasoline, oils, and oil products, to J. M. Reed, without first obtaining a certificate from the board of railroad commissioners of Iowa as provided by statute. On a plea of not guilty, the cause was tried to a jury. At the close of all the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The motion was sustained, and a verdict of not guilty, upon direction of the court, was returned by the jury. The state of Iowa appeals from a judgment entered. Affirmed.Ben J. Gibson, Atty. Gen., Maxwell A. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Vernon R. Seeburger, Co. Atty., of Des Moines, for the State.

Carr, Cox, Evans & Riley, of Des Moines, for appellee.

DE GRAFF, J.

The facts in this case are not in dispute, and show beyond any controversy that the defendant, Manhattan Oil Company, is an Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in Des Moines, Iowa; that it is engaged in the sale of petroleum products; that in making its sales the defendant company delivers the products without any specific delivery charge, from its principal place of business in Des Moines to the surrounding territory, by motor trucks that are owned and operated by the defendant; that J. M. Reed was a customer of the defendant company and purchased petroleum products from the defendant on numerous dates prior to August 16, 1924, and on said date purchased from said defendant 150 gallons of gasoline, 50 gallons of coal oil, and 10 gallons of lubricating oil; that this merchandise was delivered to him by the defendant in a motor truck driven by one of the employees of the defendant; and that said merchandise was transported over the public highways of the state from the principal place of business of the defendant to the place of business operated by Mr. Reed in Grimes, Iowa. No claim is made that the defendant had secured a certificate or filed application therefor with the board of railroad commissioners, as provided by chapter 97, Acts 40th Gen. Assem., as amended by Acts Ex. Sess. 40th Gen. Assem. c. 2, nor had it paid any taxes to the county treasurer of Polk county as provided under the provisions of said chapter. These are the salient facts introduced upon the trial of the cause.

Appellee presents on this appeal numerous specifications to sustain the correctness of the ruling of the trial court in directing a verdict for the defendant. One of these grounds is controlling: That chapter 97 of the Acts of the 40th General Assembly of Iowa with the amendments thereto, for an alleged violation of which the instant indictment is predicated, is unconstitutional and void and in violation of and repugnant to the Constitution of the state of Iowa, particularly section 29 of article III of said Constitution, in that the act embraces more than one subject, and that the subjects embraced in the act are not expressed in the title thereof.

[1] Does the act embrace more than one subject, and are the subjects embraced in the act, if more than one is embraced, not expressed in the title thereof? It is a constitutional requirement in this state that every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. Constitution of Iowa, article 3, § 29. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the title and the subject-matter of the act in question. The title reads:

“An act providing for the supervision and regulation of persons either natural or artificial engaged in the transportation of persons or property for hire over the public highways of the state by motor vehicles and conferring certain jurisdiction over such persons and such vehicles upon the board of railroad commissioners of the state; also providing for the enforcement of this act and for the punishment of violation thereof.”

Paragraph B of section 1 of the act provides:

“The term ‘motor carrier’ when used in this act means any person, firm or corporation, lessee, trustee or receiver, operating any motor vehicles with or without trailers attached, upon any public highway for the transportation of passengers or property for compensation, between fixed termini or over a regular route even though there may be periodic or irregular departures from said termini or route, or for delivering oils, goods or merchandise other than farm products in the vicinity of and from a distributing point except such motor carriers operating solely within the limits of a municipality.

Provided that the provisions of this section shall not be so construed as to apply to resident retail merchants who deliver goods and merchandise, other than oils, or oil products, in quantities of five gallons or less, in pursuance of bona fide sales to residents outside the limits of cities and towns and special charter cities or to any vehicle used in collecting dairy products from the...